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NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Lukanov Ready To Head Government, Form Coalition

AU2006185990 Sofia BTA in English 1807 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Andrey Lukanov Thinks it is Possible That He Heads New Government"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 20 Jun (BTA)—Andrey Lukanov will head the new government only if he gets such proposal by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the other parties. "I would engage myself only if the political parties consultations make this necessary and possible. If I could facilitate the formation of a coalition government with my absence from such kind of government, then this is no problem for me," the prime minister said.

Payments of installments of Bulgaria's debt to the private banks- creditors should be renewed after 1993 and the country will continue to pay the interests on the debt. The wish of the Bulgarian side was met with understanding at the former negotiations with creditors in Frankfurt and Sofia, according to Lukanov. He expressed hopes that at the new round of negotiations starting in London things will be brought to a mutually acceptable solution.

The prime minister spoke about the substantial improvement of the country's current currency balance which is improved by 700 million dollars at the end of last and during this year, and a result of the initiatives for economies. He said that the production decline has stopped and in June an economic growth of more than 7 percent is expected compared to May. Lukanov noted the existence of greater interest towards Bulgaria on behalf of Western business circles. This interest was shown right after the elections, but it is still early to draw conclusions.

According to him, the priorities of the economic reform, which are inevitable for any future government are: strengthening of the lev by neutralization of immense reserves of "hot money" and the further stabilizing of the lev compared to the dollar, until reaching a real rate of Bulgarian national currency, privatization in trade, services, tourism and industry. The prime minister spoke of his intention to meet with Valentin Mollov, head of the Union for Economic Initiatives of the Citizens, and to discuss with him the union proposal for provision of 100,000 workplaces as a result of the developing private initiative.

According to Lukanov the BSP agrarian platform and the draft law on the land, proposed by the Socialists, which offers possibility to buy up to 30 hectares of land, were the major reasons which ensured the peasants' support and, to a great extent the BSP election success.

Lukanov said that there is no "Macedonian minority" in Bulgaria. He characterized the activity of Ilinden, which is an organization that does not exist in a juridical sense of the word, as "openly separatist" and said that it is backed by the inadmissible support of foreign forces.

The Bulgarian premier has stressed that in front of his Yugoslavian counterpart Ante Markovic during their recent meeting in Nis. Lukanov marked with satisfaction the similarity of opinions regarding the worrisome trend for "revival of nationalisms" in the Balkans and recalled Markovic's words that the Balkan states would strive towards "Europization of the Balkans and not towards Balkanization of Europe."

The prime minister said that there are no unconstitutional or illegal aims in the program documents of Ahmed Dogan's Movement for Rights and Freedoms. This organization, however , like another, should have to prove by its future practical activity its intentions to observe its program aims.

Election Reaction Continues; Officials Comment

BSP's Lilov Interviewed

AU2006152590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, by DUMA correspondent Valeri Zapryanov in Sofia on 14 June: "Aleksandur Lilov: We Are A Serious Party"]

[Text] After satisfying the curiosity of the Bulgarian and foreign journalists at the press conference at the People's Palace of Culture, Aleksandur Lilov was kind enough to answer two additional questions from DUMA.

[Zapryanov] The elections are continuing. Would you like to say something to the Bulgarian voters?

[Lilov] I would like to point out that we categorically reject the attempts during the second round to scare voters. Our people are not cowards. The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] also is not a coward. One should know that the tactics of fear and intimidation is not the one that wins elections. It is not democratic election tactics. Therefore we appeal to the Bulgarian voters: vote for peace, security, and radical and democratic changes. Do not give in to the fear syndrome! Vote according to your conscience! Democracy will win peacefully in Bulgaria and nobody can stop this process.

[Zapryanov] The opposition reproached us that we are not happy, and that this was "obvious" in our surprise with the results. Is this really so?

[Lilov] This is an irresponsible, if not stupid claim. The only thing I can say is that they will have the opportunity to see how the BSP and the Bulgarian people rejoice at their election victory after the second round of the elections. We are a serious party and do not want to do this already after the first round. I do not think that blocking the streets by minors is an expression of a serious attitude toward an election victory or failure. We shall react as a serious party, which thinks about the people. Democracy still is a frail flower that needs care rather than noisy celebrations.

Finally, I would like to inform the opposition that we shall celebrate on 18 June!

Trade Union Statement

AU2006154290 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 15 Jun 90 p 1

["Statement" of the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions; place and date not given]

[Text] In connection with the tension that has emerged in many settlements, and the information received by CIBTU [Confederation of Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions] that the actions organized by the various groups and movements violate the normal pace of life and create an uneasy atmosphere on the eve of the second round of the elections, the CIBTU Executive Committee has issued the following statement:

The basic political forces in Bulgaria demonstrated keen political maturity and implemented their civil and political duty in recognizing the legality of the first round of the elections. This position also coincides with the opinion expressed by the numerous foreign guests. Thus the election of the Grand National Assembly marks the beginning of a process of real democratic changes not only in the political life of the country, but also in its economic and social life.

The CIBTU Executive Committee fully supports the idea that Bulgaria's further democratic development requires that the total honesty of the elections be proved, both generally and in the individual polling stations and constituencies. The CIBTU Executive Committee demands that all reports about manipulating and rigging the elections be carefully examined, and that these reports be immediately processed and that they be discussed at the first session of the Grand National Assembly. The result of the investigation and the discussion by the Grand National Assembly must be subjected to a great deal of publicity and glasnost.

The Executive Committee again appeals to all CIBTU members and all Bulgarian citizens to keep calm not only until the second round of the elections, but also until the Grand National Assembly, which has the right and duty to state its opinion on the elections in Bulgaria, convenes.

Kyuranov on Results, Opposition

AU2006193090 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Jun 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Chavdar Kyuranov, member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council Presidium, by Boris Latta in Sofia; date not given: "The People Must Decide, Not the Party"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Latta] How do you evaluate the course of the elections and the results which your political party has achieved?

[Kyuranov] I have no doubts of a BSP victory. My conviction is based, first and foremost, on long-term sociological research during the preelection campaign. I have visited several electoral districts in the country and have spoken with voters. The majority of them expressed their support for our party. Therefore, I am not surprised by the BSP's success in the first round and I believe that we will be equally successful on 17 June.

[Latta] Can you explain how it is that the BSP has every chance of becoming the strongest political force in the country following these elections?

[Kyuranov] Several factors play an important role in this. First, in contrast to the parties in Central and East Europe, we have maintained our own structure. The party's renewal, however, did not begin today or yesterday, but began at the 14th BSP Congress (while it was still the Bulgarian Communist Party). It has been proven that the road of democratic socialism is the correct one. Second, we abolished the activity of party organizations in workplaces. These were steps which were accompanied by many structural problems. Third, support for our party is due to the fact that the BSP's ideas were always productive ones close to the hearts of broad sectors of the population.

[Latta] Has the BSP noted a "shift" in the membership base?

[Kyuranov] Yes, it is possible to talk about a "shift," but not about the kind that had been envisaged. Approximately 40,000 people have left the party's ranks; however, during the past two months alone, we have accepted 20,000 new members. These are primarily young people and women. When asked what led them toward taking this step, the majority replied that they wanted to help the party at a time when it found itself in a difficult situation.

[Latta] The opposition is making no secret of the fact that after a BSP election victory there will be a "weak" government and a "strong" opposition. This would seem to discount the possibility of forming a coalition with the BSP. How do you see future developments on the political scene?

[Kyuranov] I admit that the opposition will not enter into a coalition with us. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], as well as other political alliances among the opposition, place their own party interests above society's interests. However, I feel that in this situation the point of view expressed by broad sectors of the population is important and not the opposition's point of view. For example, our political opponents "argue" that if we win Bulgaria will not receive economic aid from the West. We make no secret of the fact that economic orientation to date has been one-sided. The BSP is in favor of balance in this sphere. However, in no way can we weaken our economic ties with the Soviet Union.

[Latta] However, let us return to the problem of a "weak" government and a "strong" opposition.

[Kyuranov] I do not think that anything like this will arise following the elections. I believe—and development has clearly indicated this so far—that the BSP will win an absolute majority and will have more than 200 seats in parliament out of the overall total of 400. Incidentally, we could even get by without a coalition. After all, people who are politically independent, but who are specialists, can become members of the government. There are many of them. A certain disagreement within the framework of the opposition alliance will continue even after the elections. We know very well what the arguments are about. Last, but not least, it is impossible to leave out the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Today its representatives rejected a coalition with us, however, in the future all sorts of things may change....

[Latta] The SDS is creating a great deal of fuss over the activity of the West German INFAS [public opinion polling] company. Are these protests by the opposition justified?

[Kyuranov] If the INFAS forecasts were in the SDS's favor, the opposition would certainly be speaking about this company in superlatives. The fact that its popularity has slumped is a shock for many people in the SDS. However, we do not derive any pleasure out of other people's troubles. Therefore, we evaluate this situation as a penalty on the inexperience of a relatively young opposition. Perhaps the SDS's mistake was that it persuaded itself of a sweeping victory. However, it will definitely extricate itself from this situation. We are not shutting it out. If, however, the opposition decides to embark on a road of organizing various destructive activities, such as—for example—a form of civil disobedience, this will cause great difficulties. I believe that such activity should only be organized in conjuction with existing, valid laws.

[Latta] In conclusion, I would like to ask what the difference is between the BSP and SDS political programs?

[Kyuranov] First, as opposed to our political opponents, we reject the so-called shock therapy in the economy. We are in favor of a market economy which we want to work toward gradually and in stages. During the first stage, before the end of the year, we will complete a lot of work towards establishing a legal basis for the market economy. During the second stage, from 1991 to 1995, we will deal with the problem of the three types of ownership as well as with the issues associated with privatization. During the third stage, up to the end of this century, we are reckoning with the normal existence of a market economy. We envisage that the state will control approximately 25 percent of it. Second, as opposed to the opposition alliance, we have a well conceived social program. The SDS made a mistake in this particular area when it underestimated the importance of the population's social needs. The opposition oriented itself toward monetarist principles and these, in essence, limit the development of a social program or even cut it out altogether. Third, contrary to the SDS, we see Bulgarian society's future in the broad cooperation of all political parties and movements.

Elections' Integrity Continues To Be Scrutinized

CEC Announcement on 'Violations'

AU2006144390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] I shall acquaint you with the full text of the announcement of the Central Election Commission [CEC] concerning all complaints and reports addressed to it concerning irregularities during elections for the Grand National Assembly:

In connection with the elections many complaints, requests, reports, and proposals were sent directly or as a copy to the CEC. They can be classified into two groups:

The first group relates to the necessity of adopting measures in connection with irregularities in organizing and preparing the elections.

The second group relates to complaints and tip-offs in connection with the conduct of voting during the election days—10 and 17 June.

Regarding the irregularities, proposals, and measures of the first group, the CEC decided that those are issues that are within its purvey. The complaints relate to issues such as the failure to include representatives of all basic political forces in some regional and section election commissions; complaints of irregularities in composing the voters' lists; complaints related to refusal to register candidates; complaints concerning the printing of ballots and the transparency of the envelopes; measures related to preventing double voting; measures related to ensuring the truthfulness of the protocols; ensuring necessary leave for the members of the election commission, so that they could perform their tasks; determining the status of the foreign guests and the representatives of the Association on Honest Election and the Civic Initiative for Democratic and Free Elections.

In all cases of incomplete composition of the regional and section election commissions, the CEC has immediately ordered the executive committees of the oblast and municipal people's councils to include in the commissions the appropriate number of representatives of the basic political forces, on the basis of Article 26 of the Grand National Assembly Election Law. In this context, the Central Election Commission has not received complaints that its instructions have not been implemented.

To overcome the shortcomings in preparing the voters' list, such as unlisted voters, double listing, listing voters who do not live in the relevant constituency, and so forth, the CEC energetically demanded that new voters' lists be prepared on the basis of the citizens' complaints and requests to correct the lists, and it adopted the roundtable decision to include the uniform citizens' [identification] number in the lists. This makes it possible to prevent double voting on the part of the citizens. Those decisions of the CEC were implemented.

In connection with the proposals to use ink in identifying the name of the voter and thus preventing double voting, the Central Election Commission adopted a more appropriate means, namely, marking the personal passport of the citizen upon voting in the two rounds.

To ensure the truthfulness of the protocols and prevent the inclusion of corrections, the CEC decided that both the representatives of the parties and the representatives of the movements for honest elections are entitled the third copy of the CEC protocol. Appropriate instructions related to this matter have been issued.

After establishing that a part of the voting envelopes really are transparent, the CEC demanded of the Council of Ministers that opaque envelopes be prepared and used to replace the transparent ones. Only in two regions—Sliven and Burgas—was this demand not fully implemented.

The second category includes complaints and reports related to irregularities and violations of the law during the elections held on 10 and 17 June. The CEC has received 1,138 complaints and reports. These relate primarily to cases of: tearing posters and canvassing during election day—532; cases of violating the secrecy of voting by using transparent envelopes—63; cases of violations in the voting of soldiers, including sending them on leave during election day—53; voting with a permit in a different constituency—one complaint which came from Pleven and was related to the first round; irregular voting in a different constituency—15; cases of influencing illiterate, barely literate, and uninformed people—26; irregular actions of the representatives—11; manipulating the voters by abusing power and official posts and by other means—112; voting with a permit issued by the municipal people's council rather than with personal passports—one complaint; others—200.

Materials related to the regularities of the elections were also included in the protocols of the section and regional election commissions, among them were written objections and special opinions of the Commission's members. Such cases were not included in the total number of violations, because all protocols of the commissions have been placed in a special room of the National Assembly, to which nobody, including the members of the CEC, has access. Because of the exceptional importance of those documents, they will be submitted to the Grand National Assembly.

All protocols of the elections commissions have been received by the CEC by its members authorized to transfer the protocols, and according to the order established by the CEC. The composition of the protocols at the section election commissions—more than 12,500, and the regional election commissions, 228—and their transportation to the CEC continued until 12 June. This was an objective obstacle to quickly computing and announcing the results of the first round. During the second round, the people's councils sharply improved their work related to transporting the documents, and the protocols were received by noon of 18 June.

The CEC announced the results of the elections on the afternoon of the same day. From a total of 228 protocols of the regional election commissions and 12,600 protocols of section election commissions, about 10 percent were signed with a special opinion expressed by one or two members, while in some of them the signatures of one or two Commission members are missing.

There are several cases in which the protocols include three to four special opinions. One protocol includes seven special opinions, and on 17 June a second round was conducted in the relevant constituency.

All other protocols were signed unanimously by all members of the commissions without any special opinions. On the basis of Article 74 of the Constitution and Article 78 of the Grand National Assembly Law, only the Grand National Assembly is capable of investigating all the complaints of election violations. Therefore, the CEC adopted a decision, which is an integral part of the decision on announcing the election results, and according to which all complaints and reports received by the Commission, and the violations noted in the election protocols, must be submitted to the Commission on Verifying the Elections at the Grand National Assembly.

As of today, the CEC discontinues receipt of complaints and reports related to election violations. On the basis of Article 77 of the Grand National Assembly Election Law, complaints and reports related to election violations must be addressed directly to the Grand National Assembly. The term for this is two weeks from the day of announcing the election results.

Lilov Receives European Delegation

AU2006201690 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Jun 90 p 2

[Maksim Bozhilov report: "Bulgaria Is Advancing Along the Path of Democracy, European Deputies Think"]

[Text] Sofia, 16 Jun—It is our goal to convince ourselves from our own point of view that elections in Bulgaria are fair and democratic, without paying particular attention to the results. We highly appreciate the fact that Bulgaria is advancing along the path of democracy, and we are convinced up to this very moment, that despite criticism and some technical shortcomings, the general spirit of fair and free elections has been observed.

This is the impression of a delegation from the Council of Europe which attends the second round of the elections and which was submitted at today's meeting by members of the delegation to Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council.

The guests manifested their great interest in the conclusions of the Bulgarian Socialists from the first round of the elections, in their evaluation of the country's political situation, and in their program of overcoming the economic and ecological crisis which is affecting Bulgaria. Aleksandur Lilov stressed the importance which the BSP attaches to the presence of foreign guests during the Grand National Assembly elections. We would like to hold free, fair, and democratic elections because only such elections are capable of building up the solid foundations of democracy in Bulgaria, Aleksandur Lilov pointed out. Democracy in Bulgaria is still young and needs the objective assessment of foreign observers who should confirm that the elections were really free and fair.

The guests stressed the importance which the Council of Europe attaches to the way in which elections are proceeding in Bulgaria as a preliminary condition for our country's integration in the numerous European, democratic institutions.

Foreign Assessments Questioned

AU2006203690 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 19 Jun 90 p 3

[Borislav Kosturkov article: "Should We Reproach the Foreign Observers?"]

[Excerpts] In the flood of well-founded suspicions and doubts concerning the fairness of the elections (especially the first round), the foreign guest observers also "got it in the neck." Undoubtedly they have to bear the responsibility for their assessments, which varied within a narrow range from moderate criticism to fulsome praises, with phrases like "victory of democracy," "great step forward," "very good technical organization," and so on. However, how far can we criticize them for their sometimes ingenuous reactions? [passage omitted]

Could even the most conscientious observers and most inquisitive journalists, who only arrived just before the elections, know of the "preparatory artillery bombardment" by the party which had ruled for decades, and which was skilled at using state funds for its own benefit. Could they have known of the "sweetened" ballot papers distributed around the villages, i.e. accompanied by a bag of sugar, which has become a scarce commodity in Bulgaria, once a sugar producer? Could the foreigners have witnessed the distribution of the "laundered" ballot papers (accompanied by a packet of "Vero" detergent, also in short supply)? Could they have seen the new tarmac surfaces of the previously neglected village streets? Could they see the ballot paper "bonds" (in an envelope with one or more 10 leva banknotes)? Of course they could not! [passage omitted]

However, we should not forget that almost all the guest observers and journalists stressed the shortage of political experience, alongside the lack of democratic traditions. They considered that this was the reason for the ruling party's success in the so-called electioneering, that is, attempting to persuade people to vote for them. However, would it be possible for a British Conservative to canvass for the votes of the farmers and pensioners on the grounds that the Labor Party, if elected, would take away their pensions? Of course not! The farmers and pensioners are well aware that they have a legal right to their pensions, as an inalienable social perquisite. Yet how can the Bulgarian peasants and pensioners fail to be gullible, when for four decades not only has private property not been inviolable, but also every law and decree may be altered? What a shock for them was this term "shock therapy!" The pensioners have plenty of time to wait in queues for everything under the sun, and they form 25 percent of the population.

Do not blame the foreign observers. From a bird's-eye viewpoint you cannot see everything that is hidden, and because of good breeding you cannot say everything that you have seen. Moreover, we were lacking in experience. These were not the first free and democratic elections in Bulgaria, but they were the first elections of any kind in Bulgaria for 44 years. Previously we did not choose, because there was no alternative, but merely recorded our votes.

Foreign Election Figures

AU2006202490 Sofia BTA in English 1918 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Opinion About Elections in Bulgaria"—BTA headline]

[Text] Brussels, 20 Jun (BTA correspondent)—Mr Frans Andriessen, deputy-chairman of the Commission of the European Community, responsible for its foreign relations, trade policy and relations with the European countries, said there were no reasons to doubt that parliamentary elections in Bulgaria were properly held. He answered a BTA correspondent question saying that it now depends on the political groups for Bulgaria to choose which line to pursue after the elections. He said he always thought Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov would strive towards the establishment of a broad coalition and seeking of national consensus for solving the problems. He didn't however want to give advice to the political forces in Bulgaria about their actions.

London, 20 Jun (BTA correspondent)—According to the British guests at the second round of the elections there were no complaints in Bulgaria about things which could be seen in Great Britain during a competition between almost equal forces. According to Michael Stern no comparison could be drawn between Bulgaria and Romania, as the opposition in Bulgaria is much more efficient. The Socialist Party is popular as it is related with stability but if it doesn't observe its promises it will not be able to survive.

The British M.P.s [members of parliament] expressed their good impressions from the way in which elections were held in the constituencies with Turkish speaking people and Gypsies in southeastern Bulgaria.

Ankara, 20 Jun (BTA)—Hassan Korkmazdjan [as received], chairman of the Union of Turkish Parliamentarians sent Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms a letter of congratulations which says that the winning of 23 seats in the 400-member Parliament is "a success for the ideology of parliamentarism and democracy in Bulgaria." "We believe, he said, that your participation in the political life of Bulgaria will serve as a bridge for the Turko-Bulgarian friendship."

Announcement of Army Support for SDS Discounted

AU2006194090 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Jun 90 p 2

[Statement by Admiral Khristo Dobrev, deputy minister of national defense, in Sofia on 15 June: "Leave Army In Peace"]

[Text] On 13 June 1990 the municipal radio station in Sevlievo, in a preelection broadcast of the Union of Democratic forces [SDS] announced that the Bulgarian People's Army stands with the SDS. The leadership of the Ministry of National Defense is puzzled by the fact that individual representatives of the public forces again assume the right to speak on behalf of the entire Army and make generalizations that could otherwise easily be explained. The goal is obvious—to influence the voters in a certain direction. We are concerned with the fact that at this decisive moment in the life of the country and the nation the opposition forces continue their attempts to use the Bulgarian People's Army as an element of their election campaign and create a confrontation between the Army and a part of the Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian People's Army must not be turned into a means of achieving political goals.
15 June 1990, Sofia.
Admiral Khristo Dobrev, deputy minister of national defense.

Postelection Protests Continue, Receive Support

Radical Party Chairman Comments

AU2006171690 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Radical Democratic Party Chairman Elka Konstantinova article: "I Expect Future Democracy"]

[Text] As chairman of the Radical Democratic Party which proclaims and supports the ideas of peace and tolerance, I cannot pass over in silence my concern, and even my indignation at the acts of violence and the breaches of law which occurred throughout the election campaign and during the elections, even if they may have been isolated, local events. Regardless of the question of which political force, or to put it more precisely, of which of its representatives have committed such acts, they deserve to be denounced by our entire public and to be handed over to the legal authorities. I am convinced that the sooner this happens, the greater shall be the guarantee of calming the highly tense atmosphere.

We appreciate the total freedom of the individual, but we are obliged to obey the laws of the country and the state, and we must unconditionally submit all our actions to the laws without self-conceit and impunity. I am saying this in the full awareness of my sense of responsibility based on authentic facts about forged protocols in certain constituencies, as it was the case in Dimitrovgrad and in other places, which are already known, and not on the basis of unconfirmed rumors.

How do I evaluate the first round of elections? I think that despite our wish and our claims, the election process is not democratic in the real sense of the word. We, on the side of the opposition have no reason to reject them as a whole, and therefore we are preparing to participate in the first round. Nevertheless, wherever breaches of law have occurred, no matter how unimportant they may have been, the elections should be repeated, regardless of the question whether they were the results of conscious political manipulation, or stemmed from poor organization and carelessness.

One of our hopes and goals for the future, when we shall actively participate in the country's government, is uncompromisingly to eliminate all unlawful acts, regardless of the person (including the most highranking leader), or the political party committing them. This is so, because democracy does not and cannot exist without law.

We are against violence and excesses. Nevertheless, the events we recently observed in the streets and squares of our capital have nothing in common with violence, or excesses. Young people are entitled to express their indignation at unlawful acts, although this expression may be excessively noisy and blowing car horns might have disturbed the people's sleep. I hope that things will not escalate on either side.

Nevertheless, in these days of tension and anxiety, certain things still happened which I and many other people can rejoice about. I rejoice at the behavior of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS], at the political maturity manifested by the supporters and leaders of this party. I rejoice at the wise understanding that the Bulgarian peasants should not be divided between two agrarian unions.

Let me say a few words concerning the article published in the daily CENTURY 21 which mentions that our party declared itself in favor of civil disobedience. My personal opinion is that such an act should not be condoned. Yet we cannot help sharing the satisfaction of Sofia youths and citizens with the success of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and their simultaneous protest against certain breaches of the law which occurred during the elections which I already mentioned. No, we should not call for civil disobedience. As director of the daily, CENTURY 21, I feel responsible for every line published in the paper, regardless of the question of whether or not I have read the material before publication. In this particular case, it was a purely editorial mistake, a lack of accuracy in the expression of our basic stand which is shared unconditionally by the newspaper's entire collective. It was not a call for civil disobedience, but an expression of support for the citizens' unrest which is likely to subside without violence as soon as the students' demands is satisfied in the most democratic manner. This would be appropriate for a government which claims to be democratic.

Let us once more point out: The Radical Democratic Party is ready to defend its essential objectives, its profound understanding for every individual's civil right and freedom to choose his ideas and his own views on pluralism without being subject to pressure. This should be so today and in the future, and in all forthcoming elections awaiting our society—a society that should be truly democratic, a society where law and order, and a peaceful life shall be guaranteed. This is the society I believe in.

TV Chairman Shouted Down

AU2006201590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 19 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] "It was not me, but the program presenter who interrupted the transmission from the People's Palace of Culture on the night of 10 and 11 June. Ask him about it. You know him well enough, and have complete trust in him."

These were the words spoken by Pavel Pisarev, director of Bulgarian Television, on 18 June to the supporters of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] who were still protesting in front of the television building in Sofia. However, his words were greeted with howls and cries of "Resign."

Shortly before he attempted to address the protesting citizens through a megaphone, Pavel Pisarev took a representative from the crowd to a meeting with Kevork Kevorkyan. The man returned and confirmed that the program had indeed been suspended by Kevorkyan's decision.

Pisarev also attempted to discuss the issue of the information blackout. He explained that the television is not competent to decide whether or not cases of falsification and manipulation occurred during the elections. The reports received by the television were sent to the Central Electoral Commission, which will announce its findings.

This, however, did not please the protesters. The shouts of "Resign, Resign!" and "It Will Be the Same Every Day" could still be heard.

Later on, whatever Pisarev tried to say, his words were drowned by the cries of discontent. Pisarev explained that Petko Simeonov had invited INFAS representatives to the elections before he did, probably because they had won his trust. He also said that they could ask Asen Agov why the transmission covering the rally in front of Aleksander Nevski Cathedral only lasted 30 seconds.

Asen Agov, who was standing nearby, laughed and chewed a little bit on the cigarette he was holding between his teeth.

Pisarev stood his ground. In response to a question, he said he was not an employee of Department No. 6 of State Security, but when he was asked to whom he was married, he retorted that he was married to his wife, and stomped away.

Before this attempted dialogue, the "Television Initiative" held a protest action, calling on all the TV workers to come down to the entrance of the television building at 1800. However, only 12 people showed up.

Protesters Receive Election Data

AU2106070690 Sofia BTA in English 2120 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Students Are Discontented With Information on Breaches of Elections"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 20 Jun (BTA)—Today is the tenth day of the occupational strike, declared by students from Sofia University "Kliment Okhridski." Their first demand was already met: The Central Electoral Commission offered them information about breaches of elections.

"We take this information as real. We also drop our demands to the commission but we think that they were not fully met," said Atanas Kirchev, chairman of the Federation of the Independent Students Societies. He stressed that due to reasons which are unknown to the students, the Central Electoral Commission has not been handed over information about breaches by the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and by the Central SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Election Club.

The students on strike have a large part of these documents. They intend to generalize them and voice all information about breaches in the elections. "We believe that we will thus protect the interests and dignity of the whole of the Bulgarian people," Kirchev said.

Simeon II, the former Bulgarian king, wished them success with a special letter.

Today the students repeated their declaration that they guarantee the work of the particularly important university departments.

Their colleagues from Veliko Turnovo have reached agreement with the Rector's Council of their university and will not hamper entrance examinations.

The second building of the Higher Institute of Theatre and one of the buildings of the Higher Institute for Mechanical and Electrical Engineering in Sofia were also occupied by students today.

The number of lecturers who are backing the students' strike is increasing.

Future of Rights, Freedoms Movement Discussed

AU2006132190 Sofia BTA in English
1238 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Movement for Rights and Freedoms: Which Way Now?"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 19 Jun (BTA commentary by Boyko Borisov)—The parliamentary elections in mid-June showed that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) controls about 370,000 votes of Bulgarian Muslims rather than 1,200,000, as the movement's leader, Mr Ahmed Dogan, claims.

Surprisingly, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms emerged as the third most influential political force. It returned 23 candidates to Parliament and outperformed the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS), which was expected to come out third.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms was established on January 4, 1990, at the height of political tensions, strikes and riots over the authorities' decision to allow Bulgarian Muslims, victims of a forced renaming campaign launched by Todor Zhivkov's totalitarian regime in 1984, to restore their names. Originally, the organization was called Movement for Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria.

The MRF leader invariably makes a point of the "universal character" of the movement, which has a membership of 137,000 Muslims and 3,000 Bulgarians. Fifteen of the 154 candidates who stood for the MRF in the elections were Bulgarians.

The authority which Mr Ahmed Dogan, 35, commands among Bulgarian Turks is so great that "you can talk of pan-Doganism rather than of pan-Turkism in Bulgaria," as a leader of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) put it. Mr Dogan is reputed as the founder in 1985 of what he calls an "underground resistance organization of Turks in Bulgaria". In an interview for the Turkish MILLIYET newspaper in early May, he described the organization as a "Turkish national liberation movement in Bulgaria". Mr Dogan was arrested in 1986 and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for "sedition". He was amnestied on December 22, 1989.

Mr Dogan loves remembering the way he organized from his prison cell the protest actions of Bulgarian Turks in northern Bulgaria in May 1989, which sparked the exodus of more than 300,000 Bulgarian Muslims to Turkey in the summer of that year.

Two days before the elections, Mr Dogan told a news conference that his movement would act as a "balancing centrist factor" and that in Parliament "it would support any moderate tendency in the progress of democratic processes and in guaranteeing the human rights of all Bulgarian citizens." He said that the movement would be seeking cooperation with the opposition Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party.

The persistent efforts to give the MRF an image of moderation, democracy and tolerance are further evidence of Mr Dogan's political acumen. He reckons with the fact that mutual suspicion has been building up for centuries between Bulgarians and Turks and that the upheaval in the summer of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 made things even worse.

The MRF leader invariably denies the accusations of secessionist ambitions and characterizes his movement as a "stabilizing factor" in the relations between Bulgarians and Muslims. In early March the MRF and two organizations representing the interests of Bulgarians living in Muslim-populated areas signed an agreement on non-violence and peaceful settlement of their differences.

When Mr Dogan said that "Bulgaria's road to Europe is carpeted with an Islamic rug", he used the metaphor to stress the importance of the traditionally friendly ties of Bulgaria with the Islamic world as a vital factor of helping the country out of its economic crisis. Some public circles here, however, missed this point and reacted strongly to that statement.

Will the Movement for Rights and Freedoms take part in a coalition government? This delicate question gives the major political forces a lot of headaches, especially after the recent appearance of press features in which authoritative scientists blamed Bulgarian politicians for placing party interests before national interests.

Protest Against MRF in Turgovishte

AU2106070490 Sofia BTA in English
2055 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 20 Jun (BTA)—At a rally in the town of Turgovishte (north-eastern Bulgaria) the Bulgarian National Radical Party in the town declared itself against the official policy regarding the national issue and called it "unforeseeing and serving closely party interests."

"We do not want to become a second Cyprus" was how some of the speakers motivated their firm insistence to ban the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as an "anti-constitutional organization with pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic policy."

Representatives of the Fatherland Party of Labour in Razgrad and the Committee for Protection of National Interests in Omurtag also stated objections against the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

Independent Society Fights for Patriotic Revival

AU2106105190 Sofia BTA in English 0854 GMT 21 Jun 90

["'Mati Bolgaria' Against National Nihilism"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 21 Jun (BTA)—During the last few decades the legal national feelings of the Bulgarian people were suppressed in different ways. Things went so far that the notion patriotism could not be mentioned any longer without being accompanied by "internationalism."

That is how Petur Konstantinov, a popular Bulgarian writer, comments the major reasons about the crisis in the Bulgarian national conscience. The biassed "white margins" [gaps] in the Bulgarian history, the oppression of Bulgarian holidays and century-old traditions, breaking of ties with the Bulgarians living abroad, these, according to Konstantinov, are the major elements of the national nihilism implanted for years.

The Independent Association "Mati Bolgaria," founded in December last year in Kazanluk, chaired by Petur Konstantinov, is working for the national revival. The investigation and preservation of "banned" works from the Bulgarian literature, the revival of traditions, the establishment of the role of the cultural and historical heritage, as an important feature of national memory and spirit are the major trends in the society humanitarian activity.

"Mati Bolgaria" does not consider only all Bulgarians but also all Jews, Armenians, Turks, Gypsies and other smaller ethnic groups, who were born in Bulgaria or accepted our country as their fatherland, as an inseparable part of the Bulgarian national community and accepts their intellectual contribution as part of our national culture, Petur Konstantinov says.

The association pays special attention to the compact Bulgarian population, living in Bessarabia, the Ukraine, Banat, the western parts of Bulgaria and other neighbouring regions, as well as to those Bulgarians who live in the more distant countries and continents.

One of the ideas of "Mati Bolgaria" is to found fellowships for the education of Bulgarian youths from these groups in Bulgarian higher educational establishments.

Appeal Against State's Ecological 'Passiveness'

AU2006190590 Sofia BTA in English 1731 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Appeal for Civic Response"—BTA headline]

[Text] Ruse, 20 Jun (BTA)—According to independent and oppositional organizations and to many citizens very little has been done to solve the gravest problem of the Danube town of Ruse, the permanent danger from chlorine and its damage on the people's health. The Forum for Democratic Revival "Ruse" appealed for civil response against "the passiveness of state power".

Signatures are being collected to call to the Grand National Assembly which should oblige the Government to introduce an official protest at the International Court in the Hague. In view of that, the appeal reads, it is necessary to engage publicly all M.P.s [Members of Parliament] in the city. They will be offered the whole documentation on the chlorine problem of Ruse and they will hand it to the prime minister right at the first Parliament session. During that initiative, the majority of the people of Ruse will be present in front of the National Assembly in the capital city.

The Forum for Democratic Revival "Ruse" believes that the Ruse chlorine problem would be the first substantial success of democracy.

Havel Urges Iliescu To Condemn Violence

LD2006123490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1200 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Lubos Dobrovsky, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman, presented to Romanian Ambassador Ion Ciubotaro a letter from President Vaclav Havel to President Ion Iliescu in the Cernin Palace in Prague today. Vaclav Havel, who recently met Ion Iliescu in Moscow at the session of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact member states, expressed in his letter surprise over the wave of violence and arrests in Romania shortly after the people rejected the totalitarian system and dictatorship practices. He stressed that if we want to become a part of the community of free and cooperating countries in the new Europe, we have to solve all problems prudently, patiently and peacefully, and above all with full respect for basic human rights and democratic values.

At the end of the letter Vaclav Havel writes: I believe that you will contribute to the political solution of the crisis and to the strengthening of the international position of Romania by resolute condemnation of the violence against demonstrators and by starting a nationwide dialogue. I ask you for this in our common interest.

Havel Interviewed on Changes in Warsaw Pact

AU1906165090 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jun 90 p 3

["Excerpts" from radio interview with President Vaclav Havel on 9 June from the weekly "Conversations From Lany Castle" series; place not given: "A Matter of Fundemental Signficance"]

[Text] [Unidentified host] Mr. President, present circumstances force me to return to last week, before the elections, when you suddenly left for the Soviet Union to attend a very significant conference. I have no idea to what degree it was planned beforehand, but it was rather surprising.

[Havel] I am not going to report about it in detail. After all, I had a press conference on this topic and a lot has been covered by the papers. Anyone interested in the issue read these documents. I would like to stress one thing, namely, that Czechoslovakia played a quite important role in this matter. From the very beginning, we led various international initiatives— you remember my speech to the U.S. Congress, in Strasbourg; numerous appearances by Jiri Dienstbier, his many meetings and initiatives—all that led to a vision of a new and different Europe.

It is our duty, as a country situated in the very center of Europe, where wars traditionally originate or where they end and where the imminent danger is always felt first, to get involved in international politics to a higher degree than would seem appropriate for a country of our size. At the beginning, we had a certain concept of an arrangement of the entire Europe, and in this concept we also had to consider the sphere of security. Today, we see two pacts, i.e., the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, which stand here, seemingly against each other, as an obvious remainder of the former times of cold war, of the time of division of Europe into blocs, of the time when the countries of central East Europe were just simple satellites of the Stalinist Soviet Union. Their troops—they had a dignified name, Warsaw Pact, but in reality they were regular subordinates of the Soviet Army—were, de facto, sort of off shoots of the Soviet Army. In case of war, for instance, the Soviet general, who is the commander of the entire western front, would have under his command the two-thirds of the Czechoslovak Army which are assigned to the Warsaw Pact, and on top of that his staff is not even stationed in the territory of our republic. The military structure of the Warsaw Pact was simply an expression of the satellite status of our countries.

This has all been changed by the revolutions which have taken place in these countries. These countries are, and want to be, fully independent, and the Soviet Union no longer assumes the role of their imperial superior. We received a preliminary inquiry whether we would agree with the date for a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee and we immediately answered yes. It was not an especially convenient date for us, one day before the elections; nevertheless, we did not want to postpone it, because, in the rapidly developing situation in Europe, it seemed important to us to do something regarding the Warsaw Pact also. We opposed a unilateral withdrawal from the Pact and the country's pseudo-neutralization because we understand how unrealistic that is. We must contribute to the neutralization of Europe as a whole, and then we, too, will be entirely neutral. We must contribute to totally radical changes in the security structure. We would in no way strengthen our security by a unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. By doing so, we would threaten it more than enhance it. Moreover, an infinite number of tasks exist, disarmament talks for instance, in which, to a degree, the Warsaw Pact must function as a NATO partner. The West itself is interested in the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact as a more political than military alliance of co-equal countries which, for a certain period of time, would function as its partner in the disarmament talks. In addition, the Warsaw Pact can only be transformed from the inside. By a unilateral withdrawal, we would lose influence.

We realized all this and, therefore, we accepted this date. A noncommittal neutral statement was prepared. It was supposed to be a purely formal affair. We felt that the status quo was not acceptable in the new historical situation and wrote what really was a proposal of a resolution. This then actually became the starting point for all the complex talks which eventually took place in Moscow, and finally our proposal with numerous appendices and corrections—every little word involved great debates—became the statement approved by the Warsaw Pact. It may be the most important meeting of the Warsaw Pact ever, since it made a decision on an absolutely radical transmogrification of itself into something entirely different, and it even determined the time schedule. The schedule should be worked out in detail by a group of authorized government representatives, and we made certain suggestions even in this respect. The entire joint command should be replaced by something different, by a consultative group which by the end of November should be approved by the Political Consultative Committee, because a summit of all member countries of the Helsinki process should take place in Paris in December.

If everything is to be set in motion, then it is important that we, as Warsaw Pact member countries, come to the December meeting in some transformed, radically new situation. This was the crux of the matter and that was achieved. I consider it a tremendous success that the delegations agreed on a joint statement. This fact is an issue of absolutely fundamental significance. Thus far, this success has been appreciated by the session of the foreign ministers of the NATO countries, but it is something that not only history, but the entire population of Europe will, in time, give just recognition to.

Calfa Criticizes Parties' Attitude to Governing

LD2106101190 Prague CTK in English 0831 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Prague, 21 June (CTK)—The present talks on the composition of a new Czechoslovak government are characterized by the lack of interest of the political parties concerned in ministries which must tackle great problems in production, OBCANSKY DENIK wrote today.

The daily of the Civic Forum Coordinating Centre quoted Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa, who participates in the creation of a new cabinet, as saying that none of the parties which have been given the possibility to occupy ministerial seats in a new Czechoslovak cabinet have shown an interest in the ministries of telecommunications, or fuel and energy, of agriculture, of metallurgy and engineering and in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In his opinion, the main attention of the parties in question has focused on the Ministries of Interior, of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, i.e. the ministries which "offer opportunity and power."

Marian Calfa also criticized the reluctance of some political parties to share in the work of a new government, in view of the considerable victory of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence in the June 8-9 elections. According to him, some political forces claim they cannot get a higher number of seats in a new government and thus have a greater influence on its activities. In this connection, the Czecoslovak premier spoke about cool political calculations and efforts to leave all problems to a new government and profit from criticism of its mistakes.

Calfa: No 'Surprise' Expected in New Government

LD2006222990 Prague CTK in English 2119 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 20 (CTK)—"No special surprise is expected in the composition of a new Czechoslovak Government, the well-tested personalities will be included again", Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa told CTK today.

The political forces which are partners in the current talks about the new government's set-up are still considering variants of what representatives should fill the posts in the executive and legislative bodies. There are still many unsolved questions in this connection, he said.

Czech Government's spokesman Petr Prihoda said the talks about the composition of a new Czechoslovak Government are coming to an end as well as the work on its new structure. Current Czech Premier Petr Pithart who is in permanent contact with Civic Forum representatives wants the new government to be composed exclusively of specialists.

On New Government Composition

AU2106065790 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Premier Marian Calfa by Jaroslav Veis in Prague on 17 June: "The Interior Ministers Held Talks on Their Own Initiative"]

[Text] The federal premier granted us an interview yesterday afternoon. We are publishing his answers to two questions today; we will publish the entire interview in the very near future.

[Veis] Could you comment on the appearance by the three interior ministers on the television news program?

[Calfa] The interior ministers held their talks without my knowledge and without the knowledge of the Federal Government. This is particularly strange because there is a Federal Government decision on the screenings issue which expresses agreement with them on the basis of a request from the political parties and which gives the interior ministers the task of submitting the results to the parties. The screenings have taken place; no one dictated to the parties how they should deal with them. The screenings only concerned people who were registered as candidates for deputies' seats and who agreed to them. The resolution is still valid; it has not been discussed further. This statement came out of the blue. I found out about it from the television. Of course, I did not have to know about it; ministers hold meetings with each other, but this was a surprise. On Monday [18 June] I will invite Minister Sacher to give me an explanation about the whole affair and, in particular, about why he did not deliver his statement at a government session.

[Veis] Everything indicates that you will continue as the federal premier. You are taking part in the talks about the formation of the new government and, therefore, we would be interested in hearing your views on its composition or, at least, in what is known so far.

[Calfa] When the government is being formed, how well its present members acquitted themselves will be taken into consideration. During the past six months, there has been ample opportunity to become acquainted with their approach toward their work, with their level of knowledge, and with their ability to work as a team. The Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence movement won the elections and it is absolutely natural that those ministers who have proven themselves and who belong to the victorious coalition will be taken into consideration in the future. We all know whom we are talking about.

For example, V. Dlouhy, J. Dienstbier, P. Miller, V. Klaus, and K. Korinkova will not be missing from the government. As far as V. Komarek is concerned, I regard him highly as a forecaster, but, unfortunately, we adjudicated him a role in the government for which he was not best equipped. He should have been the head of the economic team. However, this role did not suit him; he is more of an individualist. Nevertheless, during the course of recent months, we entrusted the leadership of the team to V. Vales who is also envisaged for the future. A. Delong, federal deputy premier, has himself decided to return to scientific research. Mr. Vacek is also envisaged as the minister of national defense. This is the decisive point of view adopted by the president as commander in chief of the Armed Forces. In his opinion, Mr. Vacek is irreplaceable. As far as structural changes to the Federal Government are concerned, we envisage that it will not contain the post of minister of agriculture and food or chairman of the State Planning Commission for Scientific-Technical and Investment Development.

The total number of government members comes to 17. I do not want to talk about the new faces yet. Negotiations about a coalition will take place until 19 June and we would like to have a definite idea about the new government by 20 June. The delicate issue surrounding the federal interior minister is still open. However, we are considering a specific candidate whose moral credentials are indisputable. This will be a person who will guarantee impartiality in the correct sense of the word and who will also possess sufficient organizational and specialist capabilities.

Liberal Democratic Party Leaves Civic Forum

LD2006191390 Prague Television Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] As we found out today, the Liberal Democratic Party [Liberalne Demokraticka Strana], formerly the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, is leaving Civic Forum. It gained two seats in the Federal Assembly and four seats in the Czech National Republic [as heard]. It will act as an autonomous independent group in the club of Civic Forum deputies, with which it will continue to cooperate.

Urban on Withdrawal From Forum Leadership

AU2006151690 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Jan Urban, "representative" of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center, by Jan Dobrovsky; place and date not given: "I Will Not Participate in the Negotiations"]

[Excerpt] [Dobrovsky] You have decided to withdraw from your functions in the Civic Forum [OF] Coordinating Center. What were the motives for your decision?

[Urban] I have been saying since December that I was going to leave. I stayed in the OF Coordinating Center to help overcome problems generated by the early departure of many people, particularly Petr Pithart. Even then we reached the agreement that I would leave on the day of the elections. I am, in fact, only delivering what I had promised.

[Dobrovsky] Does this mean that you will not participate in the negotiations on the composition of the new government?

[Urban] I will not participate in them quite deliberately. The first reason is stated above. The other reason is that I would not like to slip into politicking, which will evidently accompany the filling of some seats in the federal government. I am thinking, in particular, of the most important ministries, specifically the Ministry of Interior for which, in my opinion, there is only one possible candidate—Jan Ruml, the present deputy minister.

[Dobrovsky] What is your idea of the development of the political system in our country?

[Urban] I think that it would be very unfortunate if we created a presidential system of state government. In defiance of all the difficulties, we avail ourselves of the prerequisites to arrive at a functioning parliamentary democracy within a short period of time, with several political currents represented in parliament. These can achieve more, in mutual cooperation and competition, than an autocratic regime by a narrow group of politicians.

[Dobrovsky] How should, according to your concept, the OF Coordinating Center be organized in future?

[Urban] We have prepared a totally new structure, which will have to be approved by the Assembly. We want the power of decisionmaking to reside in the hands of people who received a mandate in the elections, both at the local level and at the level of representative bodies. The main issue is how to eliminate the multitrack practices [vicekolejnost] which have caused certain problems in the OF thus far. The Coordinating Center should evolve into a small and highly professionalized group of managers that would provide deputies with the necessary information and establish and maintain their liaison with the surroundings. [passage omitted]

'Tricolored' Government Coalition Possible

LD2006220890 Prague Television Service in Czech 2000 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today we have tried to find out anything that could yield more information about the chess game in the formation of a new government played by the political forces. [passage omitted] Jana Bohusikova was at the Civic Forum press conference today.

[Bohusikova] Petr Kucera, member of the Civic Forum Coordination Center, said at today's press conference that originally it seemed that the government would be of one color only. This means that the government should have comprised members of the Forum and Public Against Violence, and perhaps at most be supplemented by specialists from some other parties. However, the situation is developing rather differently. The Christian Democratic Movement [Krestansko-demokraticke hnuti] has also shown interest in participating in the government. The overall meaning of this is that after yesterday's talks the coalition at the federal government level looks like a tricolored coalition—a coalition of Public Against Violence, the Civic Forum, and the Christian Democratic Movement.

[Announcer] This then concerns the federal government. Were the republican governments also discussed?

[Bohusikova] The republican governments were discussed, too. It was said that the forming of the Czech Government in which the Civic Forum is in the majority, is probably progressing fastest. A coalition with the Christian Democratic Union [Krestansko-demokraticka unie] and with the Movement for Autonomous Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia [Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii-spolecnost pro Moravu and Slezsko] is being considered here. No decision has yet been made with regard to the Czech premier, but it can be assumed that he or she will be a Civic Forum member.

As far as the Slovak Government is concerned, in this respect we have less information right now. As we learned, the talks on its composition are in progress in Slovakia in Bratislava tonight. These talks are conducted by Public Against Violence with the Christian Democratic Movement and the Democratic Party [Demokraticka strana]. [passage omitted]

As far as the structure of the federal government is concerned, it is possible to say that it will differ from its predecessors. It is thought that it should have 16 members, including deputy premiers and the premier. This means that it should have fewer seats. But several days ago this figure was seventeen, so we shall see. The number of government ministries at federal level should be reduced, and some of their authority should be transferred to the authority of national republics. This means that this begins the process of national republics strengthening to the detriment of the federation. [passage omitted]

'Constructive' CPCZ Opposition Role Evaluated

AU2006172990

[Editorial Report] Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 16 June on page 2, under the headline "Rather, Let Us Reckon With Everything," carries a 650-word article by Petr Novacek in which he considers whether or not the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) will form a constructive opposition.

According to the article, no one today knows exactly how many members there are in the Communist Party. Many of the people who remained in the CPCZ's ranks have stopped paying their party contributions. The party leadership "turned a blind eye" to this in order not to alienate potential voters. In Novacek's opinion, the party leadership "did well. It is obvious from the election results that several hundred thousand nonparty members even voted for the CPCZ." The issue now is how the CPCZ will exert its influence in the new parliament, in the Czech National Council, in the Slovak National Council, and in society as a whole. As none of the other political parties wants to cooperate with the CPCZ, it has been left with the opposition role.

The current CPCZ leadership does not deny that a "differentiation process" is taking place within party ranks. Until recently it seemed likely that this would result in the CPCZ splitting into two parties: into an "orthodox" party and into a "reformist" party. However, according to Novacek, the CPCZ "has always been governed by a strong fetish for unity which, along with its current electoral success, may mean that the party will again say what it has said so often in the past: We are doing well—it is not necessary to alter the party line. This would, of course, stall the party's incipient transformation from a Gottwald-type party to a truly new one." In conclusion, Novacek remarks that this is worth bearing in mind during the November local elections.

Government Resignation, President Election Dates

AU2006185090 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 19 Jun 90 p 4

["vrz"-signed report: "Parliamentary Take-Off; the Federal Assembly Deputies Will Meet for the First Time Next Week"]

[Text] Although the coordinating consultations of the representatives of political parties and movements on the preparations of proposals for the elections to the offices in the legislative bodies and in the Federal Assembly will only be concluded today, the parliamentary reporters already have on their desks the time schedule of the sessions and actions of this highest legislative body.

On 14 June, President of the Republic Vaclav Havel called the fall session of the Federal Assembly. Newly elected and reelected deputies will enter the parliament building on Tuesday, 26 June, at this time only to settle organizational matters and meet in the deputy clubs. The resignation of the federal government and the appointments of the governments of the republics are expected the following day, i.e., 27 June, and it will be the first significant appearance of our freely elected representatives. Still, on that very day, the deputies of the People's Chamber and of the Chamber of Nations will meet in the constituent meetings of parliamentary committees. On Thursday, 28 June, in the second joint session of both chambers, they will be acquainted with the composition of the new government and its programmatic statement.

The first week of July will also be busy for the deputies. Both chambers will continue the discussions of the government program which must also be subsequently assessed by the clubs of political parties and movements. On 4 July, a day before the new holidays, we can expect the elections of the president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The present president should abdicate after the parliamentary vote of confidence in the government he appointed. This date, however, is not confirmed. Among the dates considered is 16 July, because the possibility cannot be excluded that the debate on the government program will require more time.

During the days following the discussions and approval of all these significant modalities the deputies will begin to deal with the draft laws essential for our future existence. Therefore, we wish the new parliament a lot of success and a maximum of responsibility.

November Local Election Date Threatened

AU2006193990 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Jun 90 p 2

[Statement issued by the Czech Republic Government Presidium on 15 June; place not given: "The Election Date Is Under Threat"]

[Text] The Czech Republic Government Presidium issued the following statement on 15 June:

The democratic changes taking place in our society cannot be complete without the fundamental restructuring of local organs and the legalization of self-administration for towns and villages. The existing system of national committees, a system which conforms to the administrative system of state government, does not create the requisite scope for the development of life in communities or for the rational and quality execution of state administration.

Therefore, the Czech Republic Government considers it necessary that voting not take place for national committees, but only for self-administration organs in communities during this year's local elections planned for November. It concurs in this with the conclusions reached by the Union of Towns and Villages conference. However, it is necessary to establish constitutional conditions for the adoption of laws by the national councils on local administration, on territorial state administration, and on elections. Therefore, on 6 June 1990, the Czech Republic Government put forward the appropriate changes to the CSFR Constitution and to constitutional law No. 143/1968 on the Czechoslovak Federation. On the same day, the Slovak Republic Government expressed its agreement by putting forward similar proposals.

The republican governments do not take the legislative initiative toward the Federal Assembly; the Federal Government takes this initiative. Therefore, the abovementioned proposals were discussed at its session on 14 June 1990. We consider it necessary to inform the public that the Federal Government did not support the proposal and cast doubt on the necessity of the plan for the establishment of democratic and territorial self-administration organs during this period. Slovak Republic Premier Milan Cic, at variance with the conclusions of his own government, expressed his support for a resolution which would involve abolishing just the Regional National Committees and holding elections for the District National Committees and the Municipal National Committees. The Federal Government did not approve the proposal.

The aforementioned situation seriously threatens the November date for the elections. At the same time, it undoubtedly plays into the hands of those striving to maintain the administrative and centralist system of government. The development of democracy founded on the self-administration of towns and villages excludes the continued existence of national committees. Therefore, the Czech Republic Government Presidium declares that it will do everything in its power to ensure that the proposals for the appropriate laws are prepared in time and are submitted to the Czech National Council in accordance with the original intentions. An attempt will be made through the legislative initiatives of Federal Assembly deputies to bring about the change in the constitutional regulations, a change which qualifies the legal status of towns and villages as the representatives of local self-administration.

CPSL Statement on Elections Published

AU2006173390

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 19 June on page 6 carries a 900-word "Statement of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee on the Results of the Elections and the Tasks of the Communist Party of Slovakia After the Elections," which was adopted at the 16 June session of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee. The statement evaluates the performance of the Communist Party of Slovakia in the elections as "an expression of the party's real standing in society." It states that the party "won the necessary legitimacy and managed to restore confidence in it and its program among a part of society."

Dealing with factors which influenced the Communist Party's results in the elections, the statement points out, among other things, that the election campaign centered on the past and attitude toward the past, which is why the Communist Party of Slovakia was unable to defend its "positive program" for the future; that an "anticommunist psychosis" had been created in society with the help of state-controlled media; and that, in contrast to state and government representatives, the party's access to the state-controlled media was limited. The statement also acknowledges the role played by the "consequences of the party's past mistakes in theory and practical policy" and by unspecified "mistakes in the preelection campaign, which will have to be analyzed." It stresses that the party will work as a "constructive opposition party" and that it will express and pursue the needs and interests of the working people and low-income groups. Referring to the party's tasks in the postelection period, the statement refers, among other things, to the need to enter into consultations with other left-wing parties and movements "with the aim of seeking a common platform and joint course of action on the extraparliamentarian level."

Elections Evaluated as 'Not Democratic'

AU2006204790 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 15 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Karel Filka commentary: "After the Elections"]

[Text] After 44 years, the people of Czechoslovakia have voted again in free elections. The winners and the losers are known. The interesting thing is, however, that people do not show any extraordinary joy; the winners do not celebrate, the losers do not lament. This is something that causes some embarrassment.

The evaluation made by most Western observers whom we had the opportunity to follow proves that the West—as many times in history—was unable to judge the matter in depth and that the West sees this affair only superficially. No wonder. After 42 year of dictatorship, many people who lived under it cannot judge it either.

Some chronological data will be necessary, since the most remarkable thing is how quickly people forget.

Today we know that on 17 November the Communists attempted to use the suppressed students' demonstration to carry out a putsch within the party. It is almost certain that this was done according to a KGB scenario—or at least with its knowledge. The goal was not a state putsch, however, but a return to 1968. That is, to adopt the reformist process and to liberalize the ossified dictatorship a little—but to do so in such a way that matters would remain under the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] control. They underestimated the spirit which the people possessed—as a matter of fact they were unable to assess it correctly—and that is why an error occurred. This was not in the script, but when the people saw the opportunity they took matters into their own hands. This can be best expressed by the quotation from Cardinal Retz: "Evil culminates when those who govern become shameless, for this is the very moment when those who are governed lose all respect."

The students started the revolution and the first people to join them were the artists. Gradually, but quickly, the movement which today we call Civic Forum was established. Compared to today's situation, it was a real civic forum then. All strata of the population participated in its meetings, including workers, and all political parties, except communists. These parties, labelled as collaborating parties today, made everything available (maybe not unselfishly)—buildings, premises, material, equipment, etc. It is hard to say where the speeches would have been delivered from on the Wenceslas Square if there had been no Melantrich building. Prague had two heroes at that time—Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Maly. This was real national unity.

No revolution can last forever, however. The revolution attained significant results: the abolition of the CPCZ's leading role, the establishment of the Government of National Understanding, changes in parliament, establishing free elections, and all this was culminated in the election of a new president. Later, the unavoidable period of political classification into political parties and movements began. At that time the first absurdity became apparent. While all the parties—old ones as well as the newly created ones— began to build their membership base and their apparatus, the Civic Forum, or whatever remained of it, kept its original structure, the core of which contained individuals of great initiative, who derived their mandate exclusively from the first days of the revolution. In fact, an entire team of these people took over various government and legislative functions. And then another team set to work which was far from being as capable as the previous one and which was not impartial at all. This situation lasted until the free elections.

And this is the second absurdity. Civic Forum solemnly declared that its operation would end by ensuring the free elections. Nevertheless, with the course of time its representatives—in proportion to the growth in their authority and in President Havel's authority and popularity and as Vaclav Maly became more of a regular priest and less of a platform orator—they came to the conclusion that they would set forth their own candidates as the so-called "independent" forces. Since there was no feedback, which is represented in any normal party by its members, the leading positions in Civic Forum were taken over by individuals of various political profiles, from former communists to right-wing extremists. This composition has lasted till now. It would be an enormous error, however, to consider the unexpected victory of the Civic Forum to be a victory of its representatives as a whole. People were electing symbols which were personified in a few personalities, mainly in President Havel. This is psychologically understandable. His behavior and speeches were a balm for the soul of the people. Civic Forum's leadership will unavoidably reveal its flaws in the conglomerate of highly ambitious individuals. As Napoleon used to say: In a battle, an average general is always more successful than 10 ingenious ones.

The incomprehensible reaction to the establishment of the Christian and Democratic Union is the third absurdity. In all modern democratic countries the parties of this orientation are one of the fundamental elements of the political landscape and, at the same time, they are the engineers of an economic boom who use tested prescriptions. It would seem logical that people with realistic political thinking would welcome this fact. Unfortunately, the opposite is true. Since the establishment of the Christian and Democratic Union, Civic Forum's representatives have concentrated their attacks not on the authors of the economic and political catastrophe and of the moral morass, but on a constructive political movement, which—despite its inexperience—represented a firm base for the upcoming democracy.

These attacks surpassed all ethical toleration of a regular election campaign. Of course, attacks were not aimed at the movement itself because it cannot be ignored that Christian principles have been reflected in all humanitarian activity during developments after World War II. They were generally accepted and all civilized countries subscribe to them. The attacks were, therefore, aimed at the movement's leading members, regardless of the individuals or the charges against them. The way these attacks were led has all the attributes of totalitarian power. These attacks violate all fundamental human rights whose protection they are supposed to ensure.

So, we had free elections. But not democratic ones. The elections were manipulated. The result is abnormal. One self-appointed dictatorship has been replaced by another. The interpretation of the concepts of human rights and democracy got into the hands of the people who succeeded in acquiring the mandate—into which they installed themselves—by manipulating the elections. Nobody can exert control over them, only the next elections, maybe. But the next elections may never be held, or they will be held according to the new laws which will be created by these people for their own benefit. History is simply repeating itself. The West should realize that democracy in our country will have to be judged according to facts and not according to declarations, even if these declaration were made in excellent Czech and in a poetic style. Democracy has never survived anywhere if it was built on a single person and not on unshakable institutions.

The Christian political movement in Czechoslovakia harvested a moral victory, which was, in fact, a crushing defeat. It is not bitterness which causes me to speak like this. Our defeat was much worse in 1946. We had all that a modern party needs—personalities, equipment, property, money, and enthusiastic members. Today, we have almost nothing. In 1946 the enemy was real and it was clear who it was. When this enemy got into power, he was aware of one thing—that he could not hold trials without courts; so he staged trials. Today, we have advanced greatly. In our new democracy we do not need trials. It is enough if we have people who pronounce their judgment. This is another absurdity. People who are responsible for mass abuse, plundering, and murders live freely, drawing on high pensions, while their victims, persecuted for decades, are again trembling in fear and are looking for a country to emigrate to. The theater is over. We have only changed the curtain. On the previous one it was written: The truth will prevail! We have changed it to "Truth and love will prevail!" In fact, however, demagogy and hatred have won.

Yes, those people were heroes who signed Charter 77. Nobody can erase this from history. There was a handful of heroes. But somehow it has been forgotten that throughout these 42 years millions of ordinary people were testifying that there was another charter that has served to the benefit of humanity since the dawn of history. It has a simple title: Ten Commandments. In those people's heads a light was shining; a light which is not impressive, but which is eternal. History takes its time. History has never been denied yet. Jesus, who is now again the leading light of our hopes for the new year, said: "Judge not, lest ye be judged." Among the greatest secrets of history is the way human beings incomprehensibly insist on their own condemnation in the face of history. God will certainly forgive them, if he wants to. But history is merciless.

Negative Aspects of Results

AU1906112590 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 Jun 90 p 1

[Jaroslav Jiru commentary: "Yes, But..."]

[Text] "Are you satisfied with the election results?" a Swiss radio journalist asked me. Despite its simplicity, the question confused me somewhat. Am I to be satisfied or dissatisfied as a voter, sympathizer of the Civic Forum, or as a journalist—observer of the political stage? These were three demanding questions in one, and were therefore arduous to answer. So I recalled how in the sixties [former French President] Giscard d'Estaing defined his relation to Gaullism, and answered, "Yes, but...."

Yes, I am very satisfied that, according to the information I have at my disposal so far, more than 96 percent of the voters came voluntarily to the polling places. It is an unquestionable victory of democracy over apathy forced upon the people by the past regime. In this respect, we have much better results than in Hungary and in Poland, where a political fatigue is begining to show. Yes, I am happy that the elections ran smoothly and that the would-be assassins from the Old Town Square remained alone. I am pleased with the positive assessments by the international observers. In this respect, everybody who came to polling places and voted against totality is the winner.

From the political point of view, without any doubt, the primacy belongs to the decisive victory of the Civic

Forum and of the Public Against Violence [PAV] movement. The results from Slovakia are particularly encouraging, and those who predicted five percent for the "PAV" failed miserably. The Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence movement represent in the eyes of the voters the forces which prepared the November revolution, carried it out, and subsequently formulated a clear political program. The question arises, however, whether the burden which the victorious coalition will have to bear as a consequence of its victory will not be too heavy. Can a movement which directly in its program rejects party structures bear the load of historic responsibility and will it resist all snares of polarization? The ferocity of the clash over the character of the economic reform arising at the time when everything essential should have been decided compels prudence.

The reservations expressed above make it possible to pass on without difficulties to the word "but." According to my opinion, the fact that there is a vacuum to the left of the Civic Forum/Public Against Violence coalition is most consternating. This is certainly caused above all by the exceptional ability for absorption shown by the Forum, which also attracted the voters who would otherwise vote for the parties to the left of the Civic Forum. Nevertheless, we must point out that the new legislative bodies will not have a left in the classical sense of the word if we do not take into account the Communists who will remain in the opposition. No doubt, that is a pity. The Christian bloc fared much worse than generally expected. All these correlations directly compel a deliberation on the role played in the first free Czechoslovak elections by the political advisers who spent years in emigration. According to my opinion, the parties which followed their advice and in some cases even made them the directors of their campaigns came to regret their decisions. It is not a reproach, but just stating the fact. The unfortunate appearance of Zdenek Mlynar at the end of last year could already teach a lesson of how the loss of contact with political reality and the dearth of knowledge of the mentality of Czechs and Slovaks formed by twenty years of normalization could be fatal.

We have left, however, the most traumatic "but" for the very conclusion. The successes of the Moravian regionalists and Slovak separatists are disconcerting. We are entering a period of ponderous discussions on the shape of the future state, and it will be more difficult than we once thought, even more so as we have some doubts regarding the statemindedness [statotvornost] of the Slovak Christian Democrats. In conclusion: Despite the high victory of the positive forces, no reason exists for a careless intoxication. The 1990 elections helped us to decisively defeat the past. The future is still far from decided.

VPN Statement on Budaj's Resignation

AU2006164590 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Jun 90 p 2

[Statement by Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence movement Coordinating Center; place and date not given: "Statement Issued by the Public Against Violence Movement Coordinating Center"]

[Text] The Coordinating Center of the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement deems it necessary to announce that it has never had any doubts about the personal honesty and integrity of Jan Budaj; nor has it ever doubted that he was never a real collaborator with the State Security. The VPN Coordinating Center falls into line with Jan Budaj's testimony that his signature had a strictly symbolic character and that he never specifically collaborated. In connection with the decision adopted by the VPN movement about the vetting of candidates, Jan Budaj respected the approved rule and resigned from his candidacy despite the fact that the VPN council in Slovakia had expressed confidence in him. Jan Budaj remains a VPN member and presently is a member of the VPN Council in Slovakia and continues to belong among the important personalities on the Slovak political scene.

Bartoncik Said Bitter About Suspension

AU2006161990

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 19 June on page 1 publishes a 550-word letter from Josef Bartoncik, whose chairmanship of the Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL) was suspended on 14 June, to party members. The letter, the date of which is not given, was sent from a Prague hospital where Bartoncik had been admitted with a heart complaint.

In his letter Bartoncik first expresses gratitude for the "many letters and telegrams" expressing trust in him. He then "assures" party members that his "conscience is clear," rejects "all accusations" that have been raised against him recently, and announces that he will "fight" for his "rehabilitation."

He then briefly touches upon the decision of the 14 June session of the CSL Central Committee "to suspend the execution of my function of party chairman," saying that this decision "replenished my cup of bitterness." In the remaining part of the letter, he evaluates the CSL's performance in the elections. Even though the result is not "outstanding," he says, "given the political situation, it was a success." He appeals to party members not to let themselves be demoralized and discouraged and not to allow the party's adversaries to split the party and sow discord among Christians, but to seek the unity of all believers and get ready for the local elections later this year. "Nothing ends with the parliamentary elections," he says in conclusion. "Quite the contrary, much is only starting. Our cause is good and just. The future belongs to it and it is upon this future that we must set our eyes. May God help us!"

Unsatisfactory Results of Screening Commissions

AU2006125990 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 8 Jun 90 p 2

[Magdalena Sedlackova report: "Is the State Security's Destiny in the Hands of the Commissions?"]

[Text] Bratislava—The results of the screening of National Security Corps [SNB] members of the SNB Administration in Bratislava, the Slovak Republic capital city, and in the West Slovakia Region were discussed at yesterday's joint meeting of the SNB Administration Command, a civil commission, and two screening commissions which had been investigating the activity of SNB members in these administrations.

Lieutenant Colonel Milan Uzik, LL.D, chief of the administration, stated that the civil commission, as well as the screening commissions, had been established and had worked on the basis of an order issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and that they had fulfilled their tasks. Major Rudolf Javorcek, LL.D, announced that they have reviewed the activity of 203 SNB members and that four of them have not been recommended for participation in future SNB activity. However, based on the federal interior minister's order No. 63 of this year, a total of 83 administration members have been released from their duties for organizational reasons; this has happened despite the conclusions reached by the civil commission. Dr. Andrej D. Trnovsky, chairman of the civil commission in the SNB Administration, and other members of the abovementioned commissions pointed out that the establishment as well as the activity of the screening and civil commissions were not legitimate since they were not regulated by legislation—despite the fact that the commissions had demanded this. The results of the commissions' work are also being belittled by R. Sacher's orders. These orders are at variance with his own statement that the destiny of the entire National Security Corps is in the hands of screening commissions and, finally, in the hands of the civil commissions.

Disagreement Protracts Slovak Coalition Talks

AU2006155690

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak, the daily of the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, publishes in its 16, 18, and 19 June issues items dealing with the movement's talks with the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS) on the formation of a Slovak Republic coalition government.

On 16 June on pages 1 and 2 VEREJNOST publishes a 600-word interview with Fedor Gal, chairman of the VPN Coordinating Center and deputy chairman of the VPN Slovak Council, by the VEREJNOST editorial office, entitled "VPN Favors a Government of Personal Competence." The interview was conducted on 15 June. Asked about the course of the coalition talks, Gal says: "The coalition talks with the KDH and the DS are, in my opinion, free of tensions, even though our views on some issues differ. This concerns, above all, the KDH's unwillingness to join the federal government, of which we disapprove. We believe that the fate of Slovakia depends also on the quality and efforts of representatives of Slovak politics on the federal level. A very serious aspect of the coalition talks is the filling of key posts. I am thinking of the posts of premier, head of parliament, and the minister of interior. In the opinion of the VPN, the division of these posts is closely tied to the election results. It is inadmissible not to take into account the fact that the VPN emerged from the elections as the winner and that, consequently, it has the right and duty to offer its candidates for these posts."

Asked when he expects the coalition talks to wind up, Gal says that although the new Slovak Government is to be set up on 26 June, "VPN representatives make no secret of their view that it would not be good to let oneself be pressed for time. It is not respect for deadlines that should have priority now but the composition of a high-quality government of personal competence."

On 18 June, on page 2, VEREJNOST carries a 500-word Adriana Hostovska report on the "closed part" of the all-Slovak VPN Assembly, which was held in Bratislava on 17 June. The report mentions that "Peter Zajac briefed the assembly delegates on the course of coalition talks [on the formation of a Slovak Government]. He said that KHD representatives disagree with the posts of the premier of the Slovak Republic, chairman of the Slovak National Council, and minister of interior being held by people from the ranks of the VPN. Nevertheless, the talks with coalition partners continue."

On 19 June, on page 8, VEREJNOST issues a 50-word "correction" to the Hostovska report. The correction states that the information contained in the 18 June report was "inaccurate" and that it is "set right" by the "statement of the VPN press secretary published in today's issue."

This statement, which is published on page 2, reads: "In connection with the coalition talks between the VPN, KHD, and the DS, the VPN press secretary is authorized to issue the following statement: The talks on a coalition are protracted because the participants have different opinions particularly on the filling of the posts of Slovak premier, chairman of the Slovak National Council, and minister of interior of the Slovak Republic."

Slovaks Warned Against Independence Ambitions

AU2006162090 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Petr Liska commentary: "Reasons of Principle"]

[Excerpts] Even though they used different words, representatives of Slovak parties in the 4 June television discussion basically all unanimously voiced the demand for Slovakia's independence. I would like to draw attention to some serious aspects of this problem.

As to the views of the Slovak National Party, decent people need not dwell upon them too much because arguments such as "the government in Prague causes mass unemployment in the Vah river valley and elsewhere by reducing the production of armaments" strikingly remind one of a dictator with a moustache who did away with unemployment by producing armaments.

What is mind-boggling, however, is to hear the unequivocal demand for independence, though not immediately, from the mouth of Dr. Jan Carnogursky. I greatly respect Dr. Carnogursky for his dauntless defense of dissidents and struggle against the communist regime as well as for his profound faith in God. Nonetheless, I would like to assure Dr. Carnogursky that, should the majority of the Slovak nation harbor the wish, I, too, as a Czech and Czechoslovak, will be in favor of the Slovak nation's inalienable right to self-determination. I would even oppose a national referendum in the entire federation on this issue because only residents of the Slovak Republic should have the right to decide on its fate and residents of the Czech Republic should have no say in this matter. Should, in spite of this, a federal referendum be held, I would vote for Slovakia's independence.

I must, however, draw the attention of Dr. Carnogursky and other Slovak representatives to the fact that not only Slovaks but representatives of other nations, too, live in the Slovak Republic, among them 700,000 Hungarians who would also have the inalienable right to self-determination. [passage omitted]

Slovakia's present southern border with Hungary is based on a single historical document, the Trianon Treaty between Hungary and other states, among them **Czechoslovakia** of 4 June 1920. This border never existed, before this date not even as a border between provinces. The Trianon Treaty imposes on Hungary obligations toward Czechoslovakia—a multi-ethnic state of citizens living on its territory. [passage omitted]

Should the Slovaks give priority to the national principle over the territorial principle and thereby, among other things, deny the continued validity of the Martin Declaration [of 30 October 1918, expressing the will of the Slovak nation to live in a common state with the Czech nation], they could not deny this principle to the 700,000 Hungarians. And they would no longer be able to invoke the Trianon Treaty, whose clause concerning the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border would not exist were it not for the preceding Martin Declaration. [passage omitted]

For the same principles for which I would back the Slovaks' aspirations for independence, I would also give full support in the future to the right of Hungarians to that part of the Upper Country [the Hungarians' name for Slovakia at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire] which they would temporarily inhabit within the framework of an independent Slovak state.

I am sure that, as a lawyer, Dr. Carnogursky will find plenty of arguments from the sphere of international law to refute my conclusions. As a Christian, however, he will find it hard to justify **morally** the further integrity of the Slovak state in the present borders of the Slovak Republic. Should he, by chance, agree with me and refrain from the search for counter-arguments, would it not be better to ponder a common future of all nations living in the legally guaranteed borders of Czechoslovakia?!

Slovak Daily Rejects 'Lessons From Prague'

AU2106093790 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Igor Cibula commentary: "The Awl Has Come Out of the Bag; A Lesson in History From Prague"]

[Excerpts] The political situation in Slovakia after the elections has generated reactions within certain circles in Prague which not only reveal the degree of alarm at the new realities [in Slovakia] but, at the same time, lay bare the moral-political profile of active Czechoslovakists in the Czech environment. They cannot come to terms with the electoral success of the Slovak National Party as a reflection of facts which have their roots in deformed Czech-Slovak relations. What took them aback even more was the refusal of Slovak Christian Democrats to accept seats in the Federal Government. Burdened by the historical prejudices of Dr. Edvard Benes, they resort to insults, manipulation of facts, and one can even find those who, in a certain way, make attempts at intimidation or pressure.

The aforementioned approach can be demonstrated by Petr Liska's article "Reasons of Principle" in the 15 June issue of LIDOVE NOVINY. The views of the Slovak National Party remind the author of arguments used by "a dictator with a moustache," which is meant as a basic characterization of this right-wing political party. The writer includes himself among "decent people," which he apparently deems to be a sufficient reason not to enter into polemics with views with which he disagrees. He did not find it worthwhile to at least try to explain to the readers of this "independent Czechoslovak newspaper" the problems connected with the drastic reduction of production in arms factories in Slovakia, from where export dollars used to generously flow for years to our common federal treasury.

Even more pungent was the lesson in history and international law which the author gave to Jan Carnogursky, LLD., chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement. He reminds Slovak representatives that not only Slovaks live in the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

Yet he did not confine himself to alerting them to this fact. He dwells at length on his doubts about the legitimacy of Slovakia's southern border with Hungary because, supposedly, the sole foundation of this border is the Trianon Treaty of 4 June 1920. [passage omitted]

It is evident from the description of the reality in the article "For Reasons of Principle" that only in the event of the founding of an independent Slovak state would the author regard the codification of our borders under international law as not definitive. We should not qualify his approach as blackmail or as pressure on Slovaks, who had the chance to expres in the free elections a wide spectrum of views on Slovakia's future standing in Europe. Rather, we should perhaps qualify it as a petrified relict of national socialist chauvinism which has survived among fossils of the previous totalitarianism.

Mr. Liska's views disorient the Czech environment and provide Slovak separatists with objective arguments for the defense of their political platform. By their logic they correspond with those voices in Slovakia which resent Czech-Slovak coexistence. We regard them as anti-Czechoslovak also because they question the legitimacy of the state borders of one of the federal republics. The awl has come out of the bag of the Czech petit bourgeois who still believes that only Prague has the exclusive patent rights to guaranteeing the Slovaks' political and state identity.

Slovak Interests in Slovakia Seen as Endangered

AU2006131390 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Jun 90 p 5

[Reprint of Jozef Darmo article published by LITERARNY TYZDENNIK: "Who Is Disturbing the Political Atmosphere?"]

[Text] The Slovak public follows attentively the statements made in the press, on television, or in radio broadcasts by citizens of Hungarian origin. Being familiar with the situation of Slovaks in Hungary, the Slovak public is very often amazed. It is only natural that it tries to find the meaning and the objectives which the current tensions pursue.

At a glance we can ascertain that these tensions—when confronted with the real rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (I will not even mention the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary)—are not connected so much with the efforts for civic and cultural emancipation as they are with the much more important and strategic goals pursued by the mother country on the other side of the Danube. A reasonable person (he does not even have to be a politician!) will certainly ask the question: Is it a coincidence that the aggressive forces of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia have become active recently and that it is mainly these minorities which are spoiling the political climate? Are the efforts made by the Budapest government to give an international status to this "movement"—which it supports or even orchestrates—purely coincidental? Is it a coincidence that we are witnessing direct interference—even interference in the form of ultimatums—by the most senior representatives of this country in the internal affairs of the countries in which the Hungarian minorities live? This suggests that the Hungarian policy toward its closest neighbors has not yet lost the national aggression and the predatory philosophy of the former pre-1918 Hungary which stripped the surrounding non-Hungarian nations of their rights and national existence. This policy was revived after 1918 and also after 1945. Budapest's attitude toward the Slovak ethnic minority in Hungary is not, even today, just a residue of the past, but is the product of the real Hungarian nationality policy, which—according to all its aspects—has not become more democratic and more humane. Hungary, which by its assimilation policy of conquest extended its ethnic territory to the detriment of the surrounding nations, has never reconciled itself to the borders which are the result of the post-World War I arrangement. The aggressive forces are aware of the fact that changing these borders is impossible today. The present strategy is therefore subjugated to the plan for a common European home.

What aims does this pursue? The objective is to strengthen by all means possible the Hungarian minorities in neighboring states in such a way that they are able to create a situation for the factual and spiritual breakaway from the territorial integrity of the countries in which these minorities reside. The Hungarian minority is striving at any price to attain a state of national compactness on this territory by pushing Slovaks out of southern Slovakia. The intention of the rejection of the Slovak language as the official language on the territory of the Slovak Republic and the rejection of it as the common language for communication and as the language of Slovakia's territorial integrity is, in fact, to destroy Slovak integrity.

From this point of view, the demands voiced by aggressive nationalists among the Hungarian minority and interventions by the Hungarian Government in this regard make sense: demands for a separate education system, the activation of Magyar-Hungarian propaganda on this territory by spreading "historical maps," the removal of Slovak signs from cities and villages, and the reluctance to build industry on such a scale that would attract migration to this territory. According to Budapest's program, such a situation should be created in which it would be possible to voice demands for this territory's autonomy at the proper moment and to call for a plebiscite when entering the European home. Yes, I believe these are the goals of Hungarian Government circles. Hesitation and vacillation by the Czechoslovak Government are only playing into the hands of this process. What has been tolerated in this matter is not simple tolerance anymore. It is not possible to tolerate the elimination of the symbols of territorial integrity—of Slovak sovereignty—that is, the Slovak names of cities and villages. This is an act of breaking up the republic, an act of its disintegration, and, as such, it requires intervention by such means designated for the protection of the integrity of our territory—that is, if we are to avoid the pogroms which happened in Romania. It is also necessary to revive the Slovak language as the official language on this territory. Not one of the Slovaks living in Hungary hesitates over the fact that he is supposed to know Hungarian and, as a Hungarian citizen, he does not consider this fact to be an attack against him.

Former Slovak Premier Colotka Faces Charges

LD2006112190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Summary] The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic gave a press conference today about criminality in Slovakia in the last five months.

The number of burglaries increased this year compared with the first five months of last year by almost one and three quarter times. Only in 40 percent of the cases were the culprits caught; they seem to be ever more skillful.

The number of murders in families has significantly increased lately, by almost 85 percent. In 99 percent of the cases the culprit has been caught and charged.

Now with regard to the case which is of interest to our entire general public. It is the case of former Slovak premier Peter Colotka, who is currently in custody. He has so far been charged with issuing an order in 1987 to pay an invoice for almost 130,000 crowns from the government's budget. He used the money to pay for his 60th birthday celebration.

He is also charged with unlawfully taking a picture by national artist Martin Benka, valued at about 50,000 crowns, from the Orava Gallery in Dolny Kubin, which he gave as a present to the president on his birthday. Further criminal activity of Dr. Peter Colotka is under investigation.

Finance Minister Interviewed on Economic Reforms

AU2006125590 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus by Miroslav Kana; place and date not given: "In Three Stages"]

[Text] The past weeks have been rich in international economic and political meetings. The Brettonwood Committee, involving representatives of the European Community and the U.S. Government, took place in Washington on 23 May. We gave the report on this meeting on 25 May. The meeting dealt with financial assistance to East and Central Europe. On Sunday, 27 May, a three plus two meeting was held in Austria not far from our border at the Prince of Savoy's castle. The German speaking ministers of Austria, the FRG, and Switzerland meet every year with the aim of coordinating their financial policy. This time they also invited Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Again, financial assistance to East European countries was discussed. Finally, 40 finance ministers from various parts of the world signed a principal agreement regarding the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on Tuesday, 29 May. This institution is aimed exclusively at providing assistance to East and Central European countries, that is, at financing the transformation of those economies and at the development of the private sector, their denationalization and privatization. CSFR Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, whom we interviewed, participated in all these meetings.

[Kana] All three meetings pertained to financial assistance for East and Central European countries, that is, including Czechoslovakia. How do they regard us at such meetings?

[Klaus] They take us seriously, and usually we are granted the opportunity to speak first.

[Kana] Is this enough for achieving the economic goals which you have presented to the public on multiple occasions?

[Klaus] We are given the floor because they trust our type of economic reform. Specifically, Mr. Michel Camdessus, executive director of the IMF, said: If there is a country in which economic reform is to succeed, then it is Czechoslovakia—and, it is not only he who says this.

[Kana] The question is whether this is a real view or just politeness from a Western manager.

[Klaus] I think that this is a real view of the matter, enforced by the evaluation of our intentions and of the situation in our country—you know that they were here. Other East and Central European countries ask for unstructured financial assistance, that is, as much as possible and as soon as possible, while demanding as many write-offs as possible. Our course of action is diametrically different, which attracts attention and inspires confidence.

[Kana] Despite the fact that you have explained your attitude on multiple occasions, it will not do any harm if you explain it again in light of recent meetings.

[Klaus] We are linking assistance with individual reformist steps, and that is what our partners acknowledge. In Washington, I divided this assistance into three time periods: prior to key reforms, during the reforms, and after them. I know that this seems trivial, but an exact formulation is essential.

[Kana] It will cease to be trivial if you give us details concerning these periods. What I mainly have in mind is the utilization of financial resources.

[Klaus] I proceed from this strategy: Assistance provided prior to reformist steps would be very small. Its utilization is so evident, transparent, and indisputable that it is not necessary to make ownership relations clear and even our deformed prices do not have to be corrected. These are cases which apply outside the economy. Their number is very limited; for example, ecological projects and some technological projects can be included here—telecommunications, for instance. Their scope is very small. This opinion is also shared by foreign partners. They themselves say that this assistance is, in fact, assistance to the existing regime, old centralist institutions, old firms; that is, this assistance would help in preserving the existing structures.

[Kana] Who would have this assistance at their disposal?

[Klaus] This is exactly the question. We can see it immediately. Some of our central organs welcome such assistance very much. Money cannot be distributed from London, Washington, or Brussels; it must be distributed from Czechoslovakia. Some central organs—which we consider to be superfluous in the new economic order—see an opportunity here. Here the danger is that the money will be wasted.

[Kana] We are approaching the most important part of the assistance at the macroeconomic level. This part obviously conditions the success and the speed of the reform. It would be nice if you could mention how you are going to use it.

[Klaus] I repeat once again that this assistance must be timed so as to coincide with the principal reformist steps, above all, with the liberalization of prices in the broadest sense of the word. It is a kind of guarantee which will enable us to stabilize—to a socially and economically acceptable degree—the vacillation of some economic factors which is certain to follow. We have no specific projects. We are concerned mainly with the means of stabilizing the exchange rate after internal convertibility of the koruna is introduced. This matter is being discussed with the IMF, which will undoubtedly coordinate this assistance, and also with representatives of the EC, and with specific world banks and their consortiums.

[Kana] I take it that the third part of the assistance should apply to enterprises.

[Klaus] Yes, it applies to the microstructure. Injections into specific projects—into specific enterprises—are involved. This assistance must be preceded by principal reformist steps in the microstructure.

[Kana] You do not have a crystal ball in your office. Despite this I am going to ask you: In your opinion, how large an amount of money will have to be borrowed?

[Klaus] The first amount of assistance will be small. Our ability to absorb this assistance is not great. Moreover, such projects require time. We are talking about tens—or hundreds at most—of millions of dollars. The second case will depend on the extent to which we want to permit the influence of vacillating economic factors. The more we want to suppress them the greater assistance we will need. It can be said that this sum contains one more zero; that is, it will be greater by one order.

[Kana] There is always a risk connected with all these loans that they will get out of control and that they will be used for short-term goals; that is, the money will be trifled away. Neighboring Poland is a deterring case. What are you going to do to avoid its path?

[Klaus] Poland has drawn much of its debts for goals which we put in the first group and which we want to minimize. Their loans were neutral in the reformist sense and—based on technological or would-be technological considerations—were made to improve some projects. They knew what results this or that action would bring, yet they did not intervene further. Poland's experience showed that this is not the way to do it. That is also why I am against this type of borrowing. Wasting of funds must be prevented by reformist steps. On the macroeconomic scale, this represents maintaining today's logic of a restrictive monetary policy and a fiscal budgetary policy with a slight surplus in the state budget. We are not concerned with the short-term revival of the economy, we need to repair the economy. A short-term revival would drown us even faster. Making monetary and financial relations clear, which is what we push for, will prevent us from wasting the loans. Another matter is key reformist steps in the microstructure—which we have talked about so many times—which prevent the useless wasting of money. They are ownership rights on one hand, and the liberalization of prices on the other hand.

Czechoslovak-Japanese Joint Venture Set Up

AU2006123190 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Jun 90 p 4

["ke"-signed report: "First in CEMA"]

[Text] Bratislava— Representatives of the Slovak State Savings Bank [SSB] yesterday signed a contract on the founding of the "SSB-Anti" Czechoslovak-Japanese joint stock company, which will focus on the development of entrepreneurial activities. For the association of four Japanese companies—Anti, Trans Media Resources Inc., Nexus Inc., and Sakata Purification Co. Ltd.—this joint venture is their first or—as the companies' representatives have called it—trailblazing step in CEMA countries. The joint stock company has a start-up capital of $300,000, in which both partners have an equal stake. It will provide paid consultancy services which should stimulate the development of economic, commercial, or cultural ventures by Czechoslovak and Japanese firms.

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *Reportage on German reunification may also be found in the Federal Republic of Germany section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT and pertinent sections of the East Europe JPRS Report. Third country comment is published as available in the appropriate DAILY REPORT or JPRS publication.*

Resolution on Polish Border Approved 21 Jun

LD2106093990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0820 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR parliament approved today [21 June], by a large majority, a resolution on the border between the united Germany and the Republic of Poland. In it the People's Chamber hopes that the border between the united Germany and the Republic of Poland will finally be confirmed by an international treaty.

De Maiziere on U.S. Talks, SED Property

AU2006153590 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 15 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Premier Lothar de Maiziere by Reiner Oschmann during the GDR delegation's flight back from New York to Berlin on the evening of 13 June: "Liquidation of the PDS? Absolute Nonsense!"]

[Text] [Oschmann] Has the first visit by a GDR head of government to the United States yielded any direct practical results?

[De Maiziere] First, I think that I have been able to expound our stance on the process of German unification, which, from the standpoint of somebody who has to represent the interests of 16 million, does not have to be identical with that of somebody who has to represent the interests of 60 million people—despite any partnership.

Second, I think I have managed quite well to represent the interests of our East European neighbors. In this respect, we could have a bridging function. Our relations with our East European neighbors are not only based on the fact that we share 40 years of suffering; they are also marked by 40 years of dealing with each other in an honest and friendly way. We want to continue this. If the present developments were to be represented as a victory of the West over the East, a psychological situation would be created that would be extremely hard for us to digest.

Third, we had very good talks with business and finance representatives. In these talks, we had to try and reduce a certain reservedness on the U.S. side, because I am concerned that the GDR, or the GDR as it was in the past, might be considered as a consumer market, but not as a country for investments and industries.

[Oschmann] Have your partners in the talks made pledges?

[De Maiziere] You know, money is usually shy as a deer....

[Oschmann] .... That's why I am asking....

[De Maiziere] .... Let's leave it at that.

There was a fourth point: In all my talks, I stressed the necessity of youth exchanges because I have realized that 40 years of isolation have prevented major cultural experience in our country, that there is the danger of a new xenophobia in our country, and other such things.

Fifth, I continued the talks with the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Conference, telling them that we intend to fully face history, including specific material consequences. Before the end of this month, initial negotiations will be held, presumably in Berlin.

[Oschmann] Let us change the subject. What do you think about the reproach that the People's Chamber decision on the parties' assets violates the principle of the separation of powers?

[De Maiziere] I do not think this reproach is justified. This decision concerns all parties, and not only one party, as some people are trying to make us believe. I know from my own experience that not everything in financial matters was handled honestly in the past, because on the day I was elected, I had the accounts settled. I was not very proud of what I saw there.... You know as well as I do that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] had companies not only in the GDR but also abroad. You also know that this was achieved with conspiratorial methods.

[Oschmann] Like you, I do not know that; but like you, I assume that this is the case....

[De Maiziere] Mr. Schalck had the specific authority as of 1972 to run all firms that were managed by him as non-resident companies. There was no obligation to give an account to the state auditing authorities or whatever. Nobody was interested in knowing who was what. These firms are run as limited liability companies [GmbH] of Messrs. A, B, and C. I really think that the people's question is justified: What is going on there? Where do the profits go, and so on and so forth? It is part of my coming to terms with history.

[Oschmann] Does that mean that you dispute the view that this could be an attempt to coldly liquidate a party?

[De Maiziere] That is absolute nonsense! Some 1.9 million people voted for this party. So it has to fulfill legal tasks. However, it must not be in a more advantageous position because of the past.

De Maiziere on Unification, NATO, Berlin

PM2006075290 Paris LE FIGARO in French 18 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Premier Lothar de Maiziere by Jean-Paul Picaper in East Berlin; date not given]

[Text] [Picaper] Premier, why did you also reject Gorbachev's recent proposal offering Germany associate membership in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

[De Maiziere] I advocated staying in a NATO which is more political than military, and whose structures and strategy have been modified. In the future, though, we must seek an all-European security structure which does not exclude anybody, including the Soviet Union and the United States. Exclusion would be a very serious mistake.

We must use the existing structures to smooth the path to this goal.

In addition to this objective, we will have to tackle relations with the South and deal with ecology. It is no longer possible to waste resources on the arms race.

[Picaper] You have just said that a minimum of nuclear weapons is inevitable.

[De Maiziere] While hoping to be able to go beyond deterrence we cannot turn the clock back. These weapons exist and if we succeeded in eliminating them, there would be a race for who could procure new ones before the others. We want German unification to give a strong boost to the disarmament process in Europe.

[Picaper] Do you really think that collective security can replace the existing alliances?

[De Maiziere] A collective security system is inevitable. This will not happen overnight or in the very near future, but at the end of the century.

[Picaper] So, would Germany only remain in NATO until this new system was established?

[De Maiziere] It is a process which will take a long time. It is easier to define the final objective and then to discuss the path to it. At present, we are doing the reverse, without knowing where we are going. Knowing the goal facilitates the search for practicable paths.

"Nato and EEC Membership Is Vital"

[Picaper] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker does not want a collective security system to replace NATO. In his view this can only complement the Atlantic Alliance.

[De Maiziere] NATO and EEC membership is particularly vital because our outlook has been completely changed by the facts. Since 1975 we had all thought that the German question would be settled in an all-European context. Now the German unification process is overtaking European unification.

[Picaper] You told President Bush that the Soviet troops would remain on East German territory for a time. Did Mr. Gorbachev give you the task of conveying that request, as was alleged?

[De Maiziere] I did not visit Mr. Bush as anybody's agent and it annoyed me that a West German newspaper said the opposite.

[Picaper] Should a deadline not be set on the presence of Soviet troops in the GDR?

[De Maiziere] The withdrawal of the Soviet troops presents a social, economic, and ecological problem. If we had them withdrawn in the very near future, the economic damage would be considerable. Nobody has ever before had to move and redeploy such enormous concentrations of armaments in so short a time. Add to that the 360,000 soldiers, some with their families, who must found work and housing.

There is also this saying which is frequently heard in the Soviet Union: Stalin won World War II, Gorbachev is losing it. This is an important question of political psychology. Events in the East European countries must not be interpreted as a victory by the West over the East, but as the dismantling of a system.

[Picaper] Red Army Faction [RAF] terrorists have just been arrested in the GDR. Do you think that there was a connection between the Stasi and the RAF, as Mr. Diestel, your interior minister, thinks?

[De Maiziere] This interpenetration of the Stasi and international terrorism is a serious matter. Those assets were also a major coup for us. Some people thought that our police were not capable of handling the situation. They have just shown that this is not true by their efficiency in accomplishing their present task of fighting crime.

[Picaper] Do you think that the police can serve democracy?

[De Maiziere] Yes. They have proved it. We are also capable of solving our own problems.

[Picaper] Does this mean that if there was trouble, you would have the situation under control?

[De Maiziere] Candles were the main weapon in last fall's revolution. That must continue to be the case.

[Picaper] What is your timetable for reunification? Is it implementation of Article 23 this summer, East German regional elections in September, all-German elections in December or January, then the adoption of a new Constitution and a people's referendum?

[De Maiziere] The dates which you give were recommended by the parliamentary group of the (East German) Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and Democratic Awakening. It is true that our fellow citizens want unity as quickly as possible. We must also, however, put things in order and solve the problems calmly so that a tolerable social community emerges inside the country and, in the external sphere, a country capable of living in peace with its neighbors. It is very difficult to know when the external aspects of German unity will be settled. I do not think that we can separate the internal aspects from the external aspects. This optimistic view taken by the parliamentary group might therefore require more time on some points.

[Picaper] After the treaty of monetary, economic, and social union signed on 28 May and implemented on 1 July, will there be a second reunification treaty in the fall?

[De Maiziere] We must prepare and negotiate this treaty irrespective of the date. In the FRG and the GDR we have developed differently for 40 years and this cannot be canceled out by the GDR simply diving headfirst into the FRG.

This process must continue to be a reunification between two sovereign states. I have said that I will not allow the rate of unification to be imposed on me and that I will negotiate with Bonn on an equal footing.

Berlin, Future Capital

[Picaper] Would you accept the post of vice chairman of an all-German CDU?

[De Maiziere] I think it will be up to the congress for the reunification of the CDU-East and CDU-West to decide that. Judging by the preparations, it could be held at the end of September or beginning of October.

[Picaper] Is it not Chancellor Kohl who will decide?

[De Maiziere] Everybody is free to make proposals, but the vote rests with the congress delegates. In addition, to reunify the parties, as for the states, we must know what our aim is. We therefore think it is necessary to form a program commission comprising members of both parties. In my view, we ought to write the C for Christian in the party's name bigger and more clearly.

[Picaper] So it would be a CDU which was rather more Protestant and a little less Catholic?

[De Maiziere] That is inevitable, in view of the situation in the country. Out of 16 million inhabitants in the GDR, we have 6 million Christians. Of them, 5 million are Protestants and 1 million Catholics. The future CDU will be a little more to the East and a little more Protestant.

[Picaper] What do you think of a federal chancellor from the GDR for the nineties?

[De Maiziere] I am not a prophet.

[Picaper] Would he be a chancellor governing from Berlin?

[De Maiziere] I can imagine Berlin being Germany's capital in the nineties. The integration of the five GDR Laender [as published] into a reunified Germany will be easier to supervise from a city like Berlin. Another advantage of this city is that it is a bridge to the East European countries. The FRG will contribute its reconciliation with France and we will bring our friendship with the Czechoslovaks, the Poles, and also the Russians.

[Picaper] What do you expect from your visit to Paris?

[De Maiziere] I will meet with President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Michel Rocard, Roland Dumas, Edith Cresson, Senate Chairman Alain Poher and representatives of industry and the banks. I also hope to be able to make a quick visit to the famous Conservatory of Music.

We will explain to our French friends that a unified Germany will of course be bigger but that its main objective is peace. It will not be a worrying Germany. Its integration into the existing European structures will be the best guarantee of peace in Europe. The more power we give to supranational structures, the less danger there will be of individualism and nationalism.

We are also bringing another message, which is very important and very simple: It is worth rebuilding this country.

'Probable' All-German Election Date 9 Dec

LD2006171890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1543 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—Increasingly, 9 December is becoming the probable date for the first all-German elections. It was learned from Bonn coalition sources today [20 June] that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl named this date yesterday in a talk with leaders of the government parties. Kohl was also in favor of the unification of the two German states taking place on election night. The election would take place in the still separate states, and the GDR's accession to the Federal Republic would come into force at midnight on 9 December after the votes had been counted.

Earlier, the domestic policy politicians of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] parliamentary party and the people's chamber groups of the CDU/Democratic Awakening, and after a joint consultation the German Social Union also, called for unification to take place on election night. The domestic policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, Johannes Gerster, said that there could be different electoral laws with different hurdles for the elections in the GDR and the Federal Republic. Before the GDR accedes under Article 23 of the Basic Law the legal bases for unity must be prepared.

According to Bonn government sources, the postponing of the elections by a week from the planned date of 2 December is intended to make it easier for the two-plus-four talks on the external aspects of German unity to be concluded beforehand so that the accession of the GDR can take place under Article 23.

Federal Government spokesman Hans Klein said in Bonn today that the GDR must now first of all make its decisions on the question of the election date and the election procedure. [passage omitted]

'Thousands' Demonstrate Against State Treaty

LD2006211790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2002 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Representatives of GDR citizens' movements have called on People's Chamber Deputies to boycott the parliamentary vote on the State Treaty. Ingrid Koeppe (New Forum) called on the parliamentary groups to take part in a public session of the roundtable in front of the People's Chamber building before the start of tomorrow's session in front of thousands of demonstrators in Berlin's Lustgarten this evening.

Ingrid Koeppe stated, "13 weeks after the first free elections, circumstances in the GDR are becoming more and more similar to those before the fall revolution." Citizens' representatives came forward in the fall to abolish privileges. No new ones should be introduced now, the speaker said pointing to the mile cordon and deputies' salaries and expenses.

At the rally, declared a "popular assembly" by the organizers, the significant principles of grass-roots democracy of last year were recalled. Several speakers supported the demands by the citizens' movements for a referendum on the constitution and German unification, as well as a right for citizens to have a say even between elections.

After the rally demonstrators started a vigil in front of the parliament.

Defense Committees Discuss Military Issues

LD2006134190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1300 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The reduction of the National People's Army [NVA], the alliance allegiance of a united Germany, and other military policy problems were the focus of the first joint meeting of the defense committees of the two German parliaments in the Bundestag in Bonn today [20 June]. The chairmen of the committees, Uwe Ronneburger (Free Democratic Party, Bundestag) and Karl-August Kamilli (Social Democratic Party, People's Chamber) told the press that there was a "far-reaching agreement" on the issue of alliance allegiance.

As conditions for Germany's membership in NATO, the two politicians said that the basic principles of the Western alliance must change; the area of the present GDR must enter only the political and not the military organization; no NATO Armed Forces should be stationed on the territory of the GDR; and Germany should take into account the security interests of the Soviet Union. For a transitional period, until the formation of an all-German Army, the NVA will continue to exist as a "reduced Army," it was stressed.

With reference to the reduction of the NVA to 70,000 men, which is sought by members of the Bundestag committee, and a Federal Army strength of 400,000 men, Karl-August Kamilli said that an all-German Army cannot be reduced by "abolishing the People's Army and slightly reducing the Bundeswehr." This is a "problematic position." According to Kamilli, it would be a sensible thing if a pan-European security system can be set up without national Armies, but this is certainly a very long way off. In any case, the whole development in Germany should be embedded in the process of creating a pan-European peace order.

Diestel: Harboring RAF Honecker 'Hobby'

LD1906113690 Hamburg DPA in German 1017 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] [no dateline as received]—Interior Minister Diestel announced that for the first time, Frau Maier-Witt was detained on the validity of information from a former senior employee of the Main Department 22 of the former Ministry of State Security. The Main Department 22 was responsible for combating terrorism and also dealt with the integration of the suspects.

The interior minister said that the suspected RAF [Red Army Faction] terrorists apprehended so far were furnished with new identities in a Stasi center which was designated a holiday camp in the village of Briesen, Frankfrut/Oder area (bezirk). Diestel stressed that this took place under the strictest secrecy. "People only addressed each other using covernames or first names."

Diestel said that the reception of terrorists from the Federal Republic had evidently been an "individual hobby" of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke, who saw their own youth reflected in the terrorists. Only a small group of people was informed about the harboring of terrorists. Even the sphere of state security under the former spy chief Markus Wolf had nothing to do with the matter in any phase of its existence. It has now been explained to him, Diestel, that taking in the arrested terrorists had been considered a measure for combating terrorism.

The minister stated that eight suspected RAF members have been extensively integrated in the GDR and have no longer been active in terrorism since being sheltered. Nothing final however can be said on this.

The federal prosecutor's office wants to apply for the extradition of Silke Maier-Witt today, the spokesman for the Federal Prosecutor's Office, senior public prosecuter Hans-Juergen Foerster announced in Karlsruhe.

Judges, Lawyers Said Able To Modify Own Files

AU1906122390 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Juergen Metkemeyer report: "Socialist Unity Party of Germany Jurists Can 'Launder' Their Files"]

[Excerpt] Frankfurt/Main, 18 June—According to information received by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the Justice Ministry in East Berlin is currently handing over to judges and state prosecutors their personal files. According to Wolfgang Korbe, deputy chairman of the GDR Judges' Association, the ministry, which is headed by the controversial liberal GDR politician Kurt Wuensche, is even permitting these people to modify their personal files so that in a united Germany they can be taken over into the legal system for life.

This Thursday [21 June], the new GDR law on the judiciary is to be adopted in the second reading by the People's Chamber in East Berlin. The new law also states that the parliament must establish an election committee of nine persons, which will decide, on the basis of the files, whether a judge can expect to be permanently employed in the future.

Yet, according to what Korbe and Juergen Lucas, a judge from East Berlin, told the audience at a discussion of the special group of judges and state prosecutors within the Public Service Transportation and Traffic [OeTV] in West Berlin last Thursday [14 June], these files have been modified. Commendations and certificates for the perfect administration of justice in accordance with the party line have been erased and curricula vitae were rewritten so that they would not be an obstacle to getting a position for life even in an FRG-type legal system, Korbe and Lucas stated. Another jurist admitted that he removed from his file certificates that were much coveted until the fall of 1989 and took them home in a "plastic bag" to make sure that he would not be "reproached" in the future.

According to high-ranking representatives of the West Berlin legal administration, with this "file laundering," Wuensche, who had been in the same function between 1967 and 1972, during which time he established the legal framework for the SED course, wants to provide old friends with jobs for life. Wuensche, who was recruited for the transitional cabinet by Party of Democratic Socialism Premier Hans Modrow, made a similar attempt even in January of this year. At the roundtable in East Berlin, Wuensche suggested employing all judges and state prosecutors immediately for life. However, the roundtable rejected this proposal. [passage omitted]

Modrow Reportedly Ordered 'Laundering'

AU2006114090 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 20 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Juergen Metkemeyer report: "All GDR Enterprises Return Files"]

[Excerpt] Frankfurt/Main, 19 June—Shortly before the first free elections the former East Berlin government under Premier Hans Modrow ordered that not only judges and state prosecutors, but also all other employees in the GDR may examine and modify their personal files. This follows from a "Decree on the Work With Personal Files," which the GDR Council of Ministers put into force on 1 March 1990 yet which passed unnoticed by the public. Meanwhile, the East Berlin Justice Ministry has defended the "laundering" of files of judges and state prosecutors, about which FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU reports on Monday [19 June].

According to legal experts, this decree gave all employees in the GDR the chance to erase facts of their past that they did not like. The decree of 1 March, which was published in the legal gazette, yet whose consequences have become public only now, instructs all heads of "state organs, combines, enterprises, cooperatives, administrative departments, and institutions in the GDR" that "together with the working people, all existing personal files must be gradually eliminated, yet no later than when they leave an enterprise, and that all documents that are not needed must be handed over to the working people for their personal use."

The decree leaves it to the discretion of the individual employees whether or not they want to pass on these files to the new work place. The enterprises must not pass on data without their consent.

In connection with this decree, West Berlin Justice Senator Jutta Limbach told FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU on Tuesday that such an action will only increase the loss of trust into the GDR judiciary. However, at the same time, the official of the Social Democratic Party of Germany warned against a general condemnation of all GDR judges. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Program To Continue Under EC Standards

AU1806010790 Vienna KURIER in German 17 Jun 90 p 4

["kmm"-signed report: "The GDR Continues to Count on Nuclear Power"]

[Text] Despite the decision to close down the Greifswald nuclear power plant, the GDR continues to count on nuclear fission. Like the former fraternal country CSFR, the East Germans want to get away from brown-coal combustion, which causes heavy pollution. The GDR—followed by the CSFR—is Europe's biggest producer of sulfur dioxide, which kills the trees.

Even the disputed Greifswald nuclear plant is to be resurrected. While this year a reactor of the Soviet type is to be closed down, work on a second reactor in the same plant continues.

In the mid-1990's the nuclear power plant in Stendal, which is currently under construction, is to be completed. "Of course, everything with top modern western technology, which corresponds to the safety standards of the EC," Karl-Hermann Steinberg, spokesman of the GDR environment minister, told KURIER.

After the sensational death of Greifswald, in the medium term nuclear life will flourish even more than before.

Greens, PDS Reportedly Increase Contacts

AU2006133890 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 14 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Leftist Green, Radical, Autonomous Spectrum?"]

[Text] Berlin—Indications that sections of the Greens (West) are cooperating with the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] are becoming increasingly clear. After the PDS regional congress of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania mentioned as partners in talks "for PDS groups that are developing" in the FRG, the Hamburg Green-Alternative List, among others, Bundestag deputy Siggi Fries has now also made statements in favor of such an alliance. As the leftist Green deputy said, she could "conceive of an alliance that would represent a spectrum from the leftist Green area, the radical left, sections of the Autonomous groups....and the PDS."

Thus the leftists among the Greens continue to bank on a course that is aimed at a split. They consider the ecological party merely a quiet harbor until all-German elections have been held, so as to then found an all-German socialist party together with the PDS. This strategy has already led to massive conflicts within the Greens. For instance, the GAL [Green Alternative List] in Hamburg has split, and the PDS strategists within the AL [Alternative List] in Berlin are planning to leave the red-green coalition.

Antje Vollmer, the spokesperson of the Greens Bundestag group, has sharply criticized the election of the fundamentalist new federal presidium. She said that the new highest body of the party reflects "the spirit of the status quo and of the green restoration."

Modrow Views PDS, 'Precipitous Unification'

AU2006143390 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with former Premier Hans Modrow by Ulla Massow during the PDS Mecklenburg/Western Pomerania Land congress; place and date not given: "Prove Ability to Form Alliance"]

[Text] [Massow] This land congress of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] was the first one in our republic. What is its importance, in your view?

[Modrow] Comrades have gathered and they are participating in the preparations for establishing the laender. Thus the party congress was an important step toward Germany's unification. The election results showed that here in the north people consider our party very important.

[Massow] How should the party best make use of being the third strongest party?

[Modrow] Our knowledge must be based on what we are facing. When diet elections take place, new laws, for instance, will already be effective. The Modrow government was called a transition government. In my view, the De Maiziere government has become the transitional government. It hardly represents anything independent for the GDR. There are rights, however, which we have to preserve and which the FRG citizens want to enforce as guaranteed rights, particularly the right to work. Trade unionists in the FRG want to have this right anchored in the Constitution.

[Massow] Which of the tested things, do you think, should be carried over into unity?

[Modrow] I think that we have to contribute many values. There is solidarity, human warmth, the ability to stage a nonviolent and peaceful revolution, the sovereignty of the people, tolerance, and the understanding of politics by millions of citizens. We should not forget, however, that even though brothers and sisters in East and West want to shape unity, their wishes are not those of the capitalists, for whom the only thing that counts is profit.

[Massow] What dangers do you see in a precipitous unification?

[Modrow] In the People's Chamber we see particularly clearly that the processes of preparing the economic and monetary union are not mastered. There are no concepts against unemployment or for reducing unemployment. They simply announced a hot autumn, as if it were not linked with politics. Here the PDS has a great responsibility. It must show the processes as they are and must indicate the risks the government is taking.

[Massow] Does the PDS have a chance of working against its being increasingly isolated by those in power?

[Modrow] We can limit this isolation. Our efforts are directed at this. We have to link the view to all-German elections with the diet elections. The diet elections will be the acid test for the strength of and trust in the leftist opposition. We will have to show the ability and possibilities to form alliances, which emerge as a result. Only if we achieve respectable results in the diet elections will the leftists in the FRG consider the leftists in what is still the GDR as a real power, together with which things can be achieved.

PDS Reportedly Holding 1.08 Billion Marks

AU2006131290 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 14 Jun 90 p 1

[Wolfgang Huebner report: "PDS Discloses Assets—1.08 Billion Marks"]

[Text] Berlin—The financial assets of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] at present total 1.08 billion marks. Out of this sum, 880 million have been centrally managed; the funds of bezirk and kreis leaderships and grass-roots organizations amount to 200 million. The party assets also include 48 million marks in foreign currency—former earnings from enterprises and organizational activities. It is unknown whether transfers from abroad were made to this foreign currency account. In addition to these assets, the PDS has land and buildings.

That was stated by deputy party chairman Wolfgang Pohl at an international news conference in Berlin on Wednesday [13 June]. After the currency conversion, the PDS would have about 440 million Deutsche marks [DM], plus the existing foreign currency. If the money were not to be changed, the state would have to take over the burdens, or the party would be forced to file a bankruptcy petition. Then the political goal of liquidating the PDS with its currently 350,000 members would essentially have been reached. Answering a question, Pohl said, however, that he hoped the PDS accounts would be converted. He added that this hope was based on the fact that the party had honestly disclosed the origin and use of the money.

Pohl said that the reason he was giving the news conference were the resolutions adopted by the People's Chamber on verifying and holding in trust the parties' assets and property. An exact account of the PDS' property and assets by 30 June was envisaged anyway.

So far, neither the People's Chamber nor the GDR Government has prepared criteria for such a property account. That made it more difficult to prepare the material, as did the fact that the work had to be done under enormous time pressure. Wolfgang Pohl said that in addition, the former leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] attached little value to orderly legal documentation. He said that it was, therefore, not yet possible to conclude the work of exactly establishing the PDS' assets and giving specific information. Thus the journalists were briefed on 28 pages of facts and figures, which seems to make two things clear: First, the people within the PDS itself are feverishly working at compiling the most complete report possible. Second, it just would not be serious to explain such a complicated matter with a few facts.

Wolfgang Pohl said that the PDS has already transferred 3.041 million marks to the state budget. Out of this sum, 500 million marks were used for improving the supply of and care of old people, and 833 million marks were spent on the health and social affairs system.

Because of the explosive nature of the topic, many questions were understandably asked. Answering repeated questions of journalists about whether the SED possibly held accounts in other countries, Pohl said that the research that has been carried out so far, has not yielded any results. Thus the PDS practically did not hold any assets abroad, said Pohl. Asked whether the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] had meanwhile made financial claims, Pohl said that he had heard about such claims only from the media.

For founding and running private firms, limited liability companies [GmbH], and trade establishments, the PDS has spent about 280 million marks. These enterprises are supposed to preserve jobs. In almost every case, the shareholders are persons; the PDS does not participate in such companies and does thus not participate in their profits and losses. About 25 percent of the shareholders are PDS members. Pohl said that the PDS has spent 40 million marks on direct political work, whereas the major part of its expenditures has been used to cover the burdens left by the SED.

PDS Brandenburg Land Association Founded

AU2006122990 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 18 Jun 90 p 3

[ND-Herr. report: "PDS Land Association in Brandenburg"]

[Text] Potsdam—The Brandenburg Land Association of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] constituted itself at its first land party congress on Sunday [17 June]. During the discussion, which took several hours, questions of party renewal were mainly discussed. The goal of the next months is to establish the PDS as an important leftist power in Brandenburg and to become a strong Diet group. Heinz Vietze was elected chairman of the land association.

* Justice Minister's Career Questioned

90GE0167A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 8 Jun 90 p 7

[Klaus Pokatzky article: "The Fox Set to Watch the Chickens—Kurt Wuensche, the Servant of Many Masters, Feels Himself Unjustly Attacked"]

[Text] East Berlin, June. On Friday, at noon, the justice minister is quite well satisfied with himself, and with the world. For two days, Kurt Wuensche was the guest of the conference with his West German counterparts and colleagues for the first time, and, "on a human level," they were able to "come much closer to one another—in spite of a few recent publications that affected me as a person."

The recent publications at issue were aired on the television screen the night before the conference started. The ARD program "Contrasts" was devoted to the career of the liberal justice minister in the first freely elected government in the GDR, who was also the justice minister in the last cabinet controlled by the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany], the man who had previously held this post under Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honnecker: Kurt Wuensche—a German Career.

The television program, in his view was "way below the belt," a "one-sided presentation, torn out of context."

Of course, he was justice minister from 1967 until 1972. Of course, during this period, the GDR's penal code was changed (1968), and with these changes, the penalties for political offenses were beefed up considerably, and, following the protests and demonstrations against the occupation of Czechoslovakia, they were used in large measure against the opposition.

But formulating these laws had been the work of his predecessor, Hilde Benjamin, and if he called out in response to the claim made by the ARD reporter that he, Wuensche, "politically propagated" the law: "That does not apply, that does not apply," then that was not a lie. Immediately following that segment, the television network presented a segment from GDR-TV from 1968 in which Wuensche, seated next to Hilde Benjamin, defended the more severe penalties imposed upon critics in the following way: "Precisely these same people, who are becoming the most agitated are practically forcing us to protect the sovereignty of our state with such drastic measures."

He claimed that after all, that was more than 20 years ago, and, "if one allows certain personalities—you know the ones I am talking about—to have blackouts within the span of a few weeks—then you ought to grant that someone else might have difficulty remembering remarks made 25 years ago in a context of that type, don't you agree?" Kurt Wuensche: overcoming a German past.

Wuensche, the son of a chemist, who was born in 1929 in Obernigk in Silesia, joined the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD) while he was still in school, and, after graduating from an academic secondary school, he became a full-time party functionary. At 25, he held a seat in the People's Chamber, at 31, he was deputy secretary general of the LDPD, at 36, deputy premier, and two years later, successor to the SED's policymaker in the Justice Department, Hilde Benjamin. In 1972 he was pushed out of office, because he created problems when nationalization measures were taken, unlike the position he took in 1968. Nevertheless, he had a soft landing in a professor's chair at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, where he lectured on the court system. In January of 1990, Hans Modrow once again appointed him to the post of minister of justice.

His LDPD, the deputy party chairman of which he is, formed a coalition with the National Democratic Party (NDPD) to form the Union of Free Democrats, is still on the rolls for the election to the Chamber of the People, and it has formed a factional alliance with the newly founded FDP [Free Democratic Party] of the GDR, and now it wants to forge a union with this party and the West German FDP. For the moment, his own party is maintaining silence; while the People's Chamber faction was closing its ranks behind Wuensche, the Eastern branch of the FDP declared on Tuesday evening, after a meeting of its Council of the States, which lasted for several hours: "On no account will there be a coalition with Mr. Wuensche as minister of justice or deputy chairman of the LDPD. We demand his resignation." What the Eastern Liberals find "disturbing in the extreme," is the "great deal of support that Mr. Wuensche enjoys in the West German FDP."

In those circles, initially, the only warning voice was that of the FDP Bundestag Deputy Burkhard Hirsch. A few weeks ago, he managed to block a visit by Wuensche to the Task Force on Law of the FDP Bundestag faction. "If that fellow comes, I'll raise a procedural motion and have him thrown out." Wuensche and his party chairman, Rainer Ortleb, gave up on their trip to the Rhine. And after Hirsch was finished telling the "Contrasts" microphones he was appalled that Wuensche did not resign, over Whitsun the Party Chairman Otto Count Lambsdorff spoke out on the subject of Wuensche in a program from Radio Bremen, saying that his role as justice minster "in the times of really Ulbrichtian, or even Stalinistic policies in terms of justice" raised "cause for many questions and many concerns."

By means of a jointly written dissertation on "The function and development of the LDPD in the multi-party system of the GDR," Kurt Wuensche and his party crony Manfred Gerlach earned their doctoral degrees in jurisprudence. At that time, Gerlach was, among other things, secretary general of the LDPD, Wuensche was his deputy, and both sat in the People's Chamber. Their dissertation advisor, Karl-Heinz Schoenburg, who had the reputation of being something of a crank in East German legal circles, even in the days of the SED, and of whom it was said in the five years prior to the change that "one publication out of every two should not be permitted to appear" reports that the two candidates actually wrote this work in two years' time; he insisted on it, and he checked up on them.

In 349 pages the two Liberals plead the case for the "multi-party system of the GDR" as a "particular form of alliance that had proven its worth in the long-term transition from capitalism to socialism"; of the LDPD they said it was "a reliable, state-supporting factor, even in complicated situations" in establishing the "leading role of the working class" and its "new type of party," the SED.

The authors also indicate, in a decent way, that they were actively involved in the late forties and early fifties, as a result of thoroughgoing debate, in forcing conservative and reactionary elements from the LDPD, and that in the final analysis, the party had been transformed "from a bourgeois democratic party into a democratic party of the petty bourgeoisie" that stood side-by-side with the SED. "Without the clever alliance policies of the SED," the LDPD, "like the FDP" would have "become an instrument of reaction and restoration."

Of those FDP politicians who left the GDR in the years in which the LDPD was brought up to the status of SED advance scout, of those "defenders of the old bourgeois order whose time had come and gone," it was said: "They can think only in terms of the coalition concepts of bourgeois parliamentarianism, and, beyond all reason, they praise the 'free interplay of forces' in parliament, the deception of the people"—"the coalition of bourgeois parties in capitalism at the expense of, and in conjunction with, the deception of the voters for the advantage of these or those monopolistic groups that are represented by parties."

"In conjunction with the fascist attempted putsch on 17 June 1953" it is noted that the LDPD, at that time standing solidly at the side of the SED, "successfully passed the test of its worth." Kurt Wuensche spent four months in Stasi incarceration following 17 June 1953, as a result of "strong sympathies that I harbored for certain people who were active in Dresden and at other locations at the time," under "prison conditions that were, in part, degrading, but without physical effects, in the sense of torture."

That provided an impetus for him to study law. In the old days of the SED, he now stresses, his Justice Ministry had "no one competent in administering justice." The key function in terms of determining personnel-related matters involving the judiciary was performed by his SED party secretary of state, "apart from just a few exceptions." He claims that he often wrangled with the bosses of the SED Central Committee, a point his critics confirm. He claimed that was the reason for his forced resignation in 1972.

No one competent to administer justice? In a work submitted for tenure by two jurists in the GDR in 1982, among other things, the duties of the Justice Ministry were described. The "administration and inspection of the courts" are among them, as is the authorization to instruct the directors and chief justices of the regional courts, the district courts, and the courts martial. "When viewed as a whole, the instructive and directive duties of the Ministry of Justice in the area of maintaining the law, stand in the foreground of its activities." As a result of this work on "Basic Questions of the Status, the Function, and the Activities of the Courts, the State's Attorney's Office, and the Members of the Bar in the GDR," tenure was granted to "Professor Frohmut Mueller, JD", and "Professor Kurt Wuensche, JD."

Among the most important tasks of the justice minister of the GDR today, until reunification finally occurs is not only creating legal parity with the laws of the FRG, but also cleaning up those portions of the legal system over which the Justice Ministry exercises administrative authority, monitoring authority, and executive authority: the judiciary. Under pressure from the ministry, 82 judges, against whom it was claimed that they exercised particular duplicity in the role of the courts as an ancillary organ of the State Security Service, were compelled either to resign or to transfer to administrative duties within the justice system. A few more will probably leave as well, but for Wuensche, those judges who only "occasionally" imposed prison sentences on such perpetrators as those who attempted to flee the republic, and remained at the lower scale of the sentences that could have been imposed, are perfectly acceptable. He also considers those occupational judges acceptable who only "occasionally" found that a teacher, for example, was properly dismissed because he filed an application to emigrate. He is proud to take his place at the head of his judges, except for those who distinguished themselves by particular "intensity" in the apparatus of repression, those "with extreme exactness," and those who "extensively" took advantage of the "legally prescribed upper limits of the sentencing guidelines."

Should he have refused to become justice minister again following the democratization of the GDR? On this point, Kurt Wuensche can become rather loud: "I don't like a certain type of unfounded arrogance that breaks through in such investigations, which assume a character that rather smacks of the Inquisition and then permeates our landscape rather regularly." He asks that a "comparison with the prevailing conditions" in the FRG be undertaken, "which do not represent an altogether healthy landscape when I look at questions surrounding occupational bans, for instance."

Antall Comments on German Relations, Pact

AU2106081390 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 17 Jun 90 p 4

[Interview with Premier Jozsef Antall by Siegmar Schelling in Budapest; date not given: "The Warsaw Pact Has Lost Its Meaning"]

[Text] [Schelling] Istvan Horvath, Hungary's ambassador to Bonn, will in the future be responsible for both German states. Will he also be Hungary's first all-German ambassador; is Hungary planning to be a step ahead of all the other countries in this respect as well?

[Antall] That is correct. Hungary supports Germany's reunification without reservation. We have made our contribution in the past—with the modest means at our disposal—and we will continue to act in this way. Extending our ambassador's activities to Berlin corresponds to the practical realities. I am convinced that many countries will act similarly in the near future.

[Schelling] Would you advocate membership in NATO for a united Germany?

[Antall] I think that we must seize the unique chance of history and put an end to the division of Europe. We favor European integration which is not opposed to the Atlantic idea. The two world wars in this century have proved that the Atlantic idea is right. A united Germany will have its place in a unified Europe; however, like the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, it will form part of an all-European security system. In my view, the membership of a united Germany in NATO and the EC, and the resultant obligations, constitute a sufficient guarantee, so Germany can develop its sovereignty without threatening the justified security interests of its neighbors and the continent.

[Schelling] There is also a proposal to neutralize and demilitarize a united Germany....

[Antall] A "demobilized" or "neutral" Germany would represent a much larger insecurity factor than a Germany which is tied into an alliance.

[Schelling] Will Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact?

[Antall] In the present circumstances, the military organization of the Warsaw Pact has lost its meaning. Therefore, our country does not by any means intend to remain a member of this organization. We advocate disbanding the military organization of the Warsaw Pact step by step by 1991. The organization cannot be modernized or democratized. Because of this, I suggested at the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow that we should discuss its revision.

[Schelling] How do you judge the efforts to give the CSCE a main role in a future European security system?

[Antall] Shaping the future Europe is an extremely important and responsible task which will entail qualitative changes resulting in the far-reaching restructuring of life of the nations in this region. I think the main role of the CSCE is that it will lead to a future European security system. Hungary agrees to the proposals that are aimed at institutionalizing the CSCE process.

[Schelling] Could you conceive of Hungary becoming a member in the EC?

[Antall] We want to actively take part in the West European process of integration and establish closer relations with the EC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. Regarding the EC, our main objective is to achieve an associated status. Thus I consider it conceivable for Hungary to become a full member in the EC before the end of this decade. My government will do everything in its power to reach this goal.

[Schelling] What do you expect of your first visit to Bonn as Hungary's chief of government?

[Antall] The exclusive character of Hungarian-German relations has century-old roots. At present, we have good relations with both German states. After unification, we want to at least maintain this level. However, I think that it is really realistic to achieve an entirely new quality of relations. In a united Germany and a free Hungary, the conditions for this will be better than they have ever been before. During my upcoming visit, I want to continue the exchange of ideas that we have conducted recently with leading German figures, in particular Federal Chancellor Kohl.

[Schelling] Last fall, Hungary was the first East Bloc country to cut the Iron Curtain. Has this decisive political act been duly acknowledged, beyond the moral tribute that has been paid to it?

[Antall] The Hungarians have always followed with sympathy the Germans' almost hopeless struggle for unity and the abolition of their division. Our decision at that time was basically determined by this factor; however, we also had to take the political consequences into account when we let the Germans coming from the GDR pass. The situation developed in such a way that Hungary's step was received positively and was acknowledged throughout Europe. Together with Poland, we were the pioneers in the process of change in the Eastern Bloc. Our step led to the landslide changes of 1989—in the GDR, the CSFR, and other countries.

[Schelling] Do you expect more West Germans to spend their vacation in Hungary this summer?

[Antall] The opening of the Iron Curtain has led to a real flood of sympathy; we have also seen this with the Germans. According to the existing data and the forecasts of tourism experts, we can expect an unprecedented number of tourists from the FRG in 1990.

[Schelling] How will the trade balance between the two countries develop?

[Antall] We seek to achieve an even balance, and we do not want to achieve it by way of restrictions. Liberalization in both directions is already showing its pleasant effects, because Hungary's exports in the first five months of this year rose above average, by 32 percent. However, our main effort is not aimed at increasing the mere trade exchange, but at making our country increasingly attractive for German investors.

[Schelling] How far has your country gotten with the planned domestic policy reforms? Could Bonn help in this respect?

[Antall] The change of the political system in Hungary is a fact today. At the same time, it is, of course, very difficult for things to start moving following 40 years of a centralized dictatorial system. The change of the system will be carried out if the local elections in the fall lead to really self-administered regional power organs able to organize life in villages and towns without instructions from above. In this area, the FRG has extremely useful and practical experiences that we would like to get to know better and adopt. The same holds true for the economy where free initiative and the value system of the market will be given wide latitude. Most of the aid that Hungary has received so far has come from the FRG.

Antall Continues Tour, Talks in W. Germany

Reassures FRG Entrepreneurs

LD2006132290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Gyorgy Bernat reports from Munich about the program today of our premier.

[Bernat] Premier Jozsef Antall, was presented with a BMW at the factory's research unit. The car, made of glass, is around 30 cm long. The unit's leaders also surprised the head of government by saying that they consider possible the collaboration of Hungarian enterprises in the factory's production. From tomorrow, experts from the factory will gain information in Hungary about what kind of supplies they can expect, and from where. Almost 400 Hungarian skilled workers are working at BMW, so well that quality control has been stopped in their section. The company would definitely like to continue and expand this kind of cooperation. This was said by the chairman of BMW, and he called on the Bavarian and West German governments to amend the regulations limiting the employment of Hungarian workers.

It transpired in the Munich and Upper Bavarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce that Hungary exports more to Bavaria than it purchases. According to the chairman of the chamber, it would be worthwhile trying to ensure that the Hungarian legal system does not differentiate between ventures inside and outside the country. This would make it significantly easier for Bavarian companies to settle. Some 400 West German ventures have created joint enterprises with Hungarians, and one third of them are Bavarian.

In July a Hungarian consulate opens in Munich.

Jozsef Antall told the Bavarian representatives of commerce and industry that it is extremely important for us to learn the experiences of FRG entrepreneurs. He asked them to unequivocally formulate, if necessary in blunt form, their opinions concerning the Hungarian economy. He warned them that in the process of dismantling the party state we cannot expect to create a state of well-being the next day. It will take a long time, and it is urgent that we take the first steps.

He gave reassurances to the Bavarian enterpreneurs about the emotional manifestations of debates in Hungary. Jozsef Antall highlighted the peaceful nature of changes in Hungary, and also stressed that the majority of the population agree on fundamental issues. The premier outlined the main elements of the Hungarian political system, and also said that the agreement between the government and the oposition has made balanced parliamentary political activity possible for the Hungarians. He tried to convince the Bavarian entrepreneurs that they can safely come to Hungary, where the restructuring will continue in a peaceful way. They will receive guarantees that foreign ventures will enjoy security and freedom in Hungary. The forces of the center, with a sense of responsibility, prevent extremes from being able to assert themselves in Hungary, said Premier Jozsef Antall to West German entrepreneurs in the Chamber of Inudstry and Commerce in Munich.

Bavaria Offers More Credit

LD2006135890 Budapest MTI in English 1144 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 20, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Bavaria is prepared to grant Hungary a credit guarantee worth 100 million DM [Deutsche marks] to enable Bavarian commercial banks to finance Bavarian capital investment in Hungary, Max Streibl, prime minister of Bavaria, told Jozsef Antall, his Hungarian counterpart currently on a visit to West Germany.

This means the 250-million-DM credit line which Bavarian banks allocated Hungary last autumn to finance the foundation and development of Hungarian-Bavarian JVS [joint ventures] will now rise to 350 million DM.

However, of the 250 million DM so far available, JVS have only taken out 2 million DM.

Economic experts in Bavaria have been critical of this low take-up rate, pointing out that the whole thing has been insufficiently plugged on both sides.

The Hungarian side said it is Hungarian commercial banks that are obliged to extend guarantees for 50 per cent of the 250-million-DM credit line, with the Bavarian Government being responsible for the other half.

Bavarian banks will grant the credit at an interest rate of 9.75 per cent, a grace period of 2 years, and a 7-year maturity, but by the time JVS can get access to the credit through Hungarian banks, the interest rate will rise to about 11.5 per cent.

Though there are over 100 Hungarian-Bavarian JVS in existence at the moment, many of them only have a small initial capital, and any credit taken out may not exceed twice the JVS' initial equity.

Another condition is that the Bavarian stake should reach at least 30 per cent in any eligible JV.

Despite all these conditions, about 50 million Deutschmarks' worth of credits are expected to be taken out by JVS by the end of the year.

Of the new, 350-million-DM credit line, 150 million DM would be earned for JVS, 100 million for expert training and re-training, and 100 million would be set aside to finance small and medium-sized Hungarian companies. This distribution of the credit line is more in line with Hungarian needs.

Holds Talks in Bavaria, Stuttgart

LD2006222690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Gyorgy Bernath reports from Stuttgart about today's events in the visit to the FRG by the Hungarian premier.

[Bernath] It emerges from the program, too, that during his visit to Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, Jozsef Antall is guided by economic talks, and more precisely by the intent to gain further West German capital. It is not charity, but long-term economic cooperation which we await from the German economy, Premier Jozsef Antall stated. [passage omitted]

Today, Jozsef Antall visited two chambers of industry and commerce; in Munich he called on the local and Upper Bavarian headquarters, and in Stuttgart he visited the headquarters of this organization encompassing all of Germany. He, for example, asked the representatives of Bavarian enterpreneurs to relate bluntly the tribulations they had experienced in the course of transactions, in founding mixed enterprises in Hungary. At this a flood of complaints began—from lack of discipline in deliveries, through quality problems, to pitfalls in the legal system and lack of organization.

Jozsef Antall told West German entrepreneurs that the government does not want to offer the poorly functioning large enterprises for purchase. It wishes to shape the economy in such a manner that Hungarian and foreign capital enjoy favorable conditions. These processes are time-consuming. The main tasks of privatization will be fulfilled in the action program for the coming three years. This is also misinterpreted as the government's being afraid or hesitant. There is no question of this, Jozsef Antall reassured the West German audience.

On 1 July the Hungarian Government will launch its enterprise-revival emergency program. It will carry out an advance privatization and will place 40,000 servicing and commercial catering industry units in private hands. It will turn approximately 15 large enterprises into joint stock companies. [passage omitted]

There was also mention of Soviet-Hungarian economic relations at the discussions in the Stuttgart chamber. As of January, when we switch over to trade accounting in convertible currency, we might develop a deficit of $1 billion. [as heard] For this reason, Antall noted, we concluded an agreement in principle in Moscow with Premier Ryzhkov, so that through joint ideas and new methods we can try to reduce the shock to the Hungarian economy. Next week, a Hungarian Government delegation will travel to Moscow. It will hold talks on how it is possible to reduce this deficit, which is expected to be very large—but not by holding back turnover, but by financial-technical methods.

Prior to his program today in Stuttgart, the premier stopped for a short time in Sindelfingen. He was the first Eastern politician to visit the world headquarters of the Danubian Swabians. The talks between Jozsef Antall and Lothar Spaeth, Baden-Wuerttemberg premier, have been planned for 2200 hours this evening—so late, it is said, because Premier Spaeth returned only this evening from Moscow, where he cut short his visit for the sake of Jozsef Antall. [passage omitted]

Fur Remarks on Current Military Reduction Issues

LD2006154290 Budapest MTI in English 1459 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 20, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—In the past five years, the Hungarian budget has cut the originally-planned defence expenditure by 80 billion forints ($1.2 billion), Minister of Defence Lajos Fur told newsmen here today.

Mr Fur said this is one of the reasons the weapons and technical facilities of the Hungarian Army have become so run-down: a few weapon types are even incapable of operation.

The switch-over to convertible accounting in Hungary's trade with the Soviet Union and the rest of the COMECON countries next year will also affect military imports.

It is therefore possible that from next year, Hungary will start buying certain types of weapon from Western countries.

At the same time, experts are considering reviving Hungary's military industry, which has quite considerable traditions to look back on, and which could even become a key branch, the minister of defence said.

Reports indicate that the manufacture of military vehicles would be the most likely.

The ministry is not considering establishing a professional army in Hungary, Mr Fur said, because preliminary figures suggest it would cost six times as much as the draftee system.

As a result of the Soviet troops withdrawal and the reduction in the Hungarian Army—the number of soldiers will be cut from 107,000 to 75,000 by 1992—an area of 20,000 hectares will be released for cultivation.

New Ambassador in Washington Speaks on Tasks

AU2006124490 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with newly appointed Ambassador to Washington Peter Zwack by Peter G. Feher; place and date not given: "It Is a Satisfaction, but I Am Not Driven by a Thirst for Revenge"]

[Excerpts] Peter Zwack does not deny the fact that his nomination to the post of Hungarian ambassador to Washington gives him a certain amount of satisfaction. He told our correspondent that he accepted this difficult task in order to help the new Hungary to find its economic and political stability.

[Feher] As a businessman with many interests in the United States and West Europe, why did you accept the position of Hungarian ambassador to Washington?

[Zwack] I think that the coming four years will be decisive for the new Hungary, and I think I can help in creating a new economic and political structure in Hungary, particularly in a position in which I can express not only my private opinion in the host country but also an official position, a position that could influence those circles interested in cooperating with Hungary. The United States is an economic center in which one can contact businessmen, diplomats, and experts coming from all parts of the world, and thus we can also influence other countries.

As for the concrete reasons for accepting this nomination, I did so because, basically, the renewal of Hungary is an economic problem. Economic activity does not derive from politics, but politics will emerge from the economy. I would like to help here, and this is the main reason for accepting this position.

[Feher] Do you not think that the fact that you did not live in Hungary for many years and now you suddenly find yourself in a bustling domestic policy might be a disadvantage? Do you think that, despite all this, you will be able to fully represent Hungary in the United States?

[Zwack] I do not feel disadvantaged because I have been living in Hungary for a year and a half and I have accumulated a lot of experience with which I can make up for the "lag" of 40 years. [passage omitted]

[Feher] Does this nomination to the position of ambassador to Washington represent some sort of personal satisfaction for you in the sense that you can now represent the country which once expelled you, and represent it in the world's greatest industrial power?

[Zwack] I would be lying if I said that this did not mean some sort of personal satisfaction. However, I am not driven by a thirst for revenge. It is a moral satisfaction to be asked to represent Hungary in the United States, a country that once expelled me. It is also a satisfaction for me in the sense that it is an appreciation for the hard work I have done in Hungary in the past two years. [passage omitted]

Army Selling Military Equipment to West

LD2006153990 Budapest MTI in English 1417 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 20, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—In a bid to ease financial difficulties resulting from a cut in state budget funding, the Hungarian Army is trying to sell superseded military equipment on Western markets.

Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, admitted in a statement to the Wednesday edition of the Budapest daily the "MAGYAR HIRLAP" that they have so far sold four Soviet MIG-21 fighter planes for between 90,000 and 150,000 dollars a piece, the price depending on the state of the aircraft.

The spokesman did not specify the actual date of the transaction, but said the American businessman who wanted the planes for a museum, has not yet succeeded in obtaining an import licence.

In February, the Hungarian Government allowed in theory the export of tanks complete with gun, but the licensing committee has not met to discuss any concrete issue yet, the spokesman said.

Commenting on rumours that Yugoslavian border guards had intercepted a shipment of sub-machine guns from Hungary and destined for Kosovo, the spokesman said, "It is possible that we were used as a transit route in the international arms trade without our knowledge, but what is absolutely definite is that the Hungarian authorities had no part whatsover in getting the weapons through Hungarian territory".

Colonel Keleti said the ministry planned an expenditure of 40 billion forints (615 million USD) for the current year, but only 35.4 billion will come from the state budget.

A few years back, the ministry only had to raise between 1.6 and 1.9 billion forints annually itself.

They intend using the money from the sale of the MIG-21s to buy instruments and equipment for a military hospital.

The ministry pays their mediators fees of between 1.5 and 5 per cent of a deal and keeps the rest itself.

The sale of military equipment is done with Soviet permission, in keeping with the provisions of the original transport agreements.

Romanian Regime Keeps Old Power, Lacks Concept

AU2006161590 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Jun 90 p 2

[Editorial by Imre Krajczar: "Will Prayer Help?"]

[Text] Everyone knows that from time immemorial dramas of the revival of unstable regimes have been going on amidst Romania's ruins. The same thing is happening now. Much earlier than the foreign countries that pretend to be objective, the Romanian people themselves, accused of being in a state of corn porridge stupor, found out that a massive preservation of power was going on today, and that the old regime did not even bother to change the gallery of portraits. The muddy and troubled waters are carrying figures known from the foamy history of the Romanian Communist Party.

What has changed? What could have changed?

We have always been convinced that hatred of Hungarians holds together the Great Romania anointed in Caesarian dreams.

Iliescu's government has also tried this recipe. They had no other choice. If they had promised a better life, people would immediately take them at their word, because, if Illiescu's government promised a larger piece from the cake shop of democracy, the all-national watch would immediately get at them once the people realized the tremendous gap between the promises and the fulfillment of those promises.

Iliescu is a creation of the old guard, engaged in politics in an even more Machiavelian way than the old morals of the old guard. Therefore, we can be sure that he does not hate us. Iliescu is exercising power according to the Bolshevik recipe.

Ever since Lenin (how strange this comparison in time) we have known that the Bolsheviks are experts in obtaining and maintaining power, but they have no idea how to apply this power for the benefit of the general public. This massive bankruptcy of three quarters of a century could not have been revealed if they had found out at least occasionally what they should do with the almost unlimited and uncontrolled absolutist power in their hands. Generally, this did not go any further than the implementation of party program slogans with pseudo-measures. However, the masses should know that the "black soup is still to come."

Romania has lived through an awfully bloody revolution, but no citizen of this "Caesarian" Romania can be sure that the final act is close and that the grand political game is coming close to a decision. Nothing of the sort. Romania has reached a critical point. Anyone who knows the real history of this country—and not the one claiming that this country originates from the Romans or the one that goes so far with the lies as to claim that it originated even before the Romans—anyone who knows the real history of this country on the basis of real documents and authentic sources also knows that Romanian history is nothing else but a large-scale maneuver which started somehow with a historical accident. However, this does not matter. Who needs any tales of origin here?

Only one of weaker morals, only one who, in his foolish awkwardness, tries to creep stealthily into the European house by slamming the door loudly.

Here is our chance. If Bucharest keeps slamming the door, we—eschewing the naive attitude of the Mihaly Karolyi and Oszkar Jaszi governments—should draw the attention of international public opinion to the fact that a raving adolescent is on the rampage here, and that the issue here is not just the massacre of our own kin, but also the fact that this newly anointed power lacks any concepts and has no idea what to do with its own possibilities either. It is hardly accidental that the Iliescu regime took no action against those who blinded Andras Suto. This well-programmed "impotence" clearly shows that, just like the previous gang-leaders, the current leadership in Bucharest has no concepts whatsoever for the coming years and decades. The current Romanian leadership has set out to survive.

The new regime knows why.

We can only guess the reason. The leadership is in big trouble. Not even hatred of Hungarians helps any more.

This government will start praying sooner or later.

Perhaps for mercy, just as Ceausescu allegedly did.

Talks Held With Israeli on Jewish Emigration

LD2006205490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Hungary will continue to extend every assistance possible to Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union to Israel, Interior Minister Ferenc Horvath has told the Israeli immigrant absorption minister. Yitzhaq Peretz believes it is important to stress that information on the settlement of the emigrants is sometimes distorted. As an example he mentioned that this year, of the 55,000 emigrants, just over 100 settled on the territories occupied by Israel.

The Hungarian interior minister indicated that Budapest will be pleased to receive expert assistance to organize the movement of emigrants.

ROK Businessmen Attend Seminar on Trade Rules

LD2006135590 Budapest MTI in English 1254 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 20, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—A two-day seminar organized by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce opened today in Budapest.

Thirty South Korean businessmen are taking part.

The seminar is meant to familiarize the businessmen with the rules of trading in the Soviet Union, as the delegation will be heading for Moscow after Budapest.

This, the first seminar of its kind, will bring in a modest income for the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the organizers.

Matolosy Announces Debt Plan for Enterprises

LD2006204690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Gyorgy Matolosy, state secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, who is in Jozsef Antall's delegation to the FRG, has told West German enterpreneurs in Munich that in July the government will submit its plan to parliament, which will clear backlogs at Hungarian enterprises that are indebted to each other.

Details, which have been made known for the first time, are as follows: The debts would be paid off by bank crediting. From 30 to 40 large enterprises would still remain, those which delivered exports to the Eastern market and became very complacent and cannot be renewed. A bankruptcy procedure will be launched against them and they will be sold or leased. Some 600-700 small- and medium-scale ventures will have to face temporary financing troubles, which would be bridged with three to four months' assistance from the banks. And, finally, they will prevent any repetition of the backlogs. An independent plan will be drafted on this.

As for the government's further intentions, the state secretary informed the West German enterpreneurs that a foundation with considerable resources will be established in the near future to ease unemployment. Starting in January state enterprises will go over to a new community ownership. They will be passed into the hands of pension funds and accounts, holdings, and self-management deals. Starting in July, all current directors will have to prove their competence through renewed competition. This is what the state secretary said.

Jozsef Antall added that state intervention should be increased before privatization. For this an independent bank system and the structure of real trade unions should develop. For the old trade unions have discredited themselves, the new ones are of excessively political character, and the workers' councils, instead of interest representation, would be ready to take over and lead the enterprise. [passage omitted]

Environment Protection Body Views Danube Project

LD2006144290 Budapest MTI in English 1323 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 20 (MTI)—A decision was reached at the Wednesday session of parliament's Environmental Protection Committee over the supervision of construction work on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros water barrage.

Accordingly public supervision of the project is to replace the earlier social committee (also independent from parliament)—in line with the prime minister's request. At the same time, parliament maintains its earlier proposal to set up a parliamentary ad hoc committee for the project. This body would comprise representatives of the parliamentary committees of environmental protection, foreign affairs, economic, budgetary and constitutional law.

An agreement was also reached for the committee to hold regular consultations with various movements and experts dealing with environmental protection.

Sandor Papp (Hungarian Democratic Forum), president of the committee, who attended the international environmental conference held in Dublin said: The Hungarian delegation reminded participants of the conference that the Danube River is an asset of pan-European magnitude, and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project may not therefore be just a matter of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. An agreement was reached in Dublin between the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian delegation that disputed issues are to be settled according to the findings of an independent expert committee of the EC.

Talks With USSR on Border Crossing Requested

LD2006192290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] The Consular and Refugees Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry informs that, in view of the lengthening waiting time at the border crossing to the USSR at Medyka-Szeginia, the Ministry, in a diplomatic note, has requested urgent talks with the Soviet side, for a radical improvement in the situation at border crossings. It has also been recommended to the Polish ambassador in Moscow and the consul general in Kiev that they actively intervene with the Soviet authorities. At the same time, the USSR consul general in Warsaw was called to the Foreign Ministry, where the alarming conditions at the border crossing were presented to him, along with a demand for immediate appropriate action.

Sejm Speaker Describes Meeting With Yeltsin

LD2106032890 Warsaw PAP in English 2235 GMT 20 Jun 90

[By PAP correspondent Jerzy Malczyk]

[Text] Moscow, June 20—The delegation of the Sejm (lower house) with its Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, now on a visit to the USSR at an invitation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, met with Chairman of the Russian Parliament Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin today.

"Yeltsin briefly presented to us a plan of transformations of the Soviet Union through separation of the Russian Federation, "Speaker Kozakiewicz told PAP correspondent after the meeting.

"He also spoke about a plan to drive the federation out of the crisis in two- three-year's time. The plan provides for switching to a market economy without causing social upheavals and deterioration of the situation of people," Kozakiewicz continued.

"In sum, Yeltsin presented a very far-reaching plan according to which the Russian Federation would be completely sovereign, with exceptions made for such matters as the Army, foreign policy or currency which will remain in the domain of the Union.

"Our talk lasted for about 40 minutes and I have to say that I was surprised at his personal charm," Kozakiewicz added.

Jaruzelski Appoints New Ambassador to U.S.

LD2006210590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] PAP has just announced that President Wojciech Jaruzelski has appointed Kazimierz Dziewanowski as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Polish Republic to the United States.

Destruction of Secret Police Files Reported

AU2006184890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16-17 Jun 90 p 1

[Jan Ordynski report: "The SB Has Burnt Its Archives"]

[Text] On 15 June, Andrzej Milczanowski, deputy chief of the Office for the Protection of the State, gave journalists some intriguing news:

In the second half of May, Aleksander Herzog, deputy prosecutor general of the Polish Republic, asked the chief of the Office for the Protection of the State to investigate the destruction of files in Regional Internal Affairs Offices throughout Piotrkow Voivodship, and at the Voivodship Internal Affairs Office in Piotrkow City. A. Herzog also asked whether this practice conformed to Interior Ministry rules, and requested that appropriate material be conveyed to the prosecutor's office, depending on the outcome of these investigations.

On 15 June, the prosecutor's office received the material in question, following investigations carried out by the Investigations Department of the Interior Ministry.

Between the end of August 1989 and the beginning of February 1990, a considerable quantity of Security Service [SB] material was destroyed at the Voivodship Internal Affairs Office at Piotrkow City and Regional Internal Affairs Offices in Piotrkow City, Belchatow, Radomsko, and Opoczno. These included documents containing details of over 1,200 secret collaborators, and other material detailing SB operations. It is impossible to establish exactly what kind of and how many documents were destroyed because some of the records listing the documents were also destroyed. Some documents were destroyed so that no evidence of them exists any longer. Most of them concerned the opposition, especially "Solidarity," plus the church.

According to statements gathered by A. Milczanowski, the order to destroy the documents was issued by part of the Interior Ministry leadership—General Henryk Dankowski, currently under secretary for internal affairs and head of the SB until 1 November 1989; General Tadeusz Szczyglo, former director of the Department of Studies and Analyses; General Krzysztof Majchrowski, former director of the Department for Protecting the State Constitutional Order; and Colonel Jerzy Karpacz, deputy chief of the SB from 1 July to 1 November 1989, and chief of the SB thereafter.

These statements also reveal that orders to destroy the documents were also issued by the Department of Economic Protection, which was headed by General Jozef Sasin. These orders came in various forms, and were often ambiguous. It emerges that one of the main reasons behind the orders to destroy the files was a fear of revealing details concerning measures taken against the opposition, mainly "Solidarity," and the church. Another reason is that, because of the sociopolitical situation at the time, there was a risk that the Interior Ministry leadership would declassify some of the files, including details of the secret collaborators. Such a destruction of documents was a violation of Interior Ministry rules.

The investigations make it seem likely that documents at other Voivodship and Regional Internal Affairs Offices were also destroyed between the end of August 1989 and the beginning of February 1990.

Explanation of MSW Files Destruction Doubted

LD2006220190 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] General Henryk Dankowski, first deputy internal affairs minister, and Colonel Jerzy Karpacz, the former head of the Security Service of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], have informed PAP about the destruction of some operational materials in the MSW. They state that because of the reorganization of the MSW and disbanding of the units of the former Security Service, in August last year a decision was made to tidy up and transfer for use as waste paper various service documents which lost their operational value and had no importance as historical sources.

Decisions made in this respect did not infringe on the law. On 31 January, in accordance with the decision of the minister of internal affairs, the destruction of the serving documents was suspended.

This explanation does not dispel our doubts and we shall return to this subject.

Sejm Rejects Interior Ministry Budget Report

LD2006153490 Warsaw PAP in English 1426 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 20—Deputies of the Sejm Committee for Administration and Internal Affairs today rejected a report on the 1989 Interior Ministry Budget.

Sejm deputies said that in 1989 the property and financial means granted to the ministry were used in a way that violated fundamental regulations and criteria of legality.

The Sejm committee rejected the report and obliged the authorities of the Interior Ministry to present a detailed and competent information at a meeting in two weeks' time. The Sejm committee said that the presence of the interior minister would then be necessary.

Response to TU Price Hike Talks Invitation

LD2006201590 Warsaw PAP in English 1857 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 20—As we reported yesterday, OPZZ All-Poland Trade Union Alliance Chairman Alfred Miodowicz invited the leaders of Poland's trade unions to a joint meeting on June 22 to discuss government-planned price hikes.

Here is what PAP learned from the invited union leaders:

Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa: PAP correspondent from Gdansk reports that Walesa presumably has not made a decision yet.

The press spokesman of Rural Solidarity Piotr Dabrowski stated that his union is reviewing the possibility of taking part in the meeting.

Marian Jurczyk, the head of Solidarity '80 said: I do not exclude the need for such a meeting. I however proceed from the premise that the time is not right for personnel conflicts. The tragic situation of the Polish family calls for immediate action. Perhaps such a meeting will take place someday. This will depend on the development of the situation and social moods. At present there is no such need, however.

Janusz Maksymiuk, the head of the National Union of Farmers and Farming Circles and Organizations said: Any initiative of taking up discussion on important problems relating to society's life must be accepted.

Professor Comments on Stresses in Solidarity

AU2006191190 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16-17 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by Professor Jacek Wozniakowski, writer and publisher: "In My Opinion"]

[Text] Following the recent events in Poland, I am inclined to agree with Pawel Jasienica, who in his time maintained that in Poland there are no conflicts of any substance, there are only personal conflicts. In any case, our public opinion is ready to interpret all differences of opinion in this way.

We find ourselves in a situation where the dissemination of opinions, assessments, and views, to which contemporary Poles are entitled, still awaits its own democratic formulas and procedures. And since we have not yet succeeded in shaping any such forms or procedures, differences of opinion can easily be transformed into disputes and divisions.

Divisions, especially inside such a universal movement as "Solidarity," are a natural thing. However, one can chose to differ wisely, which can bring advantages to all concerned, or alternatively, in a way that causes problems. Let us be frank, there would not be so much debate about the citizens committees—some people even see a "battle for the committees"—if in their time some unfortunate decisions had not been made.

I think that Lech Walesa's problems are typical problems that accompany "fatherhood" and stem from the unavoidable tendency of his own offspring toward self-determination. At some moment, the child begins to live its own life. In most cases it is not very easy for the parents to accept this fact. I also understand Tadeusz Mazowiecki's situation, and I see how many difficulties face his government. Even the most patient of politicians would have been worn down by it all. Everything is continuing to pile on top of the difficult socioeconomic and psychological situation. That is why I am afraid that somebody on the sidelines should not be making the whole situation even worse by letting his careless tongue work overtime.

I know that our desired democracy is coming into this world with a great deal of pain, but could we not reduce this pain by just a little?

Weekly Justifies Divisions in Solidarity

AU2006205390 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 15 Jun 90 p 3

[Maciej Zalewski commentary: "Who Is Supporting the Government?"]

[Text] The old danger is threatening us. It is necessary to pay the economic price for faulty policies.

The Balcerowicz program is becoming increasingly unsteady. How can support for the government be whipped up without disturbing the logic of the reform by making amendments to the program?

The government has created the impression that it takes society's support for the Balcerowicz program for granted. In its mind, social support for the first noncommunist government since the war is enough by itself, and can take the place of normal, traditional political mechanisms. All of us, the entire nation, and the whole of Solidarity were supposed to support the program. Any adjustments to this straightforward but surreal state of affairs was construed as an attack on the government and its political infrastructure.

But a trade union cannot abandon its primary function of defending the standard of living of working people. A trade union cannot abandon the principle of free democratic decisions taken by people who are the subjects of politics, and not the tools thereof.

There was only one path which permitted the survival of a lasting alliance between the government and Solidarity. That path involved negotiations and joint legislative initiatives which would guarantee the union's presence on the political stage, and would defend its sovereignty.

But the government did not choose this path. It continued to expect automatic Solidarity support.

Needless to say, the reserves of Solidarity support had to run out sooner or later. The conflict between a self-governing and "sociodemocratic" political infrastructure in Poland, ready to formulate claims, and the liberal government economic program, became reality.

We have written before that it is important that Solidarity believes in capitalism. We have also written, cursing the government, that policies cannot be changed for the sake of prestige, and that part of policies that concern fundamental matters also cannot be changed.

But Solidarity never got the chance to become a real basis for the Balcerowicz program. It was constantly pushed into an opposing position. It suppressed the tensions within it, even at the expense of abandoning its own standpoints.

The protection barrier for the government has already fallen. We have reached a stage which Walesa has described as "the danger of war among the bottom ranks." The railroad strike has shown what Walesa meant, warning against the threat of a new war.

It is still not too late to repeat an obvious truth. It is not divisions that reflect the differences in social and political interests and are a danger to Poland, but an enforced artificial unity. That is the danger to Poland: the artificial unity of a movement that is arguing over which road to take to emerge from communism, the enforced unity of a people who are beginning to lose their sense of identification with their political representatives.

One has to come to accept this. It is time to formulate politics on one's own account. The blackmail of unity cannot last forever.

Iliescu Statement on Inauguration as President

AU2006143590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1308 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Statement by President Ion Iliescu for Romanian Radio-Television after inauguration as president in Bucharest on 20 June—recorded]

[Text] One of the first statements I am making is to Romanian Radio-Television. Somehow we are on the same wavelength. As president of Romania I am the representative of the entire Romanian society. The radio broadcasting station and the television station are also national institutions. Therefore, we do not see, we do not engage in things, we do not think, and we do not express our views in any other way than in the general interests of Romanian society. In the name of these interests, I want to declare, as I did at the joint meeting of the two chambers before today's Constituent Assembly for the investiture of the president, that what inspires us is serving the interests of the Romanian people, in general, the interests of Romanian society, and our general interests as a whole.

What we desire is to put an end to this situation of instability, uncertainty, insecurity, and general suspicion. We have to overcome this collective malady of our society. We have to create a framework of trust, of stability and calm, and we have to rally all our efforts to solve the great problems confronting Romanian society, because over and above all our anxieties and suspicions, I believe that all of us—in our innermost feelings—with the exception of some completely degenerate elements, which have no links whatsoever with the interests of our society, and which are not interested in anything but their strictly personal affairs of getting rich. [sentence incomplete as heard] However, this is an extreme minority in our society. The great majority of Romanian society is made up of people of good faith, and I believe that all people of good faith understand this major commandment: We have to rally around the national interests of our country; we have to redress our economy, our social life, and our structures at all levels; we have to restore mutual trust and the morality of social life, so that we are able to improve and to renew Romanian society and lend to it the vitality and dynamism that will place it among the civilized countries of the world and guarantee what every honest citizen of our country desires: A better and more peaceful life, and honest and correct relations of mutual trust. I believe that this is what all of us desire, and we have to achieve it with joint efforts. It is not easy. Great efforts will be needed. Difficult days await us. Our problems are complex and complicated and only by rallying all the forces of our society will we be able to overcome them and solve them. I have confidence in the potential of Romanian society and in the feelings of the man in street for this country—namely, the feeling of trust in a better life.

Advocates Stronger Presidency

AU2006200590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1902 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/6/1990—We are passing from a rather provisional state to a stage of setting the power bodies—the legislative power, the juridical power, presidency and government—on new bases to allow us to approach the major questions confronting the country, stated to a ROMPRES reporter Mr. Ion Iliescu shortly after he took the oath as president of Romania. This means that first of all we have to stabilize the political life which continues to be complex, to channel it in the direction of a democratic society in which the confrontation of ideas, opinions, options, stands and orientations should take place within the normal framework of the parliamentary fight, to put an end to the degrading phenomena of street terror. This also means that the executive power should get stronger to be able to deal with the fundamental problems of the economic reform, of the transition from a rigid, super-centralized economy to a market economy.

Therefore I hope that we will be up to our people's expectations to definitively do away with the remnants of totalitarianism and ensure the development of the Romanian society on new, sound, democratic bases, in step with the present development of society.

We cannot conceive the renewal of the Romanian society without broader contacts with the world, without a broad openness to democratic societies with a richer historic experience of democratic political life, stated Ion Iliescu to ROMPRES after his official installation as president of Romania. We remain open, on an European plane, as we want to take an active part in the processes occurring on our continent, to set the links among all the European states on new bases, to remove the barriers that have divided Europe and isolated Romania from the world, to contribute to the establishment of new ties, to the promotion of a new climate in inter-European relations.

On a general plane we will consistently work to expand bonds with all the states of the world. As I have said, we attach particular interest to those countries characterized by a high economic and technological dynamism, and on a more general plane to all the countries of the world. We want to maintain our relations with the poorly developed countries, with the developing countries, as a world balance cannot be conceived without a balance between the developed and the poorly developed countries, without assisting the latter to overcome their state. I think that Romania can play a positive role in this context of a balanced development of international relations, the president said.

In an interview given to ROMPRES shortly after his installation as president of Romania, Ion Iliescu expressed his hope that the negative echo in the international public opinion, both at a government and press level, of the events of 13, 14 and 15 June would be levelled in the following days.

I think that there were some who showed lack of objectiveness in analysing what had happened. I am disappointed to see that some seem to suffer of amnesia as far as the events occurred in the morning, afternoon and the night of 13 June, which were the essence of those developments, a well thought and organized action, are concerned.

Those events involved peripheral elements that were incited by well organized forces whose clear intentions were to destabilize the political life as they attacked vital institutions of the state intending to compromize the political power, the government internationally. Worth mentioning is the fact that they immediately started to distort the facts and hold responsible the government and the order-keeping forces, he said. We are particularly disappointed by the attitude of the spokesman of the department of state and its illustration in the absence of the U.S. Ambassador from today's ceremony. We want to believe it is accidental and we hope that, following a lucid judgment of the facts, conclusions will be amended accordingly, in keeping with reality. We hope that the necessary political maturity will be shown as well as a natural solidarity with the Romanian Government which is confronted with so many problems, and with the constructive political forces in this country which try to find the ways of ensuring the necessary social and political equilibrium for the country's recovery, the president said in conclusion.

Roman Statement on Appointment as Premier

AU2006142290 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1312 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Statement by Petre Roman to Romanian Radio after appointment to premiership in Bucharest on 20 June—recorded]

[Text] I believe that I am deeply touched by this appointment to the office of premier, which, first of all, is linked to the feeling that things have settled down. We are a country that has joined the ranks of all the other countries in the world, with all its democratic institutions, with all its existing, solidly-based premises, ready to start building what we want to build and to express ourselves—each of us in his own way—in this exceptional and wonderful human diversity and at the same time in an organized society.

As a matter of fact, everything that we have thought, proposed, and said in all sincerity and belief is our program. We only wish to be faithful to these thoughts and to this program in order to prove that this first, extremely important form of trust is justified, and that we can show the international community that our road toward a complete and genuine democracy is irreversible and allows us to achieve a cooperation between our thoughts and the creative work of our people, of our citizens, and makes it possible for Romania to join the international community. Thank you.

Blames Securitate for Violence

LD2006192490 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Normality seems to be returning slowly to Romania, in spite of the sanctions and criticisms it is receiving from the Western countries. On 4 July the European Community will not invite that country to the Twelve's meeting with the Eastern-bloc countries to discuss economic aid, unless internal conditions in Romania change. Nevertheless, France has said that it will continue helping the Bucharest government.

This morning Ion Iliescu was definitively installed as president, a post to which he was elected on 20 May with 85 percent of the vote. The ceremony was not attended by the U.S. ambassador in Bucharest. Iliescu confirmed Petre Roman as premier and shortly afterwards the latter spoke to our special correspondent Aurora Minguez:

[Begin recording] [Minguez] In his first statements to three Spanish media, after being confirmed as premier, Petre Roman denies having had differences of opinion and confrontations with President Iliescu, as a result of last week's coup attempt. In Roman's opinion it is obvious that it was a neo-fascist and antistate conspiracy and that the brutality of the miners and extremists was instigated by former members of the Securitate or Romanian political police.

[Roman] At the moment the question is who incited the miners to go to those places? In no way was it the government or the president. Who indicated where they were? Well, the party offices were very nearby, but, who indicated where, for example, these opposition figures lived, even though in the end nothing very serious happened. This is something that we have to clarify. It seems—it seems—that those who had an interest in this were elements of the old Securitate. [end recording]

Claims Ideal Conditions for Democracy

LD2006192990 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1900 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Premier Petre Roman of Romania has told us that among the East-bloc countries his country has ideal conditions for the speediest transition to democracy and a market economy. Roman blamed the old political police of the Ceausescu regime for the incidents of recent days, in which several people died. According to Petre Roman, members of the Securitate led demonstrators and miners to key places where the damage to the government would be greatest, such as the homes of opposition members and offices of political parties.

Assembly Speaker Calls Inauguration 'New Step'

AU2106104790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0900 GMT 21 Jun 90

["Political Life: Dan Martian—A New Step Toward Building Democracy in Romania"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 21/6/1990—After Ion Iliescu officially took over the office of Romania's president, Dan Martian, speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, stated to an ROMPRES reporter: "I think that by this act, that followed after the beginning of the activity of the Assembly of Deputies and of the Senate, a new step is taken toward building the democratic institutional framework in Romania. The government is to be formed now and with this several fundamental chains of the new democratic institutional framework in the country will be achieved. Then the parliament, the government, Mr. Ion Iliescu in his capacity, are to take over their attributions the way they are stipulated and fulfil their tasks."

Campeanu, Ratiu on Relations With Iliescu

AU2006145890 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1400 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Statements by National Liberal Party President Radu Campeanu and Ion Ratiu, president of the National Peasants (Christian Democratic) Party, after Iliescu's inauguration as president of Romania in Bucharest on 20 June—read by announcer]

[Text] Radu Campeanu: For the time being, what I desire is just and civilized relations with President Ion Iliescu, relations I have always viewed as being necessary in a genuine democracy, in that democracy we want to establish in Romania. After Mr. Ion Iliescu's speech, I hardly noticed any difference of views or distance between our views. As president of the National Liberal Party and Senate vice president, I will take a constructive position, as I have always done. No one, however, has approached me, nor will I be approached with a proposal for cooperation.

And now Ion Ratiu's statement:

I guarantee that I will cooperate loyally with President Ion Iliescu in promoting democracy in Romania, irrespective of its origin. If Mr. Iliescu promotes democracy, I will be at his side. If, in administering the executive power of this country, Mr. Roman takes measures that will promote democracy, I will be at his side and our entire party will be at his side. When I returned to Romania I did not think about competing for the Presidency, but I thought I might be elected as deputy in my native town, and now I am a deputy of Cluj, which includes the county and Turda, my native town.

I am not thinking any further ahead; it depends on events. The principles President Ion Iliescu announced today in all activities represented a wise and conciliatory move, with only one exception: The way in which he presented last week's events. It was unjust and incorrect. If this incorrectness is a measure of the truthfulness of the whole speech, then I am surely dissatisfied. I want to give my complete trust to the president and I hope he will keep his word, so as to lead this country to democracy, toward progress, and toward well-being.

Election Law Lists Presidential Powers

AU2006191390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1755 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Political Life—Presidency with the Romanians"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/6/1990—According to the election law, in Romania the president ensures a balance of powers in state. Among his powers the election law stipulates inter alia the designation of the prime minister, of the president and members of the Supreme Court, of the Prosecutor General, the calling of the parliament in extraordinary session, the dissolution of parliament with the agreement of the prime minister, of the speaker of the Assembly of Deputies and the president of the Senate and after consultations with the leaders of the leading political parties, the annual presentation in parliament of messages on the major political questions of the nation, the partial or general mobilization of the army, with the agreement of parliament and only in exceptional cases, the institution of the state of emergency throughout the country or in certain settlements, with the approval of parliament given in five days, at the latest, since the adoption of that measure. The president also concludes international treaties and submit them to parliament for ratification, accredits and recalls Romania's diplomatic representatives, receives representatives of other countries, confers the ranks of general, admiral and marshal, decorations and honorary titles, promulgates laws.

In exercising his powers the president issues decrees countersigned by the prime minister.

Romania's president, elected directly by the people, can be suspended through the joint vote of at least two thirds of the Assembly of Deputies and of the Senate, at the request of at least one third of the members of the two chambers, and dismissed by referendum organized in one month since the date of suspension by parliament. Suspension and dismissal are resorted to when he violates the constitution or commits acts that make him unworthy of being president. If presidency is vacant the president of the Senate becomes also the president of the country until the new elections that are to be called in three months at the latest.

The official installation of Mr. Ion Iliescu inaugurates the democratic presidential institution in Romania, completely different from the old dictatorial presidential institution established in 1974 and overthrown by the 1989 December revolution.

U.S. Envoy's Absence at Inauguration Regretted

AU2106054290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0920 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 21/6/1990—Daily ADEVARUL carries a note running under the above headline, signed "Observer"in its June 21 issue. It reads:

"Abruptly cutting short his consultations in Washington Ambassador Alan Green Jr. returned to Bucharest on June l8. The decision was imposed, according to his own declaration, by the grave events that occurred in the country where he is accredited. We do not doubt that the ambassador found us more depressed and sad. However, a beam of light gets through the darkness of our sadness. The parliament has met. The opposition leaders wanted to be present in the Senate and in the Assembly of Deputies alike. Yesterday, in the atmosphere full of history at the Romanian Athenaeum, the president elect got the nation's solemn investiture. In the seats of the invited guests present as usual at such moments, were the diplomatic heads of mission accredited in Bucharest. Only one notable absence: The ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

"And we must say we regret this absence.

"We know that, truthful to its democratic traditions, America does not hesitate to send overseas its official representatives on such opportunities. It is easy to understand that the absence of the American ambassador bears political significance, as it is confirmed even by the declaration of the spokesman of the State Department. That is why we are sad. America has always had a special place in the Romanians' hearts. They so hopefully and candidly looked toward the big country of democracy in the years after world war one. And they wanted so much the removal of the obstacles temporarily raised by the former dictatorship in the path of the Romanian-American relations. After the December revolution it seemed that nothing could impair these relations. We cannot help wondering as is only natural: Who would need such an upsetting of a friendly atmosphere that stood so many trials? And whom could this benefit? Neither America nor Romania anyway. Let us hope it is a passing cloud.."

U.S., Soviet, NATO Reaction to Unrest

AU2006210990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1928 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Mihai Andrei report on foreign reaction to last week's unrest in Bucharest from the "24 Hours" program]

[Text] This morning Voice of America announced that Washington decided to take a number of measures, which are meant to make known the U.S. concern in connection with, we quote— the actions of the Romanian Government—and with—using pro-government shock teams organized and especially directed toward intimidation of opponents. The U.S. State Department spokesman said that the United States called on the Romanian Government, asking it to free all those who have been arrested and ensure the force of law equally for all the citizens of Romania. The State Department advises U.S. citizens to avoid trips to Romania if they have no urgent problems that cannot be delayed.

In accordance with Radio Free Europe, the Washington Administration expressed its deep concern with the decision adopted by the Deputies' Assembly, according to which the order-keeping forces are empowered to put an end to all demonstrations in Bucharest. It notes that the U.S. Government is worried about the fact that this decision might be used to repress any legitimate protest.

Radio Moscow stresses that no one is empowered to interfere in Romania's domestic affairs and advises the Romanian people how to live in the future, however, it is evident and clear that a process of continuation of the pogrom, arson, and promotion of violence brings about prejudices in the establishment of democracy and of a climate of lawfulness in the Romanian society. Therefore, one has to hail the recent declaration of the Romanian leadership, in which it expresses its adherence to democracy and its intentions to take a stand against illegal excesses during the repression of the extremists' actions.

NATO expressed its deep concern over the violent actions in Romania and asks the Bucharest leadership to use peaceful means to ensure democracy. Admitting that the road toward democracy is marked by unexpected difficulties, NATO stresses that the Romanian Government is duty-bound to peacefully solve the current crisis and instate the fundamental elements of democracy, including the observance of the human rights.

Presenting the interview given by French President, Mr. Francois Mitterrand, to the daily, LE MONDE, Radio France International quotes the last question: Do you agree with suspending the aid for Romania?, and the answer: Violence is always condemnable, however, before taking any decision, one needs complete information on the Romanian events. Do we know why the power that resulted from the recent elections is contested in this way in the street? Do we know why this power called on miners rather than on forces which are in charge of ensuring public order? It would not be reasonable, without an additional examination of the situation, to make more difficult the Romanian people's difficult living conditions.

We conclude the quotes from French president's interview.

Extremist Elements Make Attempts on Democracy

AU1906184890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1652 GMT 19 Jun 90

["Attempts at Democracy"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/6/1990—This is how the editorial in the newspaper "TINERETUL LIBER" dubs the repeated attempts of extremist elements to destabilize the country also after the May elections, elements who were implied in the events on June 13 and 14 that shook the Romanian capital city. The author of the editorial, Gabriel Nastase, shows that while the authorities, the newly-elected parliament included, work to find the causes behind those reprovable acts and the responsibility of those who committed them, analysts try in their turn to decipher the motivations of those acts, to find out who is interested in preventing the establishment of the order of law in this country.

Suggesting that inconsistent excuses and justifications as to the apparent guilt be renounced and appealing to an in-depth analysis, the editorial shows: It is so simple to put the blame on some political parties or some rightist movements. In consideration of the present reality in Romania, the ratio between the extreme right and the extreme left is netly favourable to the latter. I find it only normal that in Romania there should be more discontented people among former Communists and Securitate people who held responsible posts than among former Iron-Guardists. Naturally, Iron-Guardist elements, especially those from the outside, did not just sit there when that attempted coup was planned....

There are many people interested in destabilization. And many of them are pseudo-sympathizers of the Front. However, what matters is the attitude of those who can indeed settle this fight, if it were to acquire the form of a confrontation of force, those who are in control of weapons, that is the Army, the police and the Securitate.

A post scriptum to the editorial shows: How is one to take the "Down with Iliescu" slogan? I should like everyone to understand me properly. It is not the name, it is not the person that are of interest now. What we have to do with here is the country's president, elected through elections which were contested by neither foreign observers nor most of the Romanians. We wonder what would have happened if after Mr. Bush's election his opponents had occupied Washington squares demanding his resignation? Of late, we seem unable to understand each other: It is not Mr. Iliescu's person that matters now but the idea of democracy. Is it not normal when the majority votes for one president that the minority accepts him until the next elections? Can anyone in this world tell us of another way to democratically organize society? I should like to know what answers all the presidents elected in the democratic countries of the world have to offer to this question. Are we no longer able to think according to elementary logic? Then how could we not take the "Down With..." slogans as attempts at the very idea of democracy? How could we not take them to mean an attempt at destabilization, possibly at establishing a new dictatorship? Are we to accept this attempt at our own condition of thinking beings?

Opposition Members Reportedly Arrested 19 Jun

AU1906132490 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Announcer] Last night, several hundred opponents of the government again ventured out on University Square in the center of Bucharest. Reportedly, the demonstration ended without incidents. I now welcome correspondent Gabor Kiszely in Budapest. Three leading opposition members are said to have been arrested in Romania. Who are they?

[Kiszely] In fact, even more people have been arrested. The three leading opposition members are Marian Munteanu, leader of the independent and anticommunist Students League, who was seriously injured by the government's terror commandos in the past few days and arrested while in the intensive care unit of the hospital; Dumitru Dinca, the chief of the oppositional People's Alliance; and Leon Nica, representative of the National Democratic Party. Another 42 people, however, were arrested this morning. These persons were identified by police video clips. Proceedings have been instituted against 400 people. They are accused of having instigated violence and damaged property.

Approximately 1,000 people are in a detention camp near Bucharest, close to the highway near Pitesti, and are waiting for their lawsuits or are still being identified. The police are resorting to violence. This was again confirmed by citizens. Moreover, the police complained that the recent damage that was allegedly caused by the opposition members amounts to approximately 20 million lei and that 60 police cars were burned. However, the damage caused by the government's terror commandos, the so-called miners, was, of course, not mentioned.

[Announcer] Thank you for this information, Gabor Kiszely.

Prosecutor's Office on Munteanu, Others' Arrest

AU2106095390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1630 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/6/1990—On 16 and 17 June 1990, Marian Munteanu, Dragos Teofan, Dumitru Dinca, and Leon Nica were taken in police custody on charges of public instigation and praise of law-breaking, outrages upon morals, serious public disorder and qualified damage to public property falling under Articles 324, 321 paragraph 2, and Article 231 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code.

In May-June 1990 the defendants committed many acts of public instigation and advocated law-breaking urging by various means to violation of the laws of the country and of the norms of social conduct, and by so doing they gravely perturbed public order and quiet for a long period of time.

On 13 June 1990 they instigated and organised several groups of attackers on public institutions (the Ministry of the Interior, the Bucharest Police, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Romanian Television) and actually took part in the attacks.

Blunt objects prepared in advance and petrol bombs, were used and explosions were caused, which took an estimated 150 million lei toll on public property. In the above circumstances, many order-keeping troops were assaulted and injured and so were civilians, of which some sustained material damage themselves.

In connection with the 13-15 June events criminal investigations are conducted by the police on other participants as well.

Government To Present Program Next Week

AU2006212390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2104 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/6/1990—I intend that next week, rather at the beginning of next week, that is in the first half of next week, to advance to the parliament the declaration-programme and the nominal configuration of the new government, as well as an outline of the responsibilities the government has to assume itself to support the parliament, stated Petre Roman on Wednesday to ROMPRES after he had been empowered by Romania's President Iliescu shortly after his official inauguration to form the new cabinet.

Commission on Government Market Economy Proposals

AU1906151190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1126 GMT 19 Jun 90

["A Strategy of Transition to the Market Economy"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 19/6/1990—The sixth and last part, "Proposals To Spread the Principal Measures for Transition to the Market Economy over 1990-1992" of the draft plan for transition to the market economy in Romania made by a commission appointed by the interim government and headed by Academician Tudorel Postolache lists in table form the targets of the government's economic policy, the specific measures that were taken until April 1990, and those planned for the next two years.

Both sets of measures are considered from four angles:

1. The economic and financial framework.
2. The social framework.
3. The re-equipment and modernisation of the national economy.
4. The legal framework comprising the laws to be made until 1992.

The economic and financial framework chapter singles out the measures that were taken to create and promote a private sector of the economy—privatisation in various spheres and branches of the national economy, a gradual liberalisation of prices over May 1990—December 1992, the development of a financial market by various means, including the reorganisation of the National Bank, and the creation of new banking and financial institutions among which the stock exchange. Further measures are to ensure monetary stability, counter inflationist pressure, liberalise foreign trade and foreign investment, make the lei convertible by periodically adjusting the exchange rate of the national currency to strike a balance until it becomes fully convertible, switch to macroeconomic planning and decentralise decisionmaking.

The social policy chapter comprises measures aimed to end an unfair pay, pension and social security system, to give the unemployed rights as well as obligations, to remove the ceiling to payment, to bring the work week down to 40 hours and less for heavy-duty or strenuous jobs (a measure that has already taken effect), financial arrangements for young families to buy homes built with state money, and others.

As far as the legal framework is concerned, provisions are made for 41 laws to be enacted before January 1992 to regulate all problems arising from transition to the market economy regarding ownership, the activity of enterprises, contracts, pricing, customs duties, public finance, taxation, insurance and social security, banking, mining, geology, agriculture, the environment, tourism, pay and pensions, cooperation, the money exchange rate and other economic and financial activities.

Appended to the draft plan for transition to the market economy are several preliminary studies on transition to the market economy in Romania and on various specific aspects of the subject as well as summaries of their amended versions after they were discussed by the commission.

Also appended is the resolution of Romania's interim government on the setting up of the commission that was assigned the task to outline the programme, along with lists of one thousand-odd Romanian contributors and of one hundred or so foreign experts who were consulted and offered suggestions. A major source of inspiration was a plan for Romania's economic and financial recovery and stability made by the Romanian-born U.S. Professor Anghel N.Rugina which was published in full in booklet form. Other Romanian-born economists who live abroad also took an interest in the commission's work and contributed precious suggestions and proposals—Ionita Olteanu, Robert Deutsch and Constantin Cojocaru.

The full text of the draft plan for transition to the market economy in Romania in Romanian as well as in English, French and Spanish versions can be bought from the Romanian News Agency ROMPRES.

Biographical Data on Deputies' Assembly President

AU1806174090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1609 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 18/6/1990—Dan Martian was born in the Commune of Remetea, Bihor County, in 1935. After graduating from the Economics Faculty in Bucharest, he was assigned a job as assistant professor at the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Bucharest.

In 1971 he was appointed minister of youth affairs. After conflicts with the former dictator he was released from that office in 1972. In 1974, refusing a responsible post in the countryside, he returned to teaching. In the summer of the same year he became a university reader.

After December 22, 1989, he was member of the National Salvation Front Council, holding the office of secretary, and after February 1, 1990 he was a member of the Provisional National Unity Council.

His wife, Elena, is a pediatrician and a doctor in medical sciences. They have two children.

* Reflections on 'Conservative' Elections

90BA0162D Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 5 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Stan Apostol article: "Reflections on Conservative Elections"]

[Text] In spite of the irregularities recorded, the 20 May election was, in the last analysis, a conservative reaction to a sudden change on the part of a society deprived of an economic structure and fragmented, doomed by decades of communist tyranny to limited economic horizons and to having to struggle not only for bare subsistence, but for mere physical survival. Consequently, what we have here is an overwhelming mass of people, who were undisputably influenced in their political options by the fact that the historical parties, those which proposed privatization, offered an economic formula that unraveled the current socioeconomic system, which had been artificially revived after the 22 December revolution through a series of panaceas.

The peasantry—so heavily oppressed by the old regime—regained ownership of a limited patch of land, a yard and a garden, as well as an opportunity to work a certain area for itself, and preoccupied exclusively with its physical subsistence, saw its modest demands satisfied. Therefore, the above-mentioned agricultural mini-reform was an unhoped for balm for this social category, numerically emaciated by the mass departure from its ranks of its most energetic members during the years of collectivization. And its satisfaction was all the greater since its expectations had been reduced to a minimum by economic horizons limited by the conditions in which it lived in the past decades. How could this peasantry, whose leaders had been mowed down in communist prisons and whose youth abandoned it in order to thicken the ranks of the workers, be expected to speak out for massive privatization? Moreover, today's peasantry depends on the industry. Many of its members hold jobs in the administrative and communal structures and belong to the agricultural bureaucracy, while a relatively large contingent rely on additional income from industrial labor. We are referring to the hundreds of thousands of commuter peasants who hold a dual status, who are only partially tied to agriculture, and who are consequently not receptive to the privatization formula.

This social segment went to vote inspired by a powerful conservative instinct. The radical changes proposed by the historical parties, which involved a complete break with the institutional past, simply threw it into a panic. For those reasons, a large portion of the peasantry, especially in the plains, saw the NSF [National Salvation Front] as the political body capable of protecting its more than modest situation.

But the wave of conservative sentiment brought to the surface by the election came particularly from the workers, specifically from the older elements among them. This large apathetic population, although dissatisfied under Ceausescu and deaf to his mobilizing slogans describing them as owners, producers, and consumers, retrenched behind the state-controlled economic formulas promoted by the NSF, hanging all its hopes on the perpetuation of such formulas. The privatization proposed by the historical parties, even in the form of making the workers into shareholders, was categorically rejected. Through this gesture they denied, in the last analysis, not so much a political party as especially the only viable means of economic recovery, of dealing with industrial inefficiency, and of recycling an economy built with great efforts and sacrifices, particularly for political reasons. As is known, the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] built a large machine-building industry, an intensive consumer of imported raw materials, not so much in order to ensure economic prosperity as to create a workers class viewed as the pillar of the communist regime, and to disable the landed peasantry and the middle classes, by definition hostile to any form of collectivism.

Consequently, precisely this workers class, artificially created by Dej and Ceausescu, was on 20 May in a position to decisively influence the country's fate. And that it did, not in the direction of a broad opening to reforms, but in a conservative direction. All these social elements continue to hide behind the protective shield of an unprofitable and inefficient big industry, incapable of surviving without state budget financing.

The picture of the 20 May election would not be complete without mentioning a relatively large class of bureaucrats and alleged technocrats who can survive only wthin a centralized, state-controlled economy. All these people cannot help being afraid of change, since they would be the first victims of radical reforms and privatization.

The massively conservative nature of the 20 May election was thus due to socioeconomic motives. In spite of political manipulations, the overwhelming victory of a neocommunist group was in fact ensured by a powerful collectivist mentality leaning toward unanimity and state control. All of us were and still are state employees. After the revolution it was enough that the chains of political repression were slightly slackened for the collective mind to forget that the totalitarian nature of the state was dictated precisely by its economic omnipotence. Thus, the image of an ideal social model emerged immediately after the revolution, in which a state led by wise men can ensure a minimum of prosperity and quiet that the overwhelming majority of a society still cannot accept in terms of political confrontation. This is the true explanation of the victory of the NSF, a political group not yet liberated from the habits of a single party.

But the NSF's difficulties are only now beginning. What is it going to do with the enormous and absolute power that it will hold? Will it be content only to preserve and adjust the old state-controlled socioeconomic structures—to make them more human—in consensus with the vote they received, ensuring the safety of the workers and peasants in conditions of weak or nonexistent economic efficiency? Will the radical reforms proposed by the historical parties not impose themselves, thus provoking a wide-scale social conflict with its own electorate? Trivialized and excluded from parliament, will the most energetic segment of the nation, the youth, disappointed that the power landed in the hands of the passive segment of the nation, which played a minor role in the revolutionary events, be compelled to express their demands only through street demonstrations?

One thing is certain: the Romanian economy has no option. Privatization is unavoidable if we are to overcome the general decline and collapse. Consequently, the new leaders will find themselves forced to take a path contrary to the conservative consensus expressed on 20 May. Obviously, Romania's situation remains one of the most critical and unstable.

* Majority-Opposition Relationship in Parliament

90BA0158D Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian
8 Jun 90 p 1

[Gabriel Tepelea article]

[Text] After a surprising and embarrassing victory for the National Salvation Front [NSF] (which took longer to count the votes from Bucharest than the French authorities to count those of New Caledonia or the Americans to get in the votes from Alaska), here we are on the eve of the opening of the legislative bodies, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. We will not now repeat the accusations leveled at the Front by the leaderships of the NPCDP [National Peasant-Christian Democratic-Party] and of other parties. They are known. Instead, let us all look forward.

After mature consideration, the NPCDP decided to attend the Chamber and the Senate in spite of its symbolic representation: 12 deputies and only one senator. This decision came because of the party's desire to make its voice heard at a crucial moment in the reorganization of the Romanian society. The NPCDP also stated in a communique that it will provide a "constructive opposition." But do the objective conditions exist for such an opposition? Constructive work requires dialogue and free expression of views before the plenum. However, the precedents in the so-called "mini parliament" of the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council] are not at all encouraging. The entire country saw the majority on television staging obstructionist maneuvers: drowning the voice of an undersirable speaker in applause; leaving the hall to preclude a vote on a decree; cutting short the time alloted for certain addresses; ignoring the opening time of sessions and then dragging them out till late hours, when messages are understood with greater difficulty and the tone of discussions drops, and so forth and so on.

If such methods and others of the same kind continue, the opposition risks being relegated to a purely decorative role. In other words, its presence will only serve to legitimize a semblance of democracy, while the place of constructive dialogue will be taken by the monologue of force. The ball is thus in the majority's court. It can either continue the debates in the new parliament with echoes from the "mini parliament" and with applause practiced at RCP [Romanian Communist Party] congresses, or, emulating the countries with an old parliamentary democracy, it can listen to the proposals and objections of the other camp, without acting like the one and only holder of the truth.

Rejecting before having listened and decreeing before having weighed all the implications, isn't this a continuation of the drills and the political and moral depersonalization to which we were subjected for so long?! We must have a climate favorable to an encounter of ideas, not to the dictate of a numerical, unconditional, and unanimous imposition.

A genuine parliamentarian will never reject a sound proposal of national interest only because it comes from the opposite camp. This requires not only a constructive opposition, but also a constructive majority, and it is to this dialectical relationship that we want to call attention in particular. Because we already hear calls for a "constructive opposition," as if the majority were constructive by definition while the opposition were automatic and at any cost. Consequently, according to all the rules of logic, it is up to the majority to permit not only a constructive opposition, but also the democratic operation of the parliament itself.

I believe that the first priority along this line is to draft bylaws for the operation of the legislative bodies, and to elect objective chairmen at the head of the two chambers, whose authority should emanate from their moral posture and competence, rather than from the classical bell or other modern tools used to "call to order."

Aside from our past parliamentary experience (especially from the period between the two world wars), we can draw on the rules of other legislative bodies of tradition. We invite those concerned to do some serious thinking, so as not to affect from the beginning the relationship between the majority and the opposition, because once a certain working style has been established, it is difficult to change.

* Objective Analysis of Elections Advocated

90BA0161A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7, 8 Jun 90

[Dr. Eng. Serban Sandulescu article]

[7 Jun pp 1, 3]

[Text] For any party with traditions and legitimate expectations like the National-Christian and Democratic-Peasant Party [NPCDP], losing an election is a failure.

The fact that we now obtained only 2.53 percent of the total number of votes, compared to the almost 70 percent we won at the previous election of 19 November 1946, which had also been falsified by the communists, is a real disaster. But was the disaster as big as that in reality? Is it wrong to think that the NSF [National Salvation Front] and its provisional government used certain methods to unforgivably distort the results of the elections, directed in particular at humiliating and even destroying our party—the most consistent adversary of communism and NSFism? What mistakes did we make to contribute to this electoral disaster, and what should we do now?

These are questions to which our party must find the correct answers democratically, if it is to have the right and ability to continue its road.

The analysis that will supply these answers must be approached with calm, reason, and objectivity—the indispensable elements for a correct and balanced understanding of a given situation. This is precisely what we will try to do here in brief, proceeding from a fairly large volume of data that we believe entitle us to undertake this analysis and to submit our conclusions to your judgment.

Along this line, it is very important that we try to examine who was the NSF electorate and what means and arguments the NSF used to win them to its side.

Obviously, after a short period of disorientation and loss of will caused by the revolution, the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] nomenklatura and activists, as well as the forces of repression of the old regime, went over to Ion Iliescu's side with "kit and caboodle," for the simple reason that he was one of theirs.

A particularly important category were some of the television personnel, several tens of thousands of people, whose subconscious mind was bent by the burden of lengthy work as "hostages of falsehood." They missed the great opportunity offered them by the immense generosity that the delirious people were capable of pouring on those who had given them the great news on 22 December, and remained petrified at the starting line at the moment when the people began their race to freedom. If you desire proof, see the tape recorded on 22 December on television and pay attention to the expression on the face of Petre Popescu; look at the normal expression of Felicia Melescan, or remember George Marinescu who on 28 January was concealing from the entire country what was happening in the Victory Square under the pretext of fog!

They and those who manipulated them in that position played an enormous role in creating a false image of Ion Iliescu the neocommunist. Can the television deny that, when Silviu Brucan himself now confessed that Ion Iliescu gathered a bunch of yesmen and sycophants around him? They undisputedly played the role and bear the responsibility for misleading millions of people in favor of the NSF and Ion Iliescu.

The great majority of workers voted for Ion Iliescu and the NSF. Some were persuaded by NSF propaganda that we wanted to sell out the country by bringing in foreign capital and privatizing the economy. Others were given pay raises: oil rig workers got a 30 percent raise while the oil production dropped 11 percent; the miners got a substantial raise while the coal production dropped 31 percent; and tractor operators received a 40 percent raise.

For the time being it means nothing to the NSF that these pay raises have no real justification and have started the inflation spiral.

Raising survivor pensions by 100 lei and the pensions of cooperative members from about 50 to 500 lei brought the NSF many votes from senior citizens.

Simultaneously with those measures, the NSF conducted a concerted campaign against the NPCDP and particularly against our leader, Mr. Corneliu Coposu, spreading slanderous rumors in every county, fabricated by the disinformation directorate inherited from the communists, and prevented us from having a dialogue with the electorate. The denigration campaign, which was extremely vehement, began already in January and caused us great damage because of the diabolic professionalism with which it was conducted.

We will not now dwell on the fact that the most elementary norms of behavior at the polls were broken, in flagrant violation of the electoral law. Details of this have already been reported in the free press.

We want to dwell on the manner in which the votes were registered and computer processed. These are the facts, drily recorded in chronological order.

About three-four days before election day, the Institute of Statistics in Bucharest was placed on great alert. It was said that the program was "altered" and "didn't know" anymore how to count ballots correctly. Naturally, the reality was much more serious than that.

After the elections I was told that at one regional computation center, two programmers managed to "break into" the program and spotted a line of transfer of votes from one party to another. They carried out two experiments: they introduced 20 votes for the ecologists, five of which were counted for the NSF, and out of 30 ballots introduced for the NPCDP, 14 were counted for the NSF. Which means that the transfer was different for each party. Now the Central Electoral Bureau admits that it ended up with about 2.7 million votes extra, allegedly due to the fact that the initial number of voters, which came to over 17 million, was misestimated, and to the fact that 17 counties showed one extra deputy and 17 counties one deputy less. What an extraordinary situation! Normally, the votes should be counted again according to the reports that the Central Electoral Bureau should have.

The vote registration and calculation program is very simple, elementary even. The Central Electoral Bureau was obligated to publish it as a source program, including its map and memory. That would have preempted any suspicion about any secondary operation transferring votes from one party to another according to the party. The existence of such a suboperation would have considerably increased the memory of the program, making it possible to spot it immediately, before the votes recorded in the reports coming in from the ballot sections began to be computed. Why was such an elementary test not done in the presence of party representatives in each county?

Thus, we believe that the interview given by Silviu Brucan for television on Thursday 31 May, when he announced his withdrawal from politics, is to be interpreted as a gesture of disassociation with these methods used in computing the results of the elections. In point of fact, at one point, speaking about the elections, he clearly stated that "the results were excessive." I think this is crystal-clear and any other commentary is superfluous!

[8 Jun p 1]

If we proceed on the basis of some disparate data that we managed to obtain to make up for the so-called "systemic errors"—which is nevertheless not the proper term—introduced into computers at the processing or computation phase, we can estimate, with all the caution required in such cases, that our party won 8-9 percent of the total number of votes. Even so the percentage is very low, but it is not humiliating like the 2.3 percent reported by the official sources.

The fact that the NPCDP lost a considerable share of its traditional electorate was due to both the above causes outside the party's control, and to mistakes we made, which we will try to highlight and which made our opponents' work easier. The analysis and conclusions that follow, although based on absolutely certain and objective data and observations, nevertheless constitute a personal viewpoint.

The most frequent criticism I encountered in cities and villages concerned the harsh tone of our campaign and the seemingly radical political line we adopted. This was in contrast with our platform program, which was positively received by the same people, belonging to various social categories, for being much more precise and anchored in the country's realities than the platforms of the other parties.

Nevertheless, many of the voters were left with the impression that we were more concerned with fighting communism and punishing those found guilty of abuses under the old regime, especially against us, than with the reconstruction of the country and society. This impression was probably magnified by the masthead of our newspaper and by all too frequent references in the press and on television to the suffering endured by our party under the communist dictatorship.

What we must do now is to show that our party's objective is to rebuild the country and to regain the freedom and dignity of the people, which are now in great danger. At the same time, the reconstruction cannot be pursued without social harmony, which is the only means of ensuring cooperation among all our forces and assets.

The struggle against communism and now against NSFism, under whose mask it is now hiding, must be viewed as a means of achieving our objective, rather than a purpose in itself; this is a distinction to which some of our veteran leaders don't seem to pay due attention.

There is also another important aspect linked to what I was saying before. For four months, the NSF, i.e., the communists, drew us into the filthy mire of provocations, insults, attacks, and even crimes against some of our activists.

We defended ourselves each time by writing countless articles in which we unmasked such wrong doings. The impact on the reader and the efficiency of our revelations would probably have been greater if we had noted them only in simple, clear, and concise reports, under a special column on page 3 titled "Electoral Felonies" or "NSF Felonies." This can allow us to use the space and forces at our disposal to explain our platform, to discuss the requirements of people in cities and villages, of youth and women, to debate matters of foreign policy important to our country, and so forth.

This situation also caused a certain ambiguity in our position toward the 3.8 million party members. Although Mr. Corneliu Coposu and later Mr. Ioan Lup said on television that our party's gates are open to everyone, including former RCP members who committed no abuses under the old regime, which was the case of the overwhelming majority among them, their statements were affected by the language used in our propaganda and by the actions of the disinformation directorate, which endeavored, with considerable success, to misrepresent our good faith.

Immediately after the revolution, an extraordinary number of young people came to our party seats to volunteer for the NPCDP. Their number, however, gradually began to drop and now there are very few left. This sort of thing happened in Rimnicu Vilcea, Pitesti, and in almost every city. The situation is very serious. From our discussions with both sides, both young and older members of the party, we concluded that the latter made big mistakes. They did not understand that the youth has its own problems, that we must listen to them without lecturing them about the hardships we suffered in the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, as was often the case, because young people are interested primarily in the future, and not so much in the past. This is the reality. Young people should have been drawn in and guided with great tact. They, too, sometimes showed extreme tendencies, having forgotten the old Romanian proverb that "if you don't have any old people, buy some." Nevertheless, in the future we must pay far greater attention to how we deal with the matter of the youth and give them more opportunities to work and participate in managing party affairs, while at the same time stressing that the main criterion for promotion remains that of value and the capacity to understand, rather than age.

Concerning the organization of the party, we came to the elections with many, very many flaws. First of all, we did not manage to establish more than a few organizations in villages. That was indeed very difficult, but the leaders of party organizations in county seats did not concern themselves sufficiently with that issue. Now we must pay it greatest attention. I think it will be useful to send three-four free copies of our newspaper every day to each village organization.

At city organizations there has been a certain lack of coordination due to the existence of several "centers" from which instructions were issued for the same area or same action.

The same thing happened in the electoral campaign. For example, although television has an enormous impact on the electorate and our access to television was restricted, we wasted a good number of our opportunities. The party did not have a "general headquarters" to establish and coordinate our televized propaganda, and when attempts were made to set one up, it was torpedoed from our midst.

Some other of our actions bore the mark of a similar dilettantism. I will cite only two examples. In order to combat concerted defamatory attacks on the NPCDP and our chairman, Mr. Corneliu Coposu, orchestrated by the "disinformation directorate," we should have mobilized help from specialists in the area of collective psychology. We were fighting against a formidable force which was using such specialists, so of course our honesty did not suffice for the task. We should have used our experts to monitor the computerized counting of the votes, who could have come prepared with a rational plan of action. Unfortunately, we failed to do so.

And finally, we cannot end without calling attention to the need to purge the party of the discredited elements of the old regime that have infiltrated our ranks. This is a delicate problem that must be handled with great care and in earnest.

Naturally, our analysis was not designed to cover the entire spectrum of issues that we must now examine calmly, reasonably, and objectively.

These issues will have to be discussed at a party congress which, in our opinion, will have to be thoroughly prepared and open to the most diverse views.

It is up to the current NPCDP leadership to organize such a congress. This leadership cannot be replaced through undemocratic methods by a group that on 6 June 1990, on its own accord, issued a communique on ROMPRES, picked up by our radio stations, in which it announced that it was taking over the party leadership, using the names of personalities that had nothing to do with it. The NPCDP must remain faithful to democratic principles and methods.

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* Distribution of Deputy Seats in 3d Stage

Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 31 May 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "From the Central Electoral Bureau: Distribution of the Deputy Seats Attributed in the Third Stage (in accordance with Article 71 point C of the Electoral Law)"]

[Text]

Alba

1. Ioan Florea, Romanian Ecologist Party [REP]
2. Radu Ciuceanu, National Liberal Party [NLP]
3. Iuliu Brendus, Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars [UDMR]

Arad

1. Calin Popescu Tariceanu, NLP
2. Petru Stefanut, National Peasant—Christian and Democratic—Party [NPCDP]

Arges

1. Cornel Constantinescu, National Salvation Front [NSF]
2. Contantin Topliceanu, Romanian Ecologist Movement [REM]
3. Nicolae Enescu, NLP
4. Cornel Nica, Romanian Socialist Democratic Party [SDP]

Bacau

1. Viorel Arama, NSF
2. Cornel Protopopescu, REP
3. Rodica Serbanescu, NLP

Bihor

1. Ioan Liviu Negrut, SDP
2. Vasile Suta, AUR [Alliance for the Unity of Romanians]
3. Iosif Tocoian, NSF
4. Ioan Seracin, Romanian Democratic Agrarian Party [DAP]
5. Mihai Carp, NLP
6. Gabriel Tepelea, NPCDP

Bistrita Nasaud

1. Ioan Oltean, NSF
2. Ioan Szilagyi, UDMR

Botosani

1. Gheorghe Marcu, NSF

Brasov

1. Octavian Enache, NSF
2. Florin Crisbasan, REM
3. Alin Mihai Dumitru Druga, AUR
4. Eugeniu Ghita, REP
5. Adrian Nicoara, NPCDP
6. Vasile Lascu, SDP

Braila

1. Nicolae Batean, NSF

Buzau

1. Petre Posea, NSF

Caras-Severin

1. Ioan Draghicescu, NSF
2. Antonica Dijmarescu, REM
3. Marin Balaban, NLP
4. Nichita Dumitrescu, NPCDP

Cluj

1. Ioan Gavra, AUR
2. Octavian Dan Capatina, AUR
3. Teodor Mircea Vaida, NLP
4. Ion Ratiu, NPCDP
5. Peter Eckstein Kovacs, UDMR

Constanta

1. Victor D. Surdu, DAP
2. Nicolae St. Iuruc, DAP
3. Radu Voicu Rosculet, NLP

Covasna

1. Ion Ursache, NSF

Dimbovita

1. Gheorghe Albu, NSF
2. Constantin Gib, DAP
3. Constantin Andreescu, NLP

Dolj

1. Radu Ispas, NLP
2. Gheorghe Scrieciu, DAP
3. Simion Silviu Somicu, SDP

Galati

1. Dumitru Beznea, NSF
2. Ioan Florin Tupilatu, REM
3. Radu Grigore, NLP

Gorj

1. Alexandru Nicolae Mischie, NSF

Harghita

1. Ioan Oancea, NSF

Hunedoara

1. Viorica Edelhauser, NSF
2. Aron Todoroni, NLP
3. Victor Vaida, REM
4. Alexandru Ioan, NPCDP
5. Albert Csaba Takacs, UDMR

Iasi

1. Doina Noghin, REM
2. Costache Bejan, DAP
3. Cristian Zainescu, NLP
4. Vasile Hobjila, SDP

Maramures

1. Gheorghe Farcasiu, NSF
2. Filip Moisei, REM
3. Marin Bivolaru, NLP
4. Attila Zonda, UDMR

Mehedinti

1. Marin Durac, NSF
2. Dumitru Maresi, NSF
3. Rene Radu Policrat, NLP

Mures

1. Paul Ciobanu, AUR
2. Mihail Constantin Gingulescu, NSF

Neamt

1. Liviu Bujor, NLP
2. Mihai Hanganu, SDP

Olt

1. Gheorghe Craciun, NSF

Prahova

1. Ioan Mihut, NSF
2. Florin Stelian Popescu, REM
3. Valeriu Pescaru, DAP
4. Georgeta Pale, REM
5. Vasile Gionea, NPCDP

Satu Mare

1. Ioan Sabau, NSF
2. Imre Andras, UDMR

Salaj

1. Toader Mihaila, NSF

Sibiu

1. Ingmar Brandsch, Democratic Forum of Romanian Germans [DFRM]
2. Ioan Les, NSF
3. Petru Weber, REM
4. Gligor Ciortea, DAP
5. Gabriel Munteanu, REP
6. Ioan Ban, NLP
7. Gregoriu Petru Maior, NPCDP
8. Nicolae Simescu, National Reconstruction Party [NRP]

Suceava

1. Ioan Ietcu, REM
2. Iulia Miza Leo, NLP

Teleorman

1. Constantin Berechet, NSF
2. Ion Zgorcea, NSF
3. Tudor Horia Nicolescu, NSF

Timis

1. Nicolae Negoescu, NSF
2. Petrisor Morar, Democratic Center Group [DCG]
3. Victor Cevdarie, REM
4. Vasile Barbat, Democratic Labor Party [DLP]
5. Marius Mihail Tudor, REP
6. Valentin-Corneliu Gabrielescu, NPCDP
7. Francisc Baranyi, UDMR

Vaslui

1. Simion Nastase, NSF

Vilcea

1. Mihai Tudor, NSF
2. Gheorghe Voinea, NLP

Vrancea

1. Verginica Novac, NSF

Bucharest

1. Ovidiu Tiberiu Musetescu, NSF
2. Serghei Mesaros, DCG
3. Mihail Balanescu, REM
4. Dumitru Teaci, DAP
5. Ernest Otto Weber, REP
6. Stefan Cazimir, Free Party for Change
7. Nae Petru Bedros, NLP
8. Nicolae Vasile Ionescu-Galbeni, NPCDP
9. Sergiu Cunescu, SDP
10. Ioan Todiras, Free Democratic Youth Party
11. Gheorghe Raducanu, Democratic Union of Romanian Gypsies
12. Ion I. Bratianu, Bratianu Liberal Union

* National Peasant Party To Continue Work

90BA0151C Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 31 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Goerge Prut article: "We Will Go On!"]

[Text] The National-Christian and Democratic-Peasant Party [NPCDP] was reborn in the life of the Romanian society not because of the wishes of a group of people, but because the society needed a political expression not only for a tradition based on modern traditions and "critical" traditionalism, but also a national movement capable of leading the country to democracy. The strongest democratic party in 1946, which was dismantled for the 40 years of communist dictatorship and which asserted itself in Romania's political life ever since 22 December 1989, the NPCDP, has once again proven its vitality and its popularity among broad social categories. During the communist dictatorship, the NPP continued its activities, although on a far reduced scale, of course, and in manifest conditions of physical extermination. Thus, the NPCDP was recognized by the Democratic-Christian International for its activities already in 1987. Consequently, from this viewpoint, too, the NPCDP's role and participation in the popular movement of December 1989 were of the most importance. The fact that it became a public presence as a political organization from the very first hours of the anticommunist revolution obviously indicated the previous existence of a careful organization and a clear ideological program.

Once it resumed its place in the country's political life as one of the most important political groups of the new democracy, the NPCDP became a factor of political effervescence and a genuine catalyst for Romania's political reawakening. The fact that to date the results of the Romanian people's resumption of a democratic political life are still insignificant is due to the same totalitarian, intolerant, and violent force currently appearing under the initials NSF [National Salvation Front], which is wielding every possible means—and it has all the means that the Communist Party had until a few months ago—to manipulate public opinion and to vitiate the democratic process that the Romanians shed their blood to win. The same force that mowed down the democracy in 1946 now came up and claimed legitimacy in the name of the Romanian people through elections that will go down in history as a real scandal.

The realities prevailing in our society and in history, the national and European climate, and individual experiences are now completely different than in 1946. It is true that now we have the television that has to a large degree annihilated the democratic process, and it is true that now the communists, especially the nomenklatura that has become a social category, have extraordinary power and impressive economic resources, nevertheless, we are firmly convinced that democracy will win, without the Nicaraguan syndrome and without the Polish Trade Unions, only through political means, in dignity and freedom, step by step at present and decisively in the future stages.

Democracy will make progress in Romania. This is a real and profound process whose logic and basis are primarily in the activities of the traditionally democratic parties, of the other new political forces, other particularly active civic organizations, and the free trade unions. The role of the NPCDP—the first party to emerge in the Romanian political spectrum—is decisive along this line. Its ideological principles, economic programs, and its corpus of governing principles make it into a first class mass political group in the new Romanian democracy. In the difficult conditions prevailing after the first elections that enjoyed formal freedom, the NPCDP will continue its national, patriotic, and responsible policy of rescuing the country from communist totalitarianism, eliminating the old political and economic structures, and integrating them in productive and professional activities and in the national reconciliation and democratic dialogue. All of the NPCDP's activities are devoted not to winning the political power at any cost, but to consistently promoting the ideals of a genuine democracy. The NPCDP views democracy in its primary and fundamental sense—as a public fact providing material and spiritual benefits not only for certain social groups, but for the entire society.

That is precisely why the NPCDP political, economic, and social programs will clearly assert this party's options for freedom, initiative, and active and socially constructive freedom of the individual, for a market economy and a free market, and for privatization and social initiative. One of the salient aspects of the NPCDP's activities is its concern for the traditions of the 1930's and for drafting and promoting social protection laws. One example along this line is the fact that already in March of this year the party worked out a draft decree-law on granting pensions and social allocations to all the peasants, and proposed to allocate damages to peasants who were deprived of important assets under the communist dictatorship. These are only a few aspects of the activities of this party, which quickly became noteworthy, although they were carried out in practically impossible conditions.

The NPCDP will continue its just struggle for democracy in Romania. The resolution it has shown, its critical and constructive spirit, its refusal to accept compromise for the sake of political power, and its spirit of self-sacrifice make this traditional democratic party the biggest hope for Romanian democracy.

The NPCDP has demonstrated through all its attitudes that democracy is not begged, but won through dignified and continual political struggle based on generous ideas and broad and genuine humanism, a struggle not affected by any circumstance, even by the risk of personal failure or by compromises that sacrifice people's hopes and interests.

The name, reputation, and popularity of the NPCDP will grow in the Romanian public consciousness regardless of the attacks of the neocommunist forces, which spare no effort in their attempt to preserve and perpetuate the disaster that has been plaguing the Romanian people for almost half a century. The first in battle and the first in sacrifice, the NPCDP will continue to struggle for democracy and freedom.

* Uniates Seek Restoration of Rights, Property

90BA0151A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 30 May 90 p 1

[Cluj Diocese General Vicar Tertulian Langa article: "Our Position"]

[Text] In keeping with our wish to contribute to resolving issues linked to restoring the rights of the Romanian Uniate Church (Greek-Catholic), on 27 May 1990 we published on page 3 the text of a communique by the Orthodox Church and the Romanian Uniate Church (Greek-Catholic). In DREPTATEA of Friday, 27 April 1990, page 1, we also published the Amendment to the Decree-Law on Measures concerning the Romanian Uniate Church (Greek-Catholic) proposed by the representatives of the National Peasants (Christian and Democratic) Party in the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council] on 24 April 1990. DREPTATEA of Sunday, 13 May 1990 carried on page 3 an open letter by Alexandru Todea, the Bishop of the Romanian Uniate Church, to PNUC Chairman Mr. Ion Iliescu.

We now bring you the Position of the Romanian Uniate Church, presented by Reverend Tertulian Langa, vicar general of the Cluj-Gherla Diocese.

In connection with the communique issued after the meeting between Mr. Ion Iliescu and representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Uniate Church (Greek-Catholic) and with the Decree-Law of 24 April 1990 on the actual situation of the Romanian Uniate Church, the assembly of Romanian Uniate priests, which met in Cluj-Napoca under the chairmanship of Bishop Alexandru Todea, discussed the contents of the above communique and decree-law and drafted the following articles on the positions of the Romanian Uniate Church:

1. In view of the human rights sanctioned in international conventions which Romania joined and which it pledged to observe, a pledge that obligates the Romanian state to ensure freedom of faith and practice to all the denominations, including the Greek-Catholic denomination; in keeping with the historic recognition of the decisive and unequaled contribution that the Romanian Uniate Church made to shaping the national consciousness and the united national Romanian state; and also remembering the fact that the Romanian Uniate Church was hurt and damaged more than any other Romanian institution, the Romanian Uniate Church believes that, under a truly democratic regime, the freedom, dignity, autonomy, and legitimacy of the church's existence, organization, and operation, with all the rights and assets it had before the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorial regime, are above any discussion, inviolable, and nonnegotiable.

2. The Romanian Uniate Church expresses the hope that the new democracy in our country wants and sincerely intends to radically eliminate, together with the dictatorship, any form of perpetuation of the abuses of the dictatorship, and thus to completely make up for the moral and material damages suffered by the Greek-Catholic denomination.

3. The Romanian Uniate Church appreciates the willingness of the PNUC to recognize and authorize the free and unimpeded operation of the Greek-Catholic denomination. It also appreciates the partial restitution of the assets that had been confiscated from it—namely, the assets that the dictatorial state illegally seized.

4. The Romanian Uniate Church asserts that the "freedom" restored to it under Decree No. 9 of 31 December 1989 and confirmed under the Decree of 24 April 1990 remains inoperative as long as the Greek-Catholic denomination continues to be deprived of the physical facilities required to practice the so-called freedom granted to it, and as long as the Romanian Orthodox Church refuses to return its churches and vicarages and continues to enjoy the privileges won under the Stalinist regime. Without churches our services will continue to be held in public squares in all weather and street noise, much to the discredit of the law and the state power, and no less to the discredit of our democracy.

5. Consequently, the Romanian Uniate Church believes that the fundamental principle that served as a basis to Decree No. 9/31/12/1989—the abolition of the Stalinist legislation and its effects, and reparation of the moral and material losses caused by it—must be implemented in its entirety. In other words, the Romanian Uniate Church demands firm, unequivocal, and complete measures designed to fully restore the Greek-Catholic denomination to the situation it held before the forced imposition of the Stalinist Decree No. 358/1948. In the absence of such a legal measure, the Romanian Uniate Church will view any assets that have not been returned as newly and illegally confiscated, and will deem that the persecutions initiated by the dictatorship have not ceased under the new democratic regime and that its faithful will further be forced to belong to the Romanian Orthodox Church against their religious identity, a situation which is tantamount to spiritual genocide.

6. The Romanian Uniate Church cannot understand why the PNUC sees it fit to return only the assets confiscated and in the possession of the state, but not those confiscated under the same arbitrary decree and now in the possession of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

At the discussions on the adoption of the Decree of 24 April 1990 it was said that Decree No. 358/1948, which deprived the Greek-Catholic denomination of its freedom and seized its assets did not specify the confiscation of churches and vicarages. How can anyone imagine that those assets could have come into the possession of the Romanian Orthodox Church without having been confiscated by the state and then tranferred to that church? However, since the state made the transfer it can also repeal it and restore the property to its legitimate owner, the Romanian Uniate Church.

By denying its ability to take the assets in question from the Romanian Orthodox Church and by shifting to the latter the latitude whether to return the confiscated property or not, the PNUC is laying the ground for a perpetual conflict, against the interests of the state.

7. Similarly, the Romanian Uniate Church does not understand or accept the PNUC's lack of interest in the impairment and alienation of the religious identity of the Romanian uniates' faith, which suggests that it wants to perpetuate the conflict and the moral damage caused by the Stalinist decree.

8. The Romanian Uniate Church is perplexed and concerned about the fact that the PNUC condones the interference of the current leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which is opposed to eliminating the effects of the arbitrary Stalinist laws, by pressing the state authorities to opt for a negotiated compromise, rather than for a just solution and the only acceptable one.

9. The Romanian Uniate Church solemnly declares that its sacred and inalienable rights, for which it suffered martyrdom, may be criminally violated, but they will never be negotiable.

10. It is clear to the Romanian Uniate Church that negotiations can be aimed only at dragging out the problems rather than really solving them, thus maintaining and legalizing—to a greater or lesser extent—the abusive realities inherited from Stalinism.

11. The existence and rights of the Romanian Uniate Church have been inextricably and undisputably woven in the very structure and legitimacy of the national Romanian state for close to 300 years. Relegating those prerogatives to the dark corner of negotiations is an insult to the process of spiritual, national, and statal

rebirth of the Romanian people. The ultimate historical reality cannot be questioned by a provisional government. This right was arrogated in 1948 only by the communist government, which became hostile to all the interests and values of our nation. We cannot accept the idea that our new democracy may have the tacit intention of doing likewise.

12. Having recognized all the merits of the Romanian Uniate Church (Greek-Catholic), the 1923 Constitution recognized it as a national Church, together with the Orthodox Church. Does it mean that our new democracy contests these merits, that it repudiates our last valid constitution, and that it may support, even partially, Stalinist laws?

14. [as published; no number 13] The Romanian Uniate Church wonders whether the difficulties the PNUC is experiencing in implementing Decree No. 9/31/12/1989, which was designed to completely abolish the Stalinist decree, reflect a crisis of authority or a flawed perception of democracy, which may be an atavism from the old regime? By what juridical logic can one keep in force the effects of a law that was abrogated? Does the Romanian Orthodox Church wield such power that it can influence the PNUC to cancel the full implementation of its own decrees and to violate the very raison d'etre of our new democracy, which is to abolish the dictatorial arbitrariness and establish a real democracy observing human rights and freedoms?

15. Just as in 1948 The Romanian Orthodox Church was moved by obedience to the illegitimate Stalinist dictatorship to accept the confiscated assets of the Romanian Uniate Church, the same obedience to the legitimate state authority should determine it now to return the property it is illegally holding, taking an example from the current actions of the Romanian state. Unless, by declining to follow that example, the Romanian Orthodox Church wants to suggest that it judges a Stalinist state worthier of obedience than a democratic one?

16. The Romanian Uniate Church strongly protests the distorted reports of the talks held with the Romanian Orthodox Church at Mr. Ion Iliescu's initiative. At that meeting, the Romanian Uniate Church delegation clearly and resolutely rejected any form of referendum. The new Decree-Law, however, ignoring that position and overstepping the text of the communique signed by the two sides, introduced in the text—in a disguised manner—the idea of a referendum by stating "according to the wishes of the people," which did not appear in the original text of the communique. The Romanian Uniate Church views this distortion as a flagrant abuse, and the PNUC's mediation as totally disloyal. The Romanian Uniate Church will not recognize the effect of this abuse as legal. Those who did not attend the talks between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Uniate Church may be manipulated and made to believe that misleading interpolation, but not so the Romanian Uniate Church and the PNUC deputy chairmen who were present at our discussion but absent (!) from the debates on the new decree.

17. The Romanian Uniate Church is convinced that its situation can be normalized de jure and de facto within the current state order, on the basis of the rights and prerogatives it held before the Stalinist dictatorships, only if truth and justice are respected. And the truth is that the Romanian Uniate Church was seriously damaged, morally and materially, by the arbitrary decisions of the dictatorship. Equally true is the fact that most of its material and spiritual assets—the churches and people's souls—were transferred to the Romanian Orthodox Church. Justice requires that they be fully returned, without a referendum, just like they were confiscated in 1948 fully and without a referendum. Only when justice has been done will the PNUC have demonstrated its repudiation of the arbitrary dictatorship and its sincere wish not to allow the perpetuation of Stalinism.

18. The Romanian Uniate Church does not demand that the restitution take place in one quick move. Naturally, the restitution will be a progressive process. The first stage was completed when the state restored the assets in its possession. The restitution of the bishopric cathedrals and the main churches in its seats will of course follow. The archpriestly churches will follow at a later stage, and the entire process will be completed by the spontaneous integration of the other churches.

19. The Romanian Uniate Church will show a broad spirit of understanding in parishes with a single church (the one returned to the Greek-Catholic denomination) toward the faithful who will want to preserve their present Orthodox identity. The Romanian Uniate Church does not want to impose the kind of hardships to which it was subjected, and will allow Orthodox services in the Greek-Catholic church, at different hours. Orthodox priests and congregants will enjoy this hospitality until the first act of hostility against the hosts, or until a new church is built.

20. The Romanian Uniate Church states that the differences of doctrine between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches never were and of course, will not constitute grounds for social tension in the Romanian state. Whenever there were controversies they were limited to theological discussions and the masses were not involved. Such involvement can take place only at the incitement of the theologians, as has been the case especially in the past few months. As far as it is concerned, the Romanian Uniate Church has never done so nor will it ever. In a spirit of mutual respect, truth, and justice, the Romanian Uniate Church wants to have relations of cooperation and charity with the Romanian Orthodox Church, in the interests of the Romanian people, whom they both love and serve.

21. The present conflict between the Romanian Uniate Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church belongs to the area of civil law and is due to only one reason: the

abusive confiscation of the assets of the Romanian Uniate Church and the refusal of the Orthodox Church to return them. Such a situation could not have been possible without the presence of Soviet troops. Their presence imposed the ban on the Romanian Uniate Church and allowed the Orthodox Church to take possession of its assets.

22. The Romanian Uniate Church wants to emphasize the fact that, although it has been subjected to a violent slander campaign, it did not respond in kind because it did not want to contribute to the deterioration of its relations with the sister Orthodox Church. However, violating the pledge it made at the meeting chaired by Mr. Ion Iliescu to cease the polemics, the Orthodox Church has continued them, painfully and regrettably with even greater vehemence.

At the same time, the Romanian Uniate Church wants to emphasize that the fact that it has abandoned the polemics does not in the least mean that it has given up asserting and demanding its legitimate rights, which it will continue to do resolutely and before anyone.

23. The Romanian Uniate Church is compelled to call attention to the fact that the dissatisfaction of the masses of Greek-Catholic faithful is increasing continuously and alarmingly, having seen that after 42 years of communist persecution the churches are still subjected to the same regime of Orthodox confiscation and occupation and that they are being served against their will by priests forcibly imposed by a hierarchy that they don't recognize as legitimate. The manner in which Decree 9/31/12/1989, in which they put great hope, was implemented profoundly disappointed them. This disappointment has created hotbeds of tension that are difficult to control and their flare-up is beyond our realm of responsibility. The Romanian Uniate Church wants to ask the PNUC not to add the dissatisfaction of the Greek-Catholic population to the tension already existing in the country and not to make that population view itself as further persecuted by the current regime, too, as a Romanian minority in Romania whose rights are being questioned.

24. The Romanian Uniate Church believes that the current deviation from the principles of a real democracy and the imposition of a decree reminiscent of Stalinism may contribute to increasing the coolness and suspicion with which Western countries regard the domestic situation in our country, having in the beginning shown a great deal of sympathy and good intentions.

25. The Romanian Uniate Church believes that the unclear, partial, and in a certain domain arbitrary measures taken by the PNUC to repair the material and moral damages suffered by the Greek-Catholic denomination cannot serve as the basis for discussions for resuming the diplomatic relations between Romania and the Vatican. Along this line, the Romanian Uniate Church wants to inform the PNUC that in the unconceivable case that a compromise is reached between Romania and the Vatican, it will not view itself as bound by it and will remain unshaken in its belief that its historical rights and its dignity are not negotiable, and will contest the results of any negotiations at any cost.

26. The Romanian Uniate Church, having seen the recent Decree, believes that the spirit in which the PNUC is planning to overcome the deadlock between the two Churches does not show a real desire to overcome it, but a desire to temporize and to hush up things.

27. In spite of the profound disappointment and acute dissatisfaction of the almost three million faithful of the Romanian Uniate Church, its spiritual leaders continue to hope that the PNUC's spirit of justice and its authority, together with the moral conscience of the Romanian Orthodox Church, will make them reconsider their obligation to return what is held arbitrarily and without legal title, not being able to ignore either human or divine justice.

Tertulian Langa, vicar general of the Cluj-Gherla Diocese

Calafat City Said Sliding Into Danube

AU1906183290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1706 GMT 19 Jun 90

["Is Calafat 'Gliding' Into the Danube?"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/6/1990—The town of Calafat, on the Romanian bank of the Danube, seems to be "gliding" into the Danube. The esplanade in front of the restaurant on the bank is sliding, the steps in the area have glided half a meter and some of the buildings (without foundations) have moved 17 centimeteres.

In connection with the landslides it is assessed that the town has no appropriate foundations lying on a sand dune, a hypothesis set on the fact that the drillings down to 45 meters bring up sand as well. According to some opinions the danger is posed by a gravel pit in the neighbourhood which, by extracting sand from the Danube ruins the town's subsoil. According to other opinions a whole ecological habitat in the region has been destroyed by a neighbouring drainage station, or the springs taken for local constructions erode the subsoil.

Deeply concerned, the mayorship of Calafat requested complex studies to identify the real causes, and measures to put a stop to the settlement's "gliding" into the Danube.

Islamic Mufti Mehmet Regains Status

AU1906194890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1820 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/6/1990—His Beatitude Iacub Mehmet regained his status as Mufti of the Muslim denomination of Romania on Tuesday [19 June].

According to a communique released by the Union of the Turkish Ethnic Minority of Romania, he was the victim of a plot mounted by a restricted group of immams after the revolution.

The Turkish community of Romania considers that the flagrant violation of its rights as a minority was the result of ill-meant intentions and not the fruit of the policy of the Romanian Government.

Doinea Cornea Addresses Copenhagen Meeting

AU1806163890 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 10 Jun 90 p 4

[Editorial article: "Mrs. Doina Cornea's Address at News Conference 'Romania 1990'"]

[Text] Within the framework of the parallel activities linked to the CSCE on the human dimension and human rights, a news conference entitled "Romania 1990" took place in Copenhagen. On this occasion, Mrs. Doina Cornea made the following address:

"Communism has pulverized the Romanian society for 40 years, destroying its institutions and system of values. The individual was reduced to his natural condition of awareness: simply existing."

The only way to struggle in all those years was to awaken the awareness. In his loneliness, the awakened individual turned into a small live institution.

Today in the wake of the young people's revolt in December, this solitary effort of intellectual renaissance has to be backed by the reestablishment of institutions designed to protect the individual against power; all the more so as the new power has its roots in the former communist regime. Despite a certain liberalization, it is painful to note that the former antidemocratic practices recur more and more frequently. Human rights and democratic rules are often violated. One can note cases of persecution and brutality on the part of the police, of organized campaigns of slanders against the opposition parties, of withholding the newspapers of inconvenient organizations by the post office under the jurisdiction of the government, and there have been cases of censored correspondence.

I would, therefore, like to ask Western governments and organizations to demand the fulfillment of certain tangible conditions before granting economic aid to the Romanian Government: the broad publication of the sum, purpose, and conditions for any loan from abroad; proof that the telephone network is linked to the international one; proof that the post office does not hinder the distribution of the press and of correspondence; proof that those in power are carrying out dialogues with the opposing sides in case of conflicts; proof that shadowing, persecuting, and molesting people, who are expressing their ideas in public or participate in peaceful protest actions, by the police or intelligence services are prohibited and will be punished; proof that the opposition parties will not be hampered in their activity; proof that the government has taken substantial steps in the area of privatization, that small-scale enterprises have taken shape and are operating normally, and that the peasants are being assisted in reestablishing small-scale agricultural farms; proof that agricultural banks have been set up to help the farmers; proof that the autonomy of basic institutions (justice, universities etc.) has been instituted; proof that the Greek-Catholic Church will receive its churches and will be enabled to function normally and that it has the right to confessional schools." [quotation marks as received]

* Tokes Scored for Anti-Romanian Statements

90BA0152A Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 2 Jun 90 p 5

[Dr. Serafim Duicu: "Open Letter to Reform Bishop Laszlo Tokes"]

[Text] I am addressing you in secular form because the matters I want to discuss here are completely outside the ecclesiastic framework, as are in fact your views, which I want to bring up.

From your interview with ROMANIA LIBERA in mid-May I learned that you knew of the fact that on several occasions people chanted publicly: "Down with Tokes," "Tokes to church, not to politics!" The demands of those who chanted those slogans should have made you and your ecclesiastic superiors think. The Church is the site of the Lord, of Truth, Beauty, and Love among people, while politics is the arena of Satan, of hostility, discord, and hatred. Taking the step from the Church to politics is tantamount to making a pact with Satan, serving the devil, and betraying the Church. Who was it, Mr. Bishop, who in the past saw Jesus and sided with Satan? Judah Iscarioth, wasn't it?

From the same interview I learned that you thought of yourself, with an embarrassing lack of modesty, as a "hero of the Romanian Revolution," and as its "emissary" abroad. Don't you think you may anger God with so much pride? In the December Revolution you played the role of the first spark and nothing more. But you exploited that part in the most detestable manner. I think you will agree with me that Timisoara has the incontestable merit of having started the Revolution, which Bucharest carried through by toppling the dictatorship. If Bucharest had not joined in, Ceausescu would undeniably have brought Timisoara to its knees, at the cost of a lot of blood, of course. But why should we talk about the matter itself when you weren't even in Timisoara during the actual events. Even the people of Timisoara—most of them Romanians—who in your difficult hour stood by you with Christian charity, forgot about you along the way and focused their attention against the Ceausescu dictatorship. The people of Bucharest, Sibiu, or Brasov hadn't even heard of you. So how come you are crowning yourself with the title of "hero of the Romanian Revolution," when any honest man can see that the true heroes of this Revolution are only its dead? When you boast of such a title not only do the dead curse you, but you appropriate a merit you don't possess. And stealing is punished by every church and every religious creed. "Thou shalt not steal!" says one of Moses' ten commandments, and you should know that better than I. Don't you blush when you hear young people shout that their Revolution was stolen away?

In the United States you had talks with the president and the vice president, at which you suggested that the most-favored-nation clause should not be granted to Romania until the Hungarian minority in our country receives the privileges we all know about. You lied to the U.S. press (THE GLOBE and THE MAIL) without blushing, saying that in Tirgu Mures "Hungarians were peacefully demonstrating (...) and were attacked by Romanian nationalist criminals," and that the Vatra Romaneasca Association of that city "was creating a paranoic reaction to the issue of Transylvania, manipulating the population by appealing to their anti-Hungarian and antidemocratic feelings," etc. If the Hungarians of Tirgu Mures were "peacefully demonstrating," how did they manage, Reverend Father, to kill 6 (six) Romanians and to seriously injure another 4 (four), to savagely kick a man, Mihai Cofaru, who had fallen to the ground, and to inflict various wounds on another 241 people, while among them only 21 were lightly injured? And if the Hungarians were "peacefully demonstrating," how did they manage to vandalize the Grand Hotel in Tirgu Mures, causing damage to the tune of about 2 million lei? Reverend Father, who were the "nationalist criminals?" The Romanians? You lied, Father, and you misled honest Americans, and you incited those Hungarians to anti-Romanian hatred by proclaiming, no more and no less than "forcible annexation of Transylvania to Hungary." So that was it! But, as you know full well, lies have short legs. Had you felt the least civic responsibility, you would not have uttered such shocking things. Moreover, were I in the place of the people of Vatra Romaneasca, I would sue you for shameless libel, because that association did not organize anything, aside from a public meeting in a sports hall and two-three folk music shows, until those events. But you had to take out your fury on someone; if not on all the Romanian people, because it would have been too obvious, then on a modest Romanian cultural association. That's not nice, Father. Your knife is showing under your priestly garb! I am sorry that the leaders of that association are not revealing the role played by the Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars in the Tirgu Mures events, because your "peaceful Hungarians" were too well armed with steel and other sophisticated weapons (axes, chains and balls, slings with lead balls, iron bars, sharp spears, Molotov cocktails, etc.) and had been well drilled for a direct and violent confrontation. You must agree that weapons like the ones listed above are not grabbed on the spur of the moment in the streets.

About the issue of the most-favored-nation clause that the United States may grant Romania only after the latter has granted the well-known privileges to the Hungarian minority in our country, why did you not ask Mr. Bush whether he had a Hungarian university for the American Hungarians? We would have liked to find out whether the most democratic country in the world has higher education in the languages of the national minorities or even in the language of the Hungarian minority, which is fairly large. I think you will agree that you used the clause to blackmail the Romanian state, to put the knife at its throat, thus betraying not only this state, but also the December Revolution. Who was it who held Jesus up at spear point, Bishop? The Pharisees, if I'm not mistaken. And who sold Jesus out for a handful of silver (even if this clause is worth several million dollars!), Bishop? Judah Iscariat, wasn't it? Since you belong to the Hungarian minority in our country, you would have done much better to show wisdom and generosity and to plead for Romania's cause like an honest citizen, in its efforts to establish a genuine democracy. I see that you justify your intervention by associating Mrs. Doina Cornea, a true blue Romanian, to your side. No! You shouldn't mix Mrs. Doina Cornea-Juhasz in this "business" because she belongs to a different "church" and has other objectives, of which we know nothing. The Lord works in many ways!

I saw in the press that you were recently promoted to the lofty position of bishop of the Piatra Craiului Diocese. I don't envy your faithful. Or I don't envy you in that posture. I believe that a priest must take care of people's souls and that his place is in the Lord's house, while the politician's place is in parliament and in the senate, which are Satan's houses. One can move from one to the other at the cost of betrayal, lies, and selling out, deeds worthy of Judah and the Pharisees. You, too, have been lying and betraying with a vengeance until now, both the country and the Church, and the Revolution. Even the sacred family, if we are to believe the question of a Cluj magazine (NO, No. 9, 1990, p 8) about a penal file concerning your "morality" at the time you were in Dej. Which should not have prompted your superiors to raise you to such a lofty seat. A bishop's seat should also be a seat of great moral dignity. Especially since you were appointed, almost simultaneously, honorary chairman of the Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars, which is a purely political organization. If you are not punished now for these many serious betrayals, what will you do on Judgement Day, Reverend Father?

* Iliescu Chided for Admiring Japan's Shogun

90BA0158E Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7 Jun 90 p 3

[Constanta Munteanu article: "The Japanese Model"]

[Text] At the end of the electoral campaign, why did Comrade Iliescu express a preference for the Japanese model of economic and social-political modernization? He was not referring to post-war Japan, but to Japan of the second half of the 19th century.

The "Meiji Restauration," as the historians refer to that so-called "Meiji Revolution" ("meiji" meaning "enlightened steering"), which began in 1868 was a palace coup organized by a group of new noblemen from the entourage of the emperor. It put an end to the shogunate, a regime of military dictatorship based on the military class (the samurai) and on secret policy. Japan of the shogunate was a centralized society, strictly hierarchical, with tight police control and a system of close monitoring of the great nobility (the daimyo), a society terrorized by fear and suspicion, in which national isolationism had become a state doctrine, with the exception of the increasing influence of the Chinese concept on the state. Foreign threat (particularly American), economic difficulties, and deepening political crisis prompted the new nobility to adopt a package of reforms that paved the way for capitalism. The leadership was provided by a closed group of young samurai and several Court dignitaries with progressive views. Gathered together around the emperor—an insignificant, sacred being—and relying on the Armed Forces and on the people's tradition of mystical obedience, they exploited the foreign threat to partially modernize the country on the Western model.

The "Meiji Revolution" offered peace to the city of Kyoto, which in previous years had gone through a period of terror: street battles, murders, robbery, and ninja attacks. The great nobility, which had supported the shogun's family, became docile; it was neither purged nor made the target of revenge, was awarded a regular, even though smaller income, and was ensured a stable life. Because of their education and political experience, the samurai preserved their entire power in the state. They became the main state functionaries and the Army, Navy, and police officers, the institutions which played the most important role after the government. Japan adopted the Western institutions it found useful, and implemented a rapid industrialization program.

The high rate of development was made possible by sacrificing the living standard of the people. For a long time the Japanese businessmen obeyed the orders of the government and the military. The guided Japanese economy recognized the government as the main factor responsible for economic development. Medieval tradition, the cult of the emperor, and autoritarianism were preserved. Economic progress was not accompanied by political progress; Japan took close to one century to achieve democracy, through Hiroshima, and it still suffers under the specter of feudalism.

If we make the due substitutions in our historical comparison, we notice that Mr. Iliescu was referring to the "Meiji model," which offers pleasant lessons to political scientists and technocrats of the ilk of Messrs. Brucan and Draganescu. The core of the comparison is a "revolution" from above, carried out by the more progressive elements of the nomenklatura, Army, and securitate, who maintained full control of the entire process of change, i.e., the levers of power.

As we can see, Mr. Iliescu wants to keep Romania under Asian horizons. Real socialism features strange similarities to what Marx called "the tribute-paying or Asian form of production." The spirit of perestroyka seems to inspire variations within the same sphere. Now we are not being lectured about the primary importance of the economy, but about... humanitarianism. The youth of Romania paid with blood for the "charity" of the communist team that seized the leadership and refuses to view the 1965-71 period as a point of reference; it is instead looking to the years between the two world wars and clamoring for a "return to Europe."

* Ambiguous Accounts of Revolution in Sibiu

90BA0158C Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7 Jun 90 p 3

[Cristina Mladin article: "Inaccuracies"]

[Text] At the Sibiu trial, both the defendant and the witnesses have something to hide. What, we don't know. The fact remains that, defying us all, they are making statements that do not jibe with the reality, muddying the waters as much as possible for one certain purpose: to create confusion.

Thus, Nicu Ceausescu stated in his deposition that he did not hear the machine-gun fire in the square, and from Dragomir's account it resulted that only one burst was fired on 21 December in the Liberty Square. Those statements do not match the reality. The truth is that at that date three bursts from tanks were fired in the square, the last coming from a large 14 mm machine gun (which could not possibly not have been heard), followed by two-three isolated shots.

The witnesses stated that, on their way to the Liberty Square, the columns of demonstrators caused damages. Aside from breaking the windows of the two central bookstores displaying the "works" of the two, there was no other incident. The demonstrators were empty handed, did not steal anything and did not destroy anything; and at that hour of the morning, 16-17 year old children certainly did not come to the square drunk.

To everyone's hilarity, Dragomir said that the demonstrators exerted pressures on the Army, and that was the reason that the troops opened fire. How could the demonstrators have done that? A few hundred empty-handed children gathered in the center of the square and shouted slogans.

This is what occurred: around 0830, the demonstrators began to be surrounded on every side by reprisal teams. The first to arrive were militiamen, who tried to scatter the demonstrators by mixing in among them. They grabbed two children, tossed them into a military vehicle, and began to hit them savagely with their clubs. The children reacted by overturning the car and setting it on fire. A fight started between militia men and demonstrators, after which the wounded (on both sides) were loaded into a small van and taken to the emergency hospital. That is when the army intervened; they fired the famous "warning shots" that ended in dead and wounded in three different points in the square: one person was killed in front of the Dunarea restaurant, one at the end of the N. Balcescu Street, and one woman was wounded in the CEC [bank] building.

Another very important moment that was not mentioned by either the defendant or the witness was the manner in which the group of about 50-60 children who remained at the end of the N. Balcescu Street was dispersed.

After the car incident, the militiamen left. By about 1030 there were still army and securitate men in the square. They congregated around a Defense Ministry troop carrier where they were given orders (by whom?). They started the armored car toward the approximately 50 children who were blocking the passage toward N. Balcescu Street; they broke up the cordon by throwing five tear gas grenades (!), stopped for a few moments in front of the CFR [Romanian Railroads] travel bureau, and the officer inside gave orders to the soldiers who were (peacefully) blocking the Xenopol Street, after which the armored car continued toward the boulevard followed by a fire truck, the two military vehicles, and two vans carrying men with shields. The demonstrators, drenched to the skin, left for the county seat.

That moment was important because from it we could learn who tossed the tear gas grenades from the armored car and at whose order. The witnesses stated that no one was ordered to make use of weapons, but that is what nevertheless happened.

The witnesses gave contradictory reports of the moment on the 22nd when fire was opened on the demonstrators who were leaving the militia building (when a student was shot and wounded in front of the main gate of the Militia Unit No. 01512), and none of the statements reflected the reality.

At that time, automatic weapon fire was opened toward the street by persons on the third floor of the militia building. A few minutes later, the army responded. Military vehicles opened machine-gun fire on the militia building.

The same day at about 1530 people began to shoot on the army from attics in the Liberty Square. All the witnesses claim that the men who were shooting from the attics did not belong either to the securitate, or to the militia, or to the Sibiu army, hinting that those were the 80 "experts" who had been sent in from Bucharest on a Rombac plane. Naturally, we ask ourselves: who was coordinating the actions of those task forces, since the snipers took up positions in every strategic point in Sibiu, and their modus operandi showed a very good knowledge of the local topography. If they were strangers in town, how did they manage to move with such ease through the attics of public or private buildings?

These are only a few of the most obvious discrepancies aimed at misleading the court. Who stands to gain if the truth remains unknown?

* Communique of Army Democratization Group

90BA0158B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 5 Jun 90 p 3

[Communique issued by the Committee of Action for the Democratization of the Army; place and date not given]

[Text] On 12 February 1990 the Committee of Action for the Democratization of the Army [CADA] issued a 13-point Appeal to the provisional bodies of political power and the Government of Romania, in the wake of which dialogues and working meetings took place between the latter and the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense [MND]. In view of the provisions of those points, the committee has been empowered to declare the following:

1. A governmental commission was set up in Timis County for the purpose of finding out the truth about the persons whose attitudes and actions contributed to the implementation of the measures aimed at suppressing the Revolution of December 1989. Although the committee members repeatedly suggested establishing similar commissions in Bucharest, Sibiu, and Brasov, the proposal was turned down.

2. Once again we want to highlight, as a specific measure, the honor and dignity of the Romanian Army, the only one, so far, which had the moral strength to begin a process of self-purge without any prompting from the outside; in this connection, National Defense Minister Brigadier General Victor Stanculescu issued orders to set up commissions throughout the military hierarchy to examine the activities of military cadres and make operative proposals. The process of consolidation and democratization of the military body will be continued by the establishment of democratic associations of military cadres in every unit, whose role is to protect the professional status of the cadres and to permit efficient cooperation in support of command functions.

3. To date, 41 generals reactivated by the former defense minister, Army General Nicolae Militaru, have been retired for failing to ensure stability and unity of action in the army and because of the fact that their mere presence and actions constituted significant factors of instability. In view of the valuable pool of active generals and officers on which the Romanian Army can draw and who can be promoted to leadership posts, the CADA members—supplemented by representatives of each corps—in complete agreement with the higher MND leadership requested and obtained endorsement at the

meeting with President Ion Iliescu for finalizing the dismissal and retirement of the last reactivated generals, plus:

—the gradual age retirement by November 1990 of generals and colonels 60 and 55 years of age respectively;

—the retirement of those whose attitude and measures violated the legal order and regulations, thus creating tension and instability among unit collectives.

Regional investigations and reports by unit commissions have shown Brig. Gen. Victor Stanculescu to be the person best morally and professionally suited to command the Romanian Army in view of his capabilities, military clear-sightedness, and democratic approach to issues concerning the army.

CADA has rephrased its statements under point 5 of the 12 February 1990 Appeal concerning the "Appointment of a civilian personality as minister of defense and representative in Parliament of the interests of the Army," and informed all the cadres and the public that at the time that requirement was imposed by the need to replace the former defense minister, Army Gen. Nicolae Militaru. The committee did not support any military personality and did not become involved in the decisions of the MND leadership.

4. In accordance with the conclusions and communiques issued by the government commission established in Timis County, the Army—from whose ranks Brigadier Colonel Mihai Chitac was promoted to the position of minister of the interior—joined in and supports the profoundly legitimate and moral request of the popular masses that the latter be removed and retired, viewing his continuation in that position as a serious insult to the memory of the heroes of the Revolution.

The body empowered to maintain public order is discredited by the very presence of its current minister, something that was highlighted by the inefficiency of all the measures taken so far to ensure order and protect the citizenry.

We request from the new interior minister resolute measures to establish legal order in the country through national concerted actions aimed at combating social parasitism, violence, and profiteering.

At the same time, we want to call public attention to the discrepance between the privileged situation and special attention that the Interior Ministry is once again enjoying in the areas of security, equipment, and pay, and the situation of the armed forces, whose problems and concerns are not receiving adequate consideration from the government.

As career soldiers we disapprove of the measures taken by Interior Minister Brig. Gen. Mihai Chitac, in the wake of which countless cadres at that ministry were promoted to high positions and spectacular promotions were carried out throughout the apparatus, probably in recognition of the special contribution that the people in question made to the victory of the Revolution of the Romanian people.

5. The Army—the armed arm of the people—has the lofty mission of defending the national territory. The only circumstance in which it can be used for internal purposes is to intervene and participate in dealing with the consequences of natural disasters.

The Romanian Army has no enemies inside the country! Consequently, military forces and means have been withdrawn from guarding certain objectives (the television and radio buildings, the Victoria Palace, etc.).

6. We want to reinforce our appeal to the entire Army to devotedly and professionally carry out the mission given to them by the people and to demonstrate through their attitude and results in the training process that the Romanian Army, strong and united, is always at its post.

We want to thank all the commanders and military cadres who are closely cooperating with the Committee, and to remind everyone that the new measures and actions taken can be found in the information bulletins Nos. 1 and 2/1990 circulated to all the military units in the country for the purpose of facilitating a better understanding and appreciation of the joint efforts being made.

7. We believe that the situation of all the veterans and war invalids who fought under the glorious colors of the Romanian flag, and of the December heroes must be reconsidered, in view of the fact that even now soldiers and civilians are already being trivialized and abandoned and having to resign themselves to suffering the consequences of the terrorist actions perpetrated during the Revolution.

On behalf of the Committee: Lieutenant Colonel Cornel Surcu, Lieutenant Colonel Ion Barbuta, Lieutenant Colonel Petru Litiu, Lieutenant Colonel Silviu Popescu, Engineer Ioan Ionel, Mr. Octavian Chiriac, Engineer Constantin Cirligeanu, Mr. Ion Didoiu, and Major Laurentiu Ungur.

Moldavia SSR President Snegur on Relations

AU1806185990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1453 GMT 18 Jun 90

["The Banks of the Prut—Mircea Snegur: 'The Dialogue Should Take Place by All Means'"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 18/6/1990—The dialogue between our republic and Romania is to take place by all means and, first of all, within the limits of what the minister of culture and religious affairs in Moldavia, Mr. Ion Ungureanu, called a "cultural confederation," stated the president of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Mr. Mircea Snegur, to a ROMPRES news agency editor during a talk held in Chisinau. I also see, the collocutor said, the possibility to deepen the economic relations by founding joint ventures and creating ties among people, by simplifying the formalities to cross the border so that we could go to our relatives because we are relatives in the morning and come back in the evening presenting only our identity cards.

I consider, therefore, that all the domains of mutual collaboration are promising.

Asked to refer to the dramatical events having taken place in Bucharest these days, Moldavia's president said: "We are watching with great concern what is happening in Bucharest. Our message is for a dialogue among all sides involved."

Iliescu Receives New Soviet Envoy's Credentials

AU1906093890 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 0800 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] This morning Romania's President-elect Ion Iliescu received Soviet Ambassador Feliks Petrovich Bogdanov, who presented his credentials. On this occasion, the Soviet ambassador conveyed warm greetings on behalf of President Mikhail Gorbachev. During their talks, both sides approached issues regarding the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and expressed their determination to work further to develop and increase these relations in the political and economic areas, as well as in other fields of activity.

Romania To Adhere to IAEA Conventions

AU2006125890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0852 GMT 20 June 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 20/6/990 —The instrument of Romania's adhesion to the convention of Nuclear Incident reporting and to the convention of assistance in case of nuclear accident or radiation emergency, an act whereby the procedure ends of acquiring the position of contracting state, has been officially deposited with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] director-general, on June 12.

Romania's adhesion to those conventions endorsed in 1986 called by the Iternational Atomic Energy Agency after the Chernobyl accident, was decided on May 11, 1990 by the Provisional National Unity Council.

Scientific Cooperation Talks Held With Albania

AU1406233290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1552 GMT 14 Jun 90

[Text] Tirana (ROMPRES) 14/6/1990—A delegation of Romania's National Commission for UNESCO, led by Professor Mihail Golu, chairman of the commission, had talks in Tirana with Professor Sofokli Lazri, chairman of Albania's National Commission for UNESCO. Bilateral collaboration actions were agreed, in keeping with the UNESCO projects and purposes, in science, culture and education. The two parties expressed the wish that Romanian and Albanian representatives participate in international activities organized in the other country, to have direct contacts, in order to help expanding the collaboration among the countries in the Balkans and in Europe.

League of Friendship With Arab World Meeting

AU2006134790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1247 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/6/1990—The first official meeting of the Romanian League of Friendship with the Arab World was hosted Tuesday [19 June] afternoon by Bucharest's Adiri head offices. The attendance included Bucharest ambassadors of Arab countries, members of the diplomatic corps, senior Foreign Affairs Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry Officials, men of letters and art, journalists. Brief speeches were made on the occasion by Craciun Ionescu, the league's president, and Tunisia's ambassador Alia Kastli, doyen of the Arab Diplomatic Corps.

Presidency Session Discusses Greek Relations

LD2006222890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar briefed the SFRY Presidency on current relations with Greece at its session today presided over by Vice President Dr. Stipe Suvar.

The SFRY Presidency supported the efforts taken by our bodies to find solutions as soon as possible while maintaining consistent respect for reciprocity and, at the same time, making efforts for establishing more liberal regulations in connection with transit, travel, and communications between the two countries.

The SFRY Presidency stressed Yugoslavia's readiness and desire to resolve, through negotiations, all these questions in a satisfactory way for both countries. [passage omitted]

The SFRY Presidency passed decisions on the appointment of the SFRY ambassadors to 16 countries and heads of missions to the United Nations.

The SFRY Presidency appointed members to its Commission for the Protection of Human rights, which will be headed by the SFRY Presidency member Dr. Janez Drnovsek. The duty of the Commission is to contribute within the competence of the highest state body to the development of institutional protection of human rights in our country, and to influence the recognition of human rights as a universal human achievement of modern society, regardless of the present stage borders and concrete political systems, through cooperation with domestic and foreign organizations and institutions from the sphere of human rights protection.

Increased Greek Border Activities Denied

LD2006131190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1241 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Defence Ministry spokesman Vuk Obradovic today denied rumours that the Yugoslav Army "has stepped up its activities" on the Yugoslav-Greek border.

Obradovic told a news conference in Belgrade that the rumours began circulating after tensions were caused in Yugoslav-Greek relations by the Greek Government decision that Yugoslavs entering Greece must have at least 1,000 U.S. dollars.

SSNO Discusses Army's Role in Changing Nation

LD2006171790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1317 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] [Dateline not received]—The Federal Secretariat of National Defense [SSNO] is carefully monitoring all the changes both in our country and in the international community. Recently a new moral education plan and program has been adopted. It will start to be applied, said Colonel Obradovic, with the newest influx of servicemen in June. This program is concentrated on developing the men's awareness of the defense of our common land, and nurturing Yugoslav patriotism and the freedom-loving and combat traditions of our nation and nationalities.

In connection with some controversial reports as to whom the SSNO is responsible to, Col. Obradovic said that as far as staff and other professional business in the field of the leadership and command of our Armed Forces is concerned the secretariat is accountable to the SFRY Presidency. For the business it carries out as an administrative organ the SSNO is accountable to the SFRY Assembly and the Federal Executive Council.

The SSNO spokesman also provided data on the number of military personnel sentenced because they supported the Informbureau resolution. In the period between 1948 to 1957, 2,301 military personnel were arrested and sentenced. During the same period, 325 Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] members were investigated and declared not guilty. Col. Obradovic said that the law regulates who and under what conditions one can present demand that these criminal proceedings be reviewed.

In letters the federal secretary for national defense is getting from throughout the country, according to the SSNO spokesman, our citizens are expressing their concern for the future of Yugoslavia, its security and its integrity. Recently letters have been arriving from Kosovo where the citizens are showing interest in the circumstances in which individual men lost their lives while doing their national service.

No YPA member has lost his life under circumstances which have not been fully clarified, Obradovic stressed and he repeated the information contained in the reply to a recent delegate question in the SFRY Assembly regarding the number of the Albanians who lost their lives in recent years.

Between 1982 and May of this year, 496 men lost their lives while serving in the national armed services. Of that number, 6.4 percent were Albanian nationals who, overall, acount for about 14 percent of the total membership in the SFRY Armed Forces.

The SSNO spokesman explained in detail the circumstances under which two men of Albanian nationality lost their lives—one in Split and one in Subotica—which made the feelings in the province run high. It has been established, said Obradovic, that Vahidin Hajrizi hanged himself while Jetulah Deskaj commited suicide by discharging a five bullets into his chest. It has been established that no military organization has undertaken a single action that could have caused the death of these soldiers, said Obradovic.

Regarding the statement made by Janez Jansa, Slovene republican national defense secretary, that the republic earmarks seven percent of its national income for the YPA, the SSNO spokesman said that this is incorrect. According to official information provided by the Federal Secretariat for Finance and the Federal Institute of Statistics, last year and the year before Slovenia set aside 4.8 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively, of its national income to finance the YPA. During these two years, added Obradovic, 4.94 percent of the SFRY national income was set aside to finance the YPA in the federal budget.

The fact that Colonel Aksentijevic, a delegate in the Slovene Assembly, was cut short when he tried to explain why territorial defense weapons were being stored on army premises, said Obradovic, was antidemocratic and an essentially nationalistic act which is at odds with conduct in a state governed by law. [He wanted to address the Slovene Assembly in Serbo-Croatian]

The YPA has no installations in Kocevski Rog in Slovenia, said Obradovic explaining that this area is under the jurisdiction of republican organs. Recently a great deal has been said about some underground installations in that part of Slovenia.

The reports that YPA units have intensified their activity along the Yugoslav-Greek border are inaccurate, was the specific answer by the SSNO spokesman when replying to a question from a Skopje Television journalist who enquired about the truth behind the stories stating that because of the current situation, the number of YPA members on the border with our southern neighbor [Greece] have been increased.

Obradovic commented briefly on the recent statement by the Croat Democratic Community that he will be resigning as the SSNO duty spokesman soon. YPA officers do not resign, said Obradovic, adding that officers of the rank of colonel are appointed and released from their duties exclusively by the federal secretary of national defense.

In the future no fixed date will be given for meetings between the SSNO spokesman and journalists. They will be convened, as required, once a month or, if deemed fit, twice or three times weekly, said Col. Vuk Obradovic.

Against 'One-Nationality' Units

LD2006140190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1253 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Defence Ministry believes that the setting up of one-nationality military units in multi-national Yugoslavia would be in opposition to the Federal Constitution, Yugoslav Defence Ministry Spokesman Vuk Draskovic told a press conference here today.

Up to 15 percent of recruits from a certain republic or province can serve their military term in their home republic or province without causing a major disturbance in the national structure of the Army, Obradovic said.

After the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia this spring, there are increasingly vocal demands that recruits serve their military terms in Army barracks in their home republic or province.

'Movement for the Confederation' Issues Appeal

LD2006153590 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] In its appeal to the Yugoslav public released today, the Movement for the Confederation [Pokret za Konfederaciju] draws attention to the historically accountable and politically favorable juncture for reorganizing political and intrastate relations. If no advantage is taken of the present situation, the movement says, the consequences for all Yugoslav people will be undesirable.

While monitoring discussions on and preparations for constitutional reform in Yugoslavia, we have become aware of attempts to manipulate and deceive. Unitarist and hegemonistic forces, which until recently a priori rejected any thoughts on changing Yugoslavia into a confederation, have now secured a confederal status for themselves but continue to impose on others the federal status or an imaginary confederation, in other words, a centralist-type federation. Such a state system in Yugoslavia would provide new scope for the same kind of hegemonism and centralism which would serve to further foment intranational intolerance and tensions. To this end they are trying to intimidate people by threatening civil war, rearranging internal and external borders, and voicing insane claims on the other territories, etc.

At the same time there is evidence of opportunism and a tendency to approve of such ideas. This in no way guarantees that either the Croatian people or any other people in Yugoslavia will be given free opportunities to change Yugoslavia's set up on confederal principles.

The movement therefore calls on all Yugoslavs to support its efforts to change the concept of the current Yugoslav federation into a confederal system of associated southern Slavic states as the most suitable constitutional and contractual solution for interstate and intranational relations. The movement has drawn up a draft of the contract between associated southern Slavic states and plans to soon present it to the Yugoslav public. It appeals to all Yugoslav people to work toward building and developing a confederal union of southern Slavic states with unity, peace, and goodwill.

Problems Remain With Albanian Minority in Kosovo

Serbian Policy 'Disaster' Viewed

AU2006130590 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 14 Jun 90 p 7

[Rexhep Zogaj commentary: "The Serbian Prime Minister's Threats"]

[Text] It was clear from the speech that Serbian Prime Minister Stanko Radmilovic made recently in Pristina that reason is not on his side. Instead of relying on the authority of reason, he relied on the authority of force, deceiving himself and others that force is the real means that will stand in the way (how can we tell how many times?) of the democratic wind in this region, and put an end to the Albanians' legitimate demands for full autonomy. Of course, it is Stanko Radmilovic's business to think this way, and the business of the freedom-loving and democratic people of Kosovo to say their piece.

Nevertheless, some of us might have expected that a statesman like Radmilovic might have correctly assessed the issue of Kosovo and its citizens, and have responded positively to the demands and will of all the people that are now being voiced in every corner of Kosovo. One might have hoped that after all, reason might prevail, even within the Serbian leadership, and that the wound of Kosovo, which has been bleeding for almost ten years, might be staunched by the Serbian Government's expressing readiness to hasten the drafting of a new Kosovo constitution by immediately annulling last year's amendments to the Serbian constitution, because this is the only way to create real conditions for improving the now embittered situation in the area. It might have been expected that Radmilovic would finally confirm publicly that the policy on Kosovo pursued for more than nine years now was mistaken, harmful, and has failed; that many innocent Albanian victims fell during the emergency measures, meaning the use of police force, whether Yugoslav or Serbian, and that the question of the Albanians and Kosovo has still remained open, and was not solved and cannot be solved by a policy such as is still being employed toward Kosovo. We would have expected, therefore, that the president of the Serbian Government would have confirmed that the current Serbian policy is bringing misery and disaster to the Albanians, needlessly estranging them from their age-old neighbors, the Kosovo Serbs, who also do not have an easy life under such conditions. We expected that Stanko Radmilovic would have said that the general situation in the province has been becoming more and more difficult, especially since the approval last year of the Serbian constitutional amendments against the will of the Albanian people; we expected him to confirm that until Kosovo enjoys the status in Yugoslavia which the Albanian people wish for it, there will not only be no freedom for this majority population, but no peace and tranquility for the Serbian people. Therefore, there may be victims in Kosovo in the future, but there will be no victors. However, Prime Minister Stanko Radmilovic did not think in this way when he came to Kosovo, which, it is true, did not surprise us very much. Instead of supporting the Albanians' demands, he issued threats and tried to scare us, frankly talking about the danger that faces us if we do not obey everything that comes from Serbia. He warned the Albanians that a great disaster will befall them if they demand that Kosovo should acquire full autonomy, the autonomy it deserves. He even produced a greater threat, stating that Serbia might one day leave us without bread (!), that Serbia will henceforth only invest in areas inhabited by Serbs (as if this has not been the case for some years already!) and that if the Albanians do not behave themselves, Serbia might use force. We, in the meantime, realize that Prime Minister Radmilovic is not proposing anything new. Last year,too, no further away than Gazi Mestan, none other than the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic openly declared [in his speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, 28 June 1989] that "not even armed struggles" can be ruled out in Yugoslavia. We have experienced a bitter and tragic reality in this matter of the use of violence and force in Kosovo against the Albanians. So many young Albanians have lost their lives, not just simply beaten with truncheons, but shot by police weapons.

Violence may be used again tomorrow, as S. Radmilovic suggests. However, one thing must be realized, and that is that victims have already fallen, but the Kosovo question has not been solved and the wound of Kosovo has not been closed, but is still bleeding; meanwhile the freedom-loving demands of the entire people, far from ending, are gathering strength, insisting that everybody in Kosovo should be able to live in peace, governing their affairs in a way suitable to everybody, without being dictated to from the outside and without the use of violence, and through the legitimate institutional bodies of the Kosovo people. The Kosovars have shown again and again that they are against the use of force of any kind and under any circumstances, and are thus against it when they declare what kind of status Kosovo must enjoy in Yugoslavia. We stress this because, if the Albanian people do not make their feelings known, there can not only be no freedom for this majority population, but no peace and tranquility for the Serbian people either.

How grotesque it sounds when it is said, as S. Radmilovic puts it, that Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbs, linking the entire past of Kosovo to the Serbs, as if the Albanians did not exist yesterday, as they do in an overwhelming majority today. Even today we see ideas being promoted that advocate a regression to the past and to the dreams of the medieval tsars, while the legitimate demands of Kosovo are portrayed as if whole phalanxes of enemies were stationed there. It is high time to condemn the tendency to see a "separatist" (!) in every Albanian.

We are deeply convinced that no form of violence, whether Serbian or Yugoslav, and therefore not the new Constitution now being proposed by Serbia, can demoralize the Albanian people, bring them to their knees, or exclude them from Yugoslavia, because Kosovo did not enter Yugoslavia through any republic, and thus not through the Republic of Serbia. Kosovo entered of its own accord. Any proposal which excludes a free declaration by the Albanians on constitutional provisions is doomed to fail.

The head of the Serbian Government should therefore realize that there can be no solution to Kosovo until representatives of the Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs sit down together and reach an understanding about how they should live in Yugoslavia. How would Stanko Radmilovic view the example of Corsica, which has only 250,000 inhabitants, but to which France permits the autonomy these 250,000 people desire? Why should Corsica not enjoy autonomy, if it still remains within the borders of France, just as Kosovo is within the borders of Yugoslavia, where Serbia also is?

Unfortunately, Stanko Radmilovic is not alone, or even a rare bird, in thinking that Serbia can only solve the problem of Kosovo by force. On the contrary, "if we may use these biological metaphors," he (S. Radmilovic) is a kind of bird we may encounter in many positions of leadership in Serbia. This is truly unfortunate!

However, the truth and historic justice are on the side of the demands of the Kosovo population, and so is the entire democratic and civilized world. It is only the authority of force that is on the side of the today's wielders of power.

However, everybody should now realize that there will either be freedom and equality for all the people of Kosovo, or there will be no peace for anyone, whether Albanian or Serbian. Let these Kosovo Serbs and Albanians now sit down in a civilized way in order to themselves solve the problems that preoccupy them, without being dictated to from outside, and without anybody imagining that the problems of Kosovo can only be solved by the use of force. This is the only way in which the Albanians and Serbs will return with confidence toward Yugoslavia, and democratic and united Europe.

Executive Council Statement

AU2006124690 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 14 Jun 90 p 1

["Statement" by Jusuf Zejnullahu, president of the Kosovo Assembly Executive Council, and the Albanian-Nationality Members of the Executive Council on 9 June; place not given]

[Text] The joint meeting of the Executive Council of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Serbia and the Executive Council of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo on 9 June 1990 examined current problems burdening the situation in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and an agreement regarding activity to overcome this situation.

The discussion at the meeting was forthright and orderly, presenting viewpoints on all current problems and matters of common interest. In studying these problems, certain disagreements were expressed on key issues, such as the future constitutional settlement of a Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, the process of the democratization of life in the province in harmony with democratic processes in the country and the republic, matters concerning the timing and extent of the removal of various matters from the competence of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, and other problems connected with school curricula and laws in education. Particular disagreement was expressed over the implementation of the Constitution and laws presently in force, both at provincial and republican level.

All the speeches expressed the readiness and commitment of the members of the Kosovo Assembly Executive Council to carry out policies of principle which aim to stabilize the situation in Kosovo, to create a climate of mutual interethnic trust, brotherhood and unity, and full national equality, to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia and the SR of Serbia, and to solve current problems in a principled and democratic way.

The demand for a declaration regarding Serbia's policies in Kosovo was outside the framework of the meeting's purpose.

We stressed that no policy that reduces the autonomy of the Socialist Province of Kosovo is acceptable.

Similarly, laws and programs which preempt provisions in the proposals for drafting the new Constitution of the SR of Serbia, and which violate the national equality, history, language, and cultural and spiritual values of the Albanian nationality and the entire status of the province cannot be supported.

There is no way of accepting the policy of solving the situation in Kosovo by using force and repression, restricting the authorities of the provincial organs, and in practice eliminating the internal affairs organs. This can in no way be considered the "constitutional coup" of which the Albanian-nationality members of the Executive Council are being accused.

We have expressed the view that it is not for us, but for the people and the Assembly of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo to decide these issues.

We further think, in accordance with the aims of the meeting, that the Executive Council of the SR of Serbia and the Executive Council of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo must define the basic issues and ensure a common commitment to solve them, with the aim of ensuring faster social and material development, interethnic tolerance and understanding, and the full equality of all peoples and nationalities living in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The only way out of the serious situation in the province lies in a democratic solution of problems, the defense of the real and objective interests of the members of all peoples and nationalities who live and work in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and in no way in plunging them into conflict and direct confrontation, because this would not benefit or be in the interest of any people or nationality, the statement concludes.

Assembly Session Adjourned

AU2006154690 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Milivoje Mihajlovic report]

[Excerpts] [Begin Mihajlovic recording] The debate on the agenda at the session of the Kosovo Assembly today lasted for four hours. The usual division among delegates on the national basis took place again. Ethnic Albanian delegates did not agree to hold the debate on the SFRY Presidency's initiative to change the Federal Constitution and the Serbian Presidency's proposal to adopt a new republican constitution. They suggested that political-security situation in Kosovo should be discussed instead. As could be expected, they demanded that the Kosovo Assembly should make the initiative on adopting a provincial law governing political parties, that it should nullify the decision of 23 March 1989 by which it gave its consent to the amendments to the Serbian Constitution, and that it should make an initiative on adopting a new, as it was put, independent constitution of the province. Several of them expressed their concern that the proposed constitutional changes will abolish autonomy for Kosovo, and (Malice Bajoku) from Podujevo even claimed that the rights of the Albanians are abolished in compliance with demands made at the meetings of Serb and Montengrin chauvinists.

Dzemail Bajra suggested that the initiative on a new Kosovo constitution should be made in 10 days, and also said that he is sorry that Serb and Montenegrin delegates walked out from Kosovo Assembly sessions in the past because of majority rule, as if Albanian delegates cannot walk out of Serbian and Yugoslav parliamentiary sessions. Sixty ethnic Albanian delegates presented an amendment in support of the demands of the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts while in their amendment Serbs and Montenegrins demanded that consent should be withdrawn to the parts of Federal Constitution concerning autonomy, because they make majority rule possible. [passage omitted]

Before the session began, security men at the Kosovo Assembly building had not allowed Zekerijah Cana and (Vehat Pusiti), emissaries of the Kosovo Albanian Alternative Movement, to enter the hall and attend the session. Cana said that he was acting as a representative of the Human Rights Committee and that he was given a permit by the secretary of the Kosovo Assembly. However, the secretary, Redzep Hadzimusa, claims that he knew nothing about that.

Although the official representatives of the alternative movements were left outside, their ideas and separatist plans were most certainly presented at the assembly rostrum. [end recording]

[Announcer] We have just received a report from our Pristina correspondent saying that Djordje Bozovic, president of the Kosovo Assembly, has adjourned the joint session of all three Assembly chambers with the explanation that one can no longer work in an atmosphere of divisions, quarrels, and the national majority rule. Ethnic Albanian delegates demanded a vote on the initiative to adopt a new provincial constitution, which is contrary to the Assembly's rules of procedure. Finding it impossible to ensure compliance with the rules of procedure and a normal work of the assembly, President Djordje Bozovic adjourned the session. All Serbs and Montenegrins have left while the Albanian delegates have remained in the hall.

Slovene Premier on Economic, Political Situation

AU2006152290 Vienna WOCHENPRESSE in German 15 Jun 90 pp 42-43

[Interview with Slovene Premier Lojze Peterle by H. Reichmann and K. Abentheuer; place and date not given: "EC Entry Is a Real Possibility"]

[Excerpts] [WOCHENPRESSE] Mr. Premier, 80 percent of Slovenia's enterprises are actually bankrupt. The directors must not fire anybody. How long is this to going to continue?

[Peterle] The situation is dramatic. At present, we are at the bottom of a development whose consequences can also be beneficial. We expect this unhealthy combination of politics and the economy—the obscured situation—to come to an end.

[WOCHENPRESSE] However, the enterprises do not benefit from this today.

[Peterle] There are firms that can also function well under these impossible conditions. We plan to classify the enterprises into three groups: such with a healthy substance that are worth reorganizing. That is, those that have to be helped to find their feet. Then there is an intermediate group for which several measures are actually required, for example, corrections in the production program. And finally there is a third group where the attempt to save them would actually be a waste of money. [passage omitted]

Several studies show that 20 percent or even one-third of the employees in the Slovene economy are overemployed. There are even firms that would have to continue their work with only one-third of their present staff.

[WOCHENPRESSE] In addition, as many as approximately 150,000 people from the other republics are working and living in Slovenia today. Will you send these people, whom some casually call "southerners," home?

[Peterle] For the time being, we are not considering sending them home at all. We actually would not have a legal means for doing so. Efforts to drive these people away from Slovenia or to scare them off cannot be perceived anywhere. I do not like the expression "southerner." I would not use such an expression.

[WOCHENPRESSE] The political reforms in Slovenia resulted in serious conflicts with Serbia. The first step was a Serbian export boycott. Could you envisage even more drastic retaliatory measures?

[Peterle] The center of all federal institutions is Belgrade. The Serbs are in the majority everywhere. They have the opportunity to give us Slovenes a bad time by means of these institutions. However, I hope that the democratic development in Serbia will also lead to the view that there is no point in an economic war with us.

[WOCHENPRESSE] Is there a basis for talks with the rulers there? Have you already talked to Slobodan Milosevic?

[Peterle] I will answer in a different way. I have a folder full of congratulatory messages on my appointment which weighs over one kilogram. Telegrams from President Ante Markovic, the presidents of the governments of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Macedonia. Among all these congratulations, these three are the only ones from within Yugoslavia. Of course, it is different with congratulations from the Croatian opposition. Neither the present nor the previous Croatian Government or the Serbian Government established contacts with me.

[WOCHENPRESSE] Do you believe that the appointment of your defense minister, former MLADINA journalist Janez Jansa, who was imprisoned until a few weeks ago, was a provocation for these people?

[Peterle] Undoubtedly for some people in Serbia.

[WOCHENPRESSE] Was his appointment your idea?

[Peterle] When forming the government, the ratio of the parties' participation in the Demos alliance on the one hand and technical qualifications on the other hand had to be taken into account.

[WOCHENPRESSE] His technical qualifications were in favor of Jansa?

[Peterle] He did, after all, complete military studies.

[WOCHENPRESSE] He also translated them very well into his journalistic work.

[Peterle] He will also translate this knowledge very well into his work in the government.

[WOCHENPRESSE] The topic of a confederation is frequently mentioned at present. For you, what are the tolerable limits of regional autonomy?

[Peterle] We proceed on the assumption that national armies are required. Of course, certain federal institutions, also military ones, can exist. Here all opportunities for joint agreements are conceivable. It would be pointless if Slovenia were to develop a completely independent military system, for example.

[WOCHENPRESSE] You rule out a formal secession to become, for example, an EC member as the Republic of Slovenia.

[Peterle] No, this will be a real possibility if no agreement is reached in Yugoslavia. We do not want to stay in Yugoslavia at any costs.

[WOCHENPRESSE] Does the government coalition agree on this?

[Peterle] We agree on this. If a consensus with the federation is reached, this will be all right. If this is not achieved, this will surely result in our secession.

[WOCHENPRESSE] To what degree is Slovenia able to exist alone?

[Peterle] I am convinced that we would hold out. The economic development is a question of quality, not of quantity. And if we were to secede, this would not mean giving up all economic relations with the other republics.

[WOCHENPRESSE] You gave a signal for clearing up the relations with Carinthia and Austria concerning the past....

[Peterle] Via church contacts, I formerly strove to clear up everything that concerns our joint history. On both sides there are hostile images that have to be eliminated as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

Discusses Republic's Future

AU2006203190 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 18 Jun 90 p 2

[Hans Haider report: "Democratic Serbia? Slovene Premier Fears Nationalism"]

[Text] Ljubljana—"Democratization in Serbia might lead to even more nationalism." The new Slovene Prime Minister Jojze Peterle expressed this concern in an interview with DIE PRESSE. In this connection, the Christian Democrat stressed his good relations with the new president of the republic, Milan Kucan—a reform-minded communist who after the elections clearly signalled that he wants to distance himself from the party .

Parliament will vote on the republic's new Constitution on 2 July. There is broad consensus on the document's basic principles, Peterle pointed out.

In the sphere of foreign policy, two scenarios are under discussion: A Yugoslav confederation of independent countries or an independent Slovenia.

Peterle, who is an expert on urban development and ecology, would like "specific and fruitful neighborly relations," with Vienna, Klagenfurt, and Graz. Despite enormous difficulties, the ruling democratic government has decided to close down the Krsko nuclear power plant by 1995.

During recent talks between Science Minister Busek and his counterpart from Ljubljana, a member of the "Greens;" Austrian scientific aid to prevent the dying of forests was requested and promised.

Slovene Assembly Approves Suspension of Payments

AU2006144290 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Jana Taskar report: "Slovenia Stops Payments to Federal Fund for Underdeveloped"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 14 Jun—In the Slovene parliament today, the deputies devoted themselves above all to one subject: how to prevent the collapse of the Slovene economy. The republican government had offered its proposals: a reduction in the contribution rates for social services and a temporary discontinuation of payments of the commitments to the Federal Fund for Accelerating the Development of Underdeveloped Regions in the country. The Chamber of Economy also presented its proposals, and so did some delegates and groups of delegates.

The discussion was most protracted in the Sociopolitical Chamber, where the entire morning was spent discussing the financing of underdeveloped regions of our country, because several deputies were of the opinion that it was not just an economic but also a political problem, or rather a question of future relations within Yugoslavia. Resolute demands to stop payments for this purpose were few, and more deputies asked—the government did not specifically answer the question—what the consequences for the Slovene economy would be, perhaps a closing of the markets, a blockade, or perhaps other retaliatory measures, although everybody admitted that this was one of the necessary steps if we want to prevent our economy from suffocating. On both sides, which is to say among the Demos [Democratic Oppostion of Slovenia] deputies (but not a majority of them) and the deputies of the parliamentary opposition, thoughts were expressed that direct cooperation between Slovenia and the Slovene economy and the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia and their economy should be preserved. The discussion was shorter in the Communal Chamber and the Associated Labor Chamber, but it was agreed in all three chambers that the payment of commitments to the Underdeveloped Fund for last year and this year should be stopped at once, except for the pooling of labor and resources for specific purposes according to already concluded self-managing agreements.

The discussion concerning reducing the burden falling on the economy at the expense of social services—the influx of money should be reduced to the level that existed in April and May this year—was similar to many others held in the Slovene parliament. In a way this is understandable, because the steps proposed were like the ones proposed by the former government and some others to overcome the economy's liquidity problems. In this discussion, the deputies did not divide according to the parties, but rather according to their places of work: those from the economy insisted that the proposed reduction is too low, and those from the social services maintained that we are thus sawing off the limb on which all the wealth of a developed and humane society rests.

The deputies also met unexpectedly at a joint session today. Yesterday, the Sociopolitical Chamber put on the agenda a discussion of the measure by which the weapons of the Territorial Defense staffs in the republic were, or should have been, taken to Yugoslav People's Army depots. This chamber was joined by the other two in listening to a report by the Presidency of the republic on the steps that it had taken and that it intended to take. The report was read by Dusan Plut, member of the Presidency. No discussion was envisaged at the joint session, but Janez Jansa, minister for people's defense, added a few points to the report. Milan Aksentijevic, delegate of the Yugoslav People's Army in the Associated Labor Chamber, did not agree with his statement and wanted to explain his own side of the story. However, he was deprived of the floor when he said he would speak in his mother tongue [Serbo-Croatian]. Because of this event—the rules of procedure allow the use of the mother tongue—we witnessed in the parliament some discussions that should not be heard on the floor of a democratic parliament.

Belgrade Protest Meeting Deemed 'Fiasco'

AU2006125690 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 90 p 10

["Z. Dj."-signed commentary: "Failed Scenario"]

[Text] Five newly established political parties in the Socialist Republic of Serbia; the newspaper, BORBA, which has for a long time been conducting a campaign against Serbia; and Studio B radio station, strongly desired and even dreamed that yesterday's meeting would force multiparty elections to be held before the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia is adopted. They first of all dreamed of more than 300,000 to cheer them at the meeting and then yesterday that desire was reduced to 100,000, but they were greeted by 7,000-8,000 supporters, curious people, and those who were just waiting for a bus.... For comparison's sake, and they should know this, this figure is considerably less than one percent of the mass of people who gathered at the solidarity meeting held last year in Belgrade or the meeting at Gazi-Mestan almost a year ago.

Perhaps the strategists of these parties will look for reasons for this obvious fiasco in the fact that the authorities so easily approved their meeting in the heart of Belgrade and perhaps even in the fact that they were not bothered by the few traffic police present, or perhaps because fights between the supporters of one party frightened "the people" just as, after all, they frightened the leaders of another party so that they had to seek protection from the militia, and perhaps.... and so on and so forth.

The main reason nevertheless lies in the fact that the intentions of these political parties consist of betrayal of the vital interests of Serbia because it is possible to understand the impatience of some party leaders to ascend to power as soon as possible. However, clearing the way to power should not be reduced to trampling on the vital national and state interests of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Any political act in a multiparty system, no matter from where it comes, must be appropriate to the national interest of the Serbian people and other peoples and nationalities and appropriate to a democratic and happy life for every citizen in Serbia. The political heads of these parties knew that early elections would threaten the integrity of Serbia and that they mean the possibility of losing Kosovo and the destruction of any hope for the Serbs and Montenegrins who live there. Such aspirations are to the direct advantage of the Kosovo Alternative movement which supports Kosovo's secession from Serbia. They do not seem to want to understand this. These interests are probably more important than individual political ambitions.

One should not need to recall that through its persistence and consistency, this Serbian leadership has in fact restored dignity and integrity to the Serbian people and Serbia as a state community, it fought for the provinces to return to where they belong, it began economic reform, and it proposed and is now creating a multiparty system. Why then do these parties want to belittle these achievements and to destroy what has been painstakingly achieved? Does the price of achieving power need to be the debasing of democracy, the loss of Serbia's integrity, the undermining of the dignity of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, and hooliganism on the streets?

And finally, the gentlemen should know that such elections would be unconstitutional! Neither the present republican constitution nor the federal version are oriented towards multiparty elections. It is therefore possible to hold multiparty elections only after a new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia has been adopted. This is crystal clear and the only legal and politically correct solution. Anything else would mean the violation of the rule of law, voluntarism, and the crude undermining of the country's stability. Legality and its preservation is a democratic achievement in all civilized countries. If the political leaders of the parties are already advocating democracy, a state governed by law, and Serbia, then the question logically arises, why are they beginning their political struggle with persistent advocacy of the violation of the present legal system and the undemocratic imposition of their will? Are their political orientations to a law-governed state and democracy then only a cover for unprincipled insinuations and the undermining of the unity of the peoples in Serbia?

Therefore, a very important question is: Do we now want to demolish or construct? There is no dilemma for us: We want to construct!

Macedonian Assembly Told Situation 'Aggravated'

LD1906215690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1515 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Skopje, 19 Jun (TANJUG)—Although draft amendments to the SFRY Constitution propose essential changes, they do not resolve all the questions of the socioeconomic system. Neither do they produce completely new conditions for a way out of the economic and social crisis. This stand by the Commission for Constitutonal Questions was adopted by delegates of the Macedonian Assembly at today's session of all three of its chambers.

The profound Yugoslav crisis, the delegates hold, can be resolved only by a new, modern, and democratic constitution that will radically change relations within the federation.

All three assembly chambers adopted a report from the Macedonian Executive Council on the realization of the economic reform program during the first half of 1990, which was presened by Dr. Metodija Nestorovski. [passage omitted]

The delegates were addressed by Lieutenant Colonel General Asprovski Stojan, commander of the Macedonian Territorial Defense Headquarters, who stressed, among other things, that anticommunism brutally threatens almost every values of our revolution, our constitutional system, and the country's independence. The profound crisis and considerable instability of the country increase foreign interference.

Talking about Territorial Defense work last year, Stojan Asprovski stressed that the military and political situation in Yugoslavia is becoming aggravated, contrary to the public impression which it is normalizing. [passage omitted]

Italian Minority in Istria Demands Equal Rights

LD1906201890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1616 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Buje, 19 Jun (TANJUG)—We are not asking for anything apart from the rights which members of the majority nations have in Slovenia and Istria. However, we are demanding the right which would enable the members of Italian nationality to express all their interests from cultural to economic, including the establishment of mixed enterprises. This was stressed by the president of the Italian Union for Istria and Rijeka [talijanska unija za istru i rejeku], Silvano Sau, at today's session of the Union Presidium. The people gathering focused on the future status of the Italian nationality in Croatia and Slovenia in the light of statements made by leading people from both republics. This topic, the Presidium of the Italian Union for Istria and Rijeka concluded today, will be discussed in the first half of the next month in Rovinj [Istria] and at a meeting of the newly-elected deputies of Italian nationality in municipal asemblies and in the Croat and Slovene Assemblies.

USSR's Petrovskiy Discusses European Reform

AU2106123290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16-17 Jun 90 p 6

[Interview with Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Dr. Ranko Petkovic for BORBA and REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; place and date not given: "The Right to Freedom of Choice"]

[Text] [Petkovic] How do you assess the current changes in East Europe? Are they a step toward a united Europe?

[Petrovskiy] In assessing the processes underway in East Europe, I think that they have natural and historic causes. A strong wave of democratization is flowing that was started by Soviet perestroyka, and the right of peoples to freely choose the social order and path to historic development is being exercised. Having renounced the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist states, the new leadership of the USSR has decisively and irrevocably broken with the heritage of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism in its foreign policy.

General Reformations

Thus, the reformation in this region has for the first time acquired an overall character. The reciprocal influence of reforms quickens their pace and makes them more effective.

However, the transitional stage will probably be complex. It has not been discounted that the radical reforms in the social order will be accompanied in some countries by the strengthening of populist, nationalist, and separatist movements, social disturbances, and possible economic halts in the process of reforms. However, all this is not able to annul the general developmental trend in Central and East Europe: The transition from authoritarian-bureaucratic systems to humane democratic societies and their increasingly active involvement in general European and world economic, political, and cultural links.

Europe is now entering a new period in its development and we, in welcoming the positive orientation of the changes which are taking place, cannot in the least forget that distinct requirements exist in Europe. They are connected with the results of World War II and the postwar political and territorial structure. We cannot be unaware that any quick process of change, and particularly such a violent process as the one in Central and East Europe brings with it elements of instability. Even now, many people are asking themselves the question—will the European international ship bare the burden of the problems that have pressured it? [sentence as received]

In our opinion, perestroyka in the general European orchestra should be strictly balanced, and the transition from old forms to new ones should be optimally coordinated. Only stability represents the basis on which a move toward a better future for Europe can be constructed. This is the most important condition for further European development through relaxing tensions and progress.

[Petkovic] The question logically arises—How is the correlation between stability and changes established? In other words, where is the border of stability which if crossed could lead to unforeseeable troubles?

[Petrovskiy] Our point of view is that the postwar realities are the general European heritage. No one has the right to try to unilaterally change these realities. We can only decide on them together and only by general consensus. No one is bringing into question the people's right to freedom of choice. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that the realization of this right should not harm the rights and interests of other people in Europe, increase tension, and lower the level of general European security.

Europe has acquired the not inconsiderable advantage of being able to jointly resolve the most complex problems. This is borne out by the development of the Helsinki process, which is a unified achievement of political thought and the practice of European countries, the United States, and Canada. Our choice goes further and is marked by the term "common European home," in which there is sufficient room for both the European process and the other structures which exist on the continent (the European Community, European Free Trade Agreement, the Council of Europe, and so on).

[Petkovic] In your opinion, what effect will the unification of the two German states have on the future of Europe and the world?

[Petrovskiy] The German question has taken over the central position in European and world politics and has entered the category of those questions which nowadays are usually called fateful for our continent and even for the whole world. In the postwar years, the whole structure of military and political confrontation began around Germany, this is everything that we associate with the "cold war" period. So nowadays we are not just merely resolving German problems.

We are proceeding from the idea that despite all its complexity and emotional hue, a civilized solution can be found to this question. The solution should be such that it does not ruin but strengthen the incipient positive processes and that it does not undermine but speeds up the construction of a new Europe.

The Soviet position is well known in this regard. The Germans, like every other nation, want to be united, and we act toward this desire with understanding.

However, the certainty must exist above all that a new war will never again begin on German territory. In this connection, total clarity in relation to European borders is necessary. The credited trust in the FRG would be greater if it were now to take a clear and unambiguous stand on this issue.

The problem of the military and political status of a united Germany, and the composition of its armed forces from the point of view of quality and quantity, is also of first-rate importance. We are firmly convinced that it should not enter NATO, as this would lead to an unacceptable destruction of the military-strategic balance between the two blocks—the foundation of modern stability and security on the continent.

Of particular importance is the question of guarantees that when the two German states are unified, neither the interests of our security nor the security of other peoples will be destroyed.

Peace Treaty

On the whole, we believe that the whole complex of problems connected with the external aspects of the unification of Germany should be resolved within the frameworks of international legal regulations. In our opinion, a German peace treaty, that would finally put an end to both the Second World War and the "cold war," would be suitably appropriate to these aims and would become a guarantee that only peace would in future come from German soil.

We do not have any reason to be suspicious of the peace-loving nature of the Germans in both German states and their devotion to general human and humanist ideals. In this connection, it is our wish to once again stress the thought that the idea of a document that would in any way discriminate against Germany and impeach the national dignity of Germans is alien to us. This should be a document of peace, in the literal sense of the word.

Nevertheless, the main thing nowadays is to do this in such a way that the process of the unification of the two German states is organically connected and synchronized with the CSCE process and its main line, directed at forming new general European structures of military and ecological security and economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation which could replace the present military political blocks in the future.

[Petkovic] What role do the four great states and the other European countries play in the process of German unification?

[Petrovskiy] The "two-plus-four" talks undoubtedly represent the most important forum for examining the German problem. However, it would obviously be a mistake to consider them as the only possible way to harmonize stands. Therefore, numerous bilateral contacts have already been started which also include in this process the governments of Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, and some other countries together with the great states. The participation of these states in synchronizing the settling of the German question with the creation of a European system of security seems to be very important. In this respect, we would like to once again recall that at the end of the Second World War more than 50 states entered the anti-Hitler coalition, states that managed to rise above their socioeconomic differences in the name of general human interests and values. Apart from that, considering the contribution of the struggle against fascism by many non-European countries, it would obviously be fitting for them to also participate in settling the German question. This could become an example of the closing of ranks by all democratic forces in Europe and the world to resolve common historical tasks.

[Petkovic] How do you see the system of European security in the case of the unification of Germany?

Balance of Forces

[Petrovskiy] The present European stability is based on a certain balance of forces. Some imbalances exist in some fields but, as a whole, the balance of forces is being maintained. The main question for us is—what will happen after the unification of Germany? The West is insisting that a united Germany enter the NATO system. They are also announcing that they are allowing Soviet troops to be retained on the territory of the present-day GDR. However, in our opinion, this could not compensate for a future united Germany's membership in NATO.

Life itself requires that unusual solutions and principally new approaches be sought. As one of these, there has been a proposal, for example, for Germany to be a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact simultaneously. Apart from that, why can Germany, for example, not remain an independent state, not entering into any military alliances? In this case, there would be a nonaligned state in the center of Europe that would enter the EEC. Such a status for Germany could be acceptable to everyone in the East and the West. The most important thing is that when it appears, a united Germany should see itself as a full and responsible member of the European Community and it should become an important factor of European stability.

The main difficulty is in the fact that the process of German unification is going at a considerably faster rate than the new general European structures are being formed. We are nowadays bothered by the lack of real progress in reducing conventional armed forces in Europe. Unfortunately, not one of the West European countries is now being guided by the doctrine of defense sufficiency. The talks in Vienna actually represent the most important part of the process of synchronizing the settlement of the German question and general European interests.

In our opinion, the question of the unification of Germany should be resolved in stages and it should be synchronized with the processes of creating an already constant system of general European security and cooperation based on truths that go beyond the blocks and are above the systems.

The way to such a system of security should be embarked upon by supplementing with new elements the institutions that are already functioning: the blocks and economic, political, and social organizations.

World Bank Grants $1 Billion Ecological Credit

*LD2006154890 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1450 GMT 20 Jun 90*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—The World Bank will grant Yugoslavia a one-billion-dollar credit for ecological purposes, one half of the sum needed to realize an environment protection project, provided that it also be of interest to the neighbouring countries and that Yugoslavia invest one billion dollars on its part.

This was said at a press conference in the Federal Secretariat for Development in Belgrade on Wednesday [20 June], at which the newsmen were informed about the results of a World Bank mission's several-day visit to Yugoslavia.

The credit would be granted on a 15-year period, with a possible five-year grace period, and with a 7.75 percent interest rate, it was said.

The priorities of the Yugoslav environment protection project include the protection of the Adriatic Sea and waterways, and the securing of water supply in the basins of the rivers Sava, Mura, Drava, Sana, Una and Bosna in northern and central Yugoslavia, as well as the protection of some industrial zones.

So far, Yugoslavia has also developed cooperation in this area with Japan, the United States and West Germany.